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PREFACE
In their classic study, Industrial .Democracy , published
in I897, Sidney and Beatrice Webb confidently declared that "In
the Anglo-Saxon world today, we find Unions are deraocracios:
that is to say, their internal constitutions are all based on
the principle of 'government of the people by the people and for
the people 1 ."
1
Two decades later, students of labor in the
United States were beginning to take exception to their obser-
vation. "While unionism in its ultimate effect on industrial
organization and conduct of industry is democratic . . . ,"
noted economist Robert Hoxie in 1919, "unionism in its own
2
organization and conduct is hardly to be called democratic."
Although a few other scholars including J.3.S. Hardman, Sylvia
Kopald, and Communist William Z. Foster also called attention
to the oligarchical nature of trade union government during the
1920' s, their arguments did not receive extensive
consideration
until after 1940. 3 Then the growing public awareness of
the
power of leaders like John L. Lewis and Sidney Hillman,
followed
by the debates over the Taft-Hartley Act, the
investigations
of the MoClellan Committee, the prosecution of
Teamsters Dave
Beck and Jimmy Hoffa, and most recently the power
struggle in
the United Mine Workers between W.A. "Tony"
Boyle and the
murdered Joseph Yablonsky focused the attention
of both the
iv
general public and the academic community on the modern labor
leader and the related problem of internal union democracy.
One consequence of this increased interest over the past
thirty years has been the publication of a number of important
studies on various aspects of union government. Written largely
by sociologists, economists, and political scientists, these
4
works provide valuable insights on the contemporary labor scene.
Yet with a few exceptions, they suffer from a general lack of
historicism. Concerned with the modern labor leader and the
organization he leads, many of these authors have dealt with
their subject in static terms, unconcerned with the process of
change and development. Lois MacDonald's Leadership Dynamics
and the Trade-Union Leader (1959), for example provided an
extensive review of the literature on labor leadership and
suggested areas for future research. She called for the psy-
chologist, sociologist, economist, political scientist
and
others in the social sciences to explore the dynamics
of labor
leadership, but never did she infer that the historian
could
make any contribution to the subject.
5 To be sure, several
scholars of the labor movement, including C. Wright
Mills, Eli
Ginzberg, Will Herberg, and Richard Lester have
sought to give
some historical dimensions to their studies.
Yet in their
oonoentration on the present, they did not
linger long in tho
past. Usually they have fallen baok on a
liberal, Lookoan
notion that in the beginning the labor
movement .a. an innocent
vi
democracy which "became corrupted in the years following the
New Deal.
This study explores in depth the historical development
of labor leadership from I87O to 1920. It also reveals an
important aspect of the increased "bureaucratization of American
life which occurred in the decades around the turn of the
century, a subject which has received its broadest treatment
in Robert Wiebe's The Search for Order: 1877-1920. Wiebe and
others have concentrated primarily on the impact which the rise
of large-scale, bureaucratically structured organizations had on
American society. "Curiously," as Louis Galambos has observed,
"the intricacies of organizational change receive very little
attention, even though bureaucracy provides the moving force in
Wiebe's view of history."
8 Given the special conditions which
unions faced, many of the conclusions of this study are appli-
cable only to the labor movement. Yet many of the
broader forces
behind leadership development such as the members' values,
prevailing social attitudes, and problems of basic
organizational
action were common to many of the emerging institutions
of modem
society. As the editor of the United Mine Workers'
Journal
trenchantly remarked in 1912: "The problem of
leadership, one
that is almost constantly before the public,
is, after all,
nothing more than the problem of mankind in
all walks of life,
in labor circles as well as othera."
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CHAPTER I
THE TRADITIONAL LABOR LEADER AND THE
HEW BUSINESS UNIONIST
"It does not do, therefore, to
take the historian too seriously;
at best he hut weaves the warp of
fancy into the woof of fact and
gives us the weh called history,",
Terence V, Powderly
I
Historians have long maintained that a fundamental turning
point occurred in American labor history during the closing decade
of the nineteenth century. On the one hand, the decline of the
Knights of Labor marked the end of an era during which the labor
movement had been strongly rural and middle class in orientation.
The Knights had failed in their attempt to unite all producers
into one big union, and to replace the wage system with an economy
of co-operative associations. The rise of the American Federation
of Labor, on the other hand, signified the beginning of a now era.
Predominantly an urban skilled-workers movement, the APL advocated
a new philosophy of "business unionism." Unlike the Knights, the
Federation accepted the existence of industrial capitalism, aban-
doned all efforts to transform the workers into owners, and sought
to advance the laborer's welfare through bread-and-butter issues
2
of hours and wages.
1
2As part of this transition in the nature of the American
labor movement, scholars have also perceived the emergence of a
new type of union official. Selig Perlman, Philip Taft, Gerald
Grob, Robert V.'iebe and a number of other historians have distin-
guished in their works between the old-school labor leader and
the new business unionist. To a large extent, moreover, these
scholars have seen the differences in outlook and attitude of the
two phases of the labor movement as manifestations of the differing
sociological backgrounds and behavioral patterns of the two types
of leaders. Such an approach is used by Gerald Grob to explain
the origins of the Knights of Labor's "Utopianism"
:
The Knights, on the whole, were led by men who had been
born and had grown to maturity during the eventful dec-
ades preceding the Civil Y/'ar. The humanitarian crusades
of the l3/r0 's and 1850' s had laid the foundation for an
irrevocable hostility toward industrial society and the
wage system. Belonging to an America where the devel-
praent /sic/ of an industrial economy had not yet over-
whelmed a predominantly rural nation, these leaders did
not think in terms of a permanent wage-earning class and
its needs. Regarding the workers as the only legitmate
members of the community, they sought to establish a
co-operative society based iipon a large number of small
producers, for only under such conditions could the
American democratic ideal be realized.
John R. Commons similarly used environmental! sra to reveal
how men like Adolph Strasser and P.J. McGuiro arrived at the
philosophy of "business unionism." Unlike the old-school labor
leaders, he maintained, these men did not regard "combination into
trade unions as a mere stepping stone to self-employment. . . .
At the same time their foreign birth and upbringing kept them from
contact with the life of the great American middle class, the
3farmers and the small employers, the class which kept alive the
philosophy of self-employment and voluntary co-operation."-*
Descriptions found in secondary works of the character-
istics of the old-school labor leaders and the new business
unionists are for the most part highly generalized, frequently
impressionistic, and often misleading. Even John R. Commons
slighted the historical record to substantiate his impressions.
P.J. McGuire, one of Commons' ideal-type new unionists, was, in
fact, not of foreign origin and upbringing but born and raised
in New York City's lower East Side. Yet scholars have freely
borrowed conclusions from one another with the result that their
portraits of the traditional and business unionists seldom differ.
In effect, two ideal-types have been created.
The characteristics of the old-school or traditional labor
leader aro the more delineated of the two types. Ho is seon as
the product of a native American, middle class, small town back-
ground. Quito probably his father was either a merchant, small
manufacturer, farmer, or, at the least, a skilled craftsman. Pie
recoived a respectable education, and perhaps even spent a year or
two at a private academy. The traditional labor leader generally
became associated With unionism through one of two paths. After
leaving school he might have established a small business which,
like so many such ventures during the Gilded Age, failed within a
few years. Forced into the ranks of the wage earners, he saw in
the labor movement a means of regaining his lost status and also
of combating the disruptive forces of industrialism. Another path
into the labor movement was frequently taken by reformers, journal-
ists, and politicians. Primarily desiring to advance their own
careors and causes, such men would attach themselves to a fairly
strong union in order to establish a base for their individual
missions. As a product of the middle class, the old-school labor
leader would inevitably misguide the union movement away from the
"basic issues 11 of hours and wages and into such bourgeois causes
as co-operatives, temperance, and particularly "anti-monopolyism."
He was active in politics, often a supporter of third party move-
ments, and frequently a candidate for political office himself
•
In his search for increasing status, he was a chronic joiner of
middle-class fraternal organizations. Finally, if fortunate, the
traditional labor loader eventual became a successful politician,
lawyer, merchant, or journalist and would then lesson or completely
break his ties with the labor movement.
In The Labor Movement in the United States, 1660-1895 »
Norman V/are presents a description of an individual who ho feels
was representative of the traditional labor leader:
Charles Litchnan, grand scribe of the Crispins, was made
grand secretary of the Knights of Labor at it3 first
convention in I878. Litchman was a typical labor loader
of the old school—trade unionist, reformer, politician,
and publicist in one. He was born in Marblohcad, Mass.,
April 8, 184^. His father was a shoo "manufacturer 1 and
ho went on the road as a salesman for the concern. He
studied law and wont into business but evidently failed,
for in I874 he was employed in a shoo factory. As a
Republican he was twice defeated for the general court
of Massachusetts. In I878 he ran as an independent and
supported Bon Butler for govornor. lie was elected by
the Greenback-Labor Party and served one year in the
5lower house. In 1880 he went to Washington as a delegate
to the conference which called the national convention
of the Greenback-Labor Party, and he attended the Chicago
convention as a delegate from Massachusetts. After
holding office in the Knights of Labor off and on for
fourteen years, he resigned in I892 to return to his
first love, the Republican Party.
Litchman was a Mason; past grand and past chief
patriach, etc., of the Grand Encampment of Massachusetts
I. 0.0. P.; grand senior sagamore of the Great Council of
the United States Improved Order of the Red Men; past
regent of the Royal Arcanum; member of the American „
Legion of Honor and the Order of the Golden Cross. ...
The stereotype of the business unionist is far less
developed than that of the traditional labor leader. Nor has any
one individual been awarded the honor of serving as the new labor
leaders' ideal representative. In the main, the business unionist
has been described as being essentially those things which the
traditional labor leader was not. Raised in an urban, working-
class environment, he was quite probably a first or second genera-
tion immigrant. He received, only a minimal education and went to
work at an early age. His motive for joining the union was
simply to advance his own welfare as a wage earner, and he had no
visions of using the union as a base from which to attain self-
employment or middle-class status. He rejected the notion that
the promotion of his welfare depended on close cooperation with
farmers, merchants, and small employers, and thus remained aloof
from middle-class reform movements, fraternal societies, or
polit-
ical crusades. He sought the advancement of his cause
solely
through effective economic action, and thus was never a
candidate
for political office. In sum, the business unionist
was a
6professional labor official primarily concerned with leading an
efficient trade union in the drive simply to gain better hours
Q
and wages for its members.
Although historians have widely accepted the above stereo-
types, their creators and perpetuators have failed to present
substantial documentation for their impressions. At best they
have provided biographical information on one or two leaders as
evidence to prove the case, while giving in some studies no
o
concrete substantiation at all. The reasons for this are several,
As with most stereotypes, the image of the traditional labor leader
and the business unionist appears, upon first examination, to
contain enough truth to discourage closer scrutiny. As a result,
no one has yet attempted a scholarly analysis of the evolution of
labor union leadership from the Civil War to the death of Gompers.
Information on particular labor leaders during this period, more-
over, is unduly limited. Published scholarly biographies are
available for only a few union officials, notably V/illiara Sylvis,
Samuel Gompers, Andrew Furuseth, Eugene V. Debs, William D. Haywood,
and Sidney Hillman. For the seventy nationally elected leaders of
the Knights of Labor between I878 and 1893, there are a handful of
biographical sketches, two autobiographies, one dissertation, and
no published scholarly biography. The sixty-eight national
officers
of the American Federation of Labor between l30l and 1924
have
fared somewhat better at the hands of historians, although
we still
know little about the majority of those men. Lacking the basic
information from which such ideal-types should be constructed,
scholars have arrived at the above-mentioned portraits by relying
on highly impressionistic evidence. Such a methodology too easily
yields historical accuracy over to the forces of subconscious
emotion and bias.
Preconceptions of historians were indeed a significant
factor in shaping prevailing stereotypes. Under the inspiration
of John R. Commons, labor history in the United States came of age
at the very time that the American Federation of Labor was rising
to prominence. The early pioneers in the academic discipline
encouraged the Federation's moderation and sympathized with its
struggle for survival. Finding the AFL's outlook congenial to
their own orientation, they tended to accept uncritically its
analysis of its own ideology and sociological composition, as well
as its critia.ue of its opposition. Historians have consequently
used such pejorative words as "reformist, 11 "Utopian," "unrealistic,
and "anachronistic" to describe the Knights of Labor, while
referring to the AFL as "pragmatic," "realistic," "mature," "bona
fide," and "businesslike."
10
Badical concepts also were important in shaping the stereo-
types of union leadership. Samuel Gompers, who formulated many
of the ideas later incorporated into the scholars
1 images, and
Selig Perlman, who was a major figure in putting Gompers
1 ideas
into academic form, wore both Llarxists in their youth.
11 John H.
Commons was a Christian Socialist in the who studied
liarx
in order to refute charges that the labor movement
as represented
812
"by the AFL was radical in approach* While rejecting the ultimate
conclusions of the Marxists, these men adhered to many of its rad-
ical conceptions, including the nature of the ideal labor leader.
The creators of the ideal-types agreed with many of their more
radical critics that a good labor leader should avoid middle-class
politics and reform movements and that he should not use the union
as a stopping stone for self-advancement. Indeed, at times it
seems that the debate between the Wisconsin School of Labor Studies
and such Marxists as Philip Poner centers on the question of
whether the "business unionist was an ideal labor leader, rather
13
than on what constitutes an ideal labor leader.
Whereas the lack of adequate information has resulted in a
distortion in the stereotypes of union leadership, the preconcep-
tions of historians have led to an insensitivity with the plight of
the union official, "writers of labor history have tended to ridi-
cule individuals who engaged in activities considered improper for
union officials, rather than to understand such behavior. This
approach has caused a few scholars, including J.B.S. Hardman,
to
criticize the "sustained effort in lecturing to death the pre-A.F.L.
half-century of militant labor unionism because it has been
char-
acterized by a consciousness of almost every problem on
the American
scene. . . ."
14
"Thinking of these labor leaders as anti-industrial
romantics," David Montgomery adds, "renders one incapable
of appre-
ciating their impact on contemporary economic and
political life.
On the other hand, isolating their conflicts
with employers from
9their other social activities artifically divorces their efforts
from the mainstream of national development. Workers wore not
purely econoraic men but were in every sense members of their local
and national communities, and it is in this setting that their
15
efforts to improve their lot should be studied." *
II
Through the use of statistical analysis, this chapter
attempts to create more substantial portraits of the old-school
labor leader and the new business unionist. Biographical sketches
were developed on one hundred and fifty traditional unionists and
16
two hundred new labor leaders. To be included, an individual
must have held an elective office in a national or international
union, or national federation of labor. Leaders prominent pri-
marily during the twenty-five years before 1895 were classified
as traditional labor leaders, while those prominent largely from
I895 to 1920 were considered business unionists.
The year I895 was chosen as the pivotal date since historians
have generally pointed to the mid-1890 *s as the period in which
17
"business unionism" triumphed over "reform unionism." Although
the American Federation of Labor, founded in 1886, and its prede-
cessor the Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions,
founded
in 1881, were the institutional representatives of the
new philo-
sophy of "pure and simple unionism," not all of their
early members
broke their ties with the past. Baring the 1880- s
and early l890's
a number of leaders and unions kept a foot in
both camps. In 1883,
10
for instance, Frank K. Foster served as both secretary of District
Assembly 30, Knights of Labor and as a member of the Federation
of Organized Trades and Labor Unions' executive board. Similarly,
Daniel McLaughlin spent a term on the governing bodies of both the
19Knights and the AFL. Until the mid-1890 1 s several unions in-
cluding the Mine Workers, Machinists, and Brewery '.Yorkers, main-
20tained membership in both national federations. Thus, in order
to discern the emergence of a new type of labor leader, the 1895
date seems the most judicious choice.
The final collection of sketches represents a good cross
section of the labor movement's leadership during this period. A
total of seventy-four national or international labor bodies are
included in the study. The Knights of Labor are represented by
fifty-four national officers; the American Federation of Labor by
forty-four. Among the various trade groups, the International
Typographical Union, the International Association of Machinists,
the United Mine Workers, and the International Ladies Garment
Workers* Union have the largest representation with over fifteen
leaders each. The independent railroad brotherhoods account for
nineteen officers. Excluding the Knights and the AFL, each union
has an average of four leaders included*
Computations were made of the date and place of birth,
educational attainment, father's occupation, political preferences,
tenure in office, and other factors for the three hundred and
fifty
individuals included in the sample. From this material,
statistical
11
pox-traits were constructed of the old-school labor leader and the
new business unionist. The quantitative tools used in this study-
were the measures of central tendency, being the mean, median,
and mode, plus such measures of distribution as percentile ranks
and percentiles.
In a survey of this nature, the historian must be conscious
of unavoidable bias in his material. Unlike the modern pollster
or social scientist, he cannot freely construct a proper question-
naire or scientifically determine his sample. Rather he must work
with the material at hand. The leaders used in this study, for
instance, do not constitute a random sample of the universe of
union officials during this period, but are those individuals on
whom the most information is known. There were, of course,
hundreds of other leaders meeting the criteria of this study,
the details of whose lives have been forgotten. Similarly, humans
have always been more fascinated by the unique than the typical,
with the result that it has been easier to discover such oddities
as which leaders supported the Socialist, Populist, Greenback, and
other third parties than it has been to identify staunch Democrats
and Republicans. Finally, one is confronted with the accuracy of
the information itself, which is difficult to cross-check. Muoh
of the data available on labor leaders originated with union
officials or their supporters and was prepared as campaign liter-
ature or testimonials. In typically human fashion, men would
distort facts to attain a desired image. Although difficult to
12
prove, it seems likely that such men, living in a nation enamored
With the "rags-to-richos" myth, would over-dramatize their humble
origins, lack of education, and commencement of work at an early
age. As Eli Ginzberg suggests, labor leaders "who refer to their
working-class origins do so boastfully. They desire to emphasize
that they are thoroughly acquainted with the problems confronting
21
the workers, since they themselves are workers." Hopefully,
through judicious interpretation of the data and by use of a large
sample, such biases as these can be controlled. Nonetheless, the
final statistics are not definitive but simply indicative of
trends.
Although a quantitative analysis of labor union leadership
between I87O and 1920 has not previously been attempted, there are
several statistical studies which are useful as a means of checking
the conclusions of this work, David Montgomery's study of labor
leaders prominent during the Reconstruction era is a benchmark for
an analysis of the traditional unionist. Montgomery has examined
leaders prominent during a period earlier and shorter than that of
the present study; he has included looal union leadership, labor
journalists, and politicians, as well as national labor figures.
22
Moreover, his sample has a decidedly political orientation. A
study by Louis Stanley and one by Pitirim A. Sorokin provide a
partial check on the conclusions regarding the business unionists.
These studies relate only to leaders in office in the mid-1920
«S
and suffer from the biases both of the authors and the
source of
the sample. Pitirim Sorokin, for example, assumes
that "everybody
13
knows that tho modern labor movement has been closely connected
with these various radical movements. American .Labor Who's Who
,
from which these scholars took their data, contains sketches of
local as well as national and foreign labor leaders, and reflects
the preconceptions of its editor, Solon DeLeon, the son of the
famed leader of the Socialist Labor Party, and hence contains a
disproportionate number of sketches of socialists, LaFollette
Progressives, Jews, and leaders of the needle and textile trades.
Eli Ginzberg's study of labor leaders prominent from 1900 to 1940
is also helpful in understanding the business unionist, but it is
primarily concerned with leaders in office at the later date.
Reference to these works will occur primarily in the citations.
Ill
The men who led labor during the last third of the nine-
teenth century represented a clear break with the pre-Civil War
labor movement. With eighty-six percent of the traditional labor
leaders born after I83O, and with 1844 as the median year of
birth, the overwhelming majority were too young to have been
_ _ . 26
active in the wave of unionism during the Age of Jackson.
Indeed, out of a sample of one hundred and fifty, only two leaders
are known to have been involved in tho American labor
movement of
the I84O »s and I85O ' s—William D. Robinson of the Locomotive
Engineers and James L. Wright of the Knights of Labor. One other
leader who was not included in the sample, Charles II. Rihl of
the
Bricklayers, was also active in the pre-Civil War labor
movement.
14
None of these men held major union posts during this time. 2^
Union offices during the Gilded Age were quite clearly
reserved for white males of Western European extraction. None of
the leaders studied were Negro or Oriental, and only three were
women—Leonora M. Barry of the Knights of Labor, Mary Burke of the
28Retail Clerks, and Augusta Lev/is of the National Labor Union.
In terms of ethnic background, Irish-Catholics were the most
numerous group, accounting for nineteen of the seventy-oight
leaders on whom information is known. The English were the next
largest group with fifteen, while the Scots were third with nine.
Scotch-Irish and Canadians each accounted for six? Germans and
Welsh for five each; French for three; and Russian-Jews and
Hungarians for one each. Finally, eight of the leaders could
distinctly be classified as being of Old American stock. Clearly,
national labor union leadership during this period was dominated
by individuals with ancestral roots in the British Isles. While
certain ethnic groups such as the Germans were influential in the
labor movement during these years, statistics suggest that thoir
office holding was concentrated at the local level.
The religious backgrounds are known for only forty-nine of
the one hundred and fifty leaders in the sample. Of these, fifty
per cent were Catholic. Protestants accounted for forty-four per
cent, with Methodism, the faith most commonly associated with the
English working class, constituting the largest single denomination.
Pour per cent were Jews, and two per cent were declared
atheists.
15
Actually, these proportions are probably more indicative of formal
church attendance than of religious beliefs, for during the Gilded
Age there was a tendency particularly among Protestant workingmen
to disassociate themselves from the formal institution of the
church. A survey conducted by the Massachusetts Bureau of Labor
Statistics in 1869 and I87O revealed that most Protestant working-
men did not attend services. According to the labor politician
Edward H. Sogers, "the church was very unsocial . . . poor people
29
were not wanted." The most significant statistic on religion,
therefore, is that the faith, or lack of it, of two-thirds of
these men are unknown. Perhaps a majority of them were vaguely
Protestant, a third Catholic oriented, and the remainder undeclared
agnostics and atheists. For such men, the sermons of the Social
Gospelers and the encyclicals of the Pope had little direct
meaning.
Forty-eight per cent of the old-school labor leaders studied
were foreign-born, with the vast majority coming from the British
Isles. Roughly twenty-nine per cent were born in England, twenty-
three per cent in Ireland, fifteen per cent in Scotland, and eight
per cent in Wales. Outside the British Isles, Canada was the
birthplace of the next largest group, totaling thirteen per cent.
Another ten per cent were born in Germany. Only six per cent of
the foreign-born leaders came from countries other than those
listed above.
Thirty-eight per cent of the foreign-born labor leaders
immigrated to the United States while youths under the
age of
16
fourteen. The rest, sixty-two per cent, came to America between
their sixteenth and thirty-ninth birthdays, with the largest
cluster of men, thirty-one per cent, arriving while in their late
31twenties. At least forty-three per cent, and probably more, of
the foreign-born leaders who were sixteen or older at immigration
had been involved in union activities before reaching the United
States. Among them were such notables as Thomas Phillips, John
Siney, Richard Trevellick, Chris Evans, John Jarrett, and Adolf
Strasser. While the largest proportion of these men were involved
in mining, leaders with foreign trade union experience were influ-
32
ential in other industries as well.
The evidence on the clear break between pre- and post-Civil
War labor union leadership, the statistics on the ethnic back-
grounds of the traditional leaders, plus the number of foreign-
born, their age at immigration, and their previous union activities
all tend to support the conclusions of such scholars as Clifton
Yearley and David Montgomery as to the predominant influence of
British immigrants in the development of the American labor move-
ment after the Civil War. 33 In his study of labor leadership
between 1862 and 1872, Montgomery concludes that fifty-eight per
cent of his sample was foreign born, with forty-four per cent
coining from the British Isles.
34 Similarly, Yearley notes that
"among the ten more important figures associated with the
National
Labor Union from 1862 to 1872, half wore British. Of the
twenty-
five foremost leaders and organisers in the Knights of
Labor at the
17
peak of its power in 1886, eleven v/ero English, Irish, Scotch or
Welsh." 35
Although foreign-born leaders proportionately decreased
over time—from fifty-eight per cent for the period 1862 to 1872,
to forty-eight per cent for the period I87O to I895—statistics
on ethnic background plus individual biographical information
suggest that their places were taken by the sons of immigrants,
born in the United States and raised in a cultural environment
which accepted unionism. While both John Brophy and Samuel Gompers
were foreign-born and of a later era, the attitudes toward unionism
they absorbed during childhood were probably similar to those of
many native-born sons of immigrants raised in the ethnic confines
of a mining town or urban ghetto. "All my life," Gompers recalled,
"I had been accustomed to the labor movement and accepted as a
matter of course that every wage-earner should belong to the union
of his trade. I did not yet /in 1864 when he joined the Hew York
City English-speaking Cigarmakers' local/ have a conscious appre-
ciation of the labor movement. My awakening was to come later.
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However, I attended union meetings and observed union regulations."
Likewise, Brophy related: "Everybody belonged to unions, it was
taken for granted as a normal part of life."
37 Brophy attributed
a large part of his success in organizing a miners
1 union in South
Fork, Pennsylvania "to the fact that the miners were almost all
of British origin; very few were native Americans or from later
immigration stock. The bulk were English, from Cornwall,
Lancashire,
or Staffordshire, with generous sprinklings of Welsh,
Scottish,
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and Irish.
. . .
The British immigrants "brought with them not only
experience in British mines but also, like my father, the cxperi-
ence of British unions."" Native Americans, raised in community-
centered societies which cherished the values of individualism
and self-reliance, no doubt faced greater difficulty in accommo-
dating their cultural heritage with the principles of unionism.
Consequently they took longer in developing a sizable leadership
group than many of the foreign-born who brought this tradition
with them and transmitted it to their children.
Most American-born labor leaders came from those regions
of the country which experienced industrialism during the 1840's
and 1850' s. Porty-nine per cent of the native unionists were born
in the Middle Atlantic states of Hew York (25$), Pennsylvania (21$)
,
and New Jersey (3/o)« England provided twenty-one per cent of
the leaders, two-thirds of whom were born in Massachusetts. The
East-North-Central states were the birthplaces of fifteen per cent,
and the Yfest-North-Central and South Atlantic states each contri-
buted six per cent. The remaining three per cent came from the
East-South-Central, the V/est-South-Central, the Mountain, and the
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Pacific regions of the country.
The majority of traditional unionists were born in relatively
highly populated urban centers. Seventy-nine per cent of tho
native labor leaders were born in communities with populations
over 2,500, the figure adopted by tho United States Census in 1880
to define an urban area. In that year only twenty-nine and ono-half
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per cent of the American people lived in communities of that size,
and the percentage had been considerably lower thirty or forty
years earlier when most of the labor leaders v/ere growing up.
Indeed, whereas only twelve and one-half per cent of the nation 1 s
population lived in communities of 8,000 or more inhabitants in
I85O, forty-one per cent of the labor leaders were born in towns
this size or larger. Approximately twenty-three per cent of the
leaders v/ere born in cities with populations over 100,000.
Philadelphia, with a population of 340*000 in I85O, was the birth-
place of more traditional labor leaders than any other single
community*^ The urban origins of union officials was further
accented by the fact that a large percentage of the immigrant
labor leaders were natives of such major cities as Liverpool,
London, Glasgow, Belfast, Londonderry, and Toronto.
The industrial-urban orientation of the traditional
unionists became even more marked once they began work. Upon
their election to national office, seventy per cent of tho leaders
carne from the five industrial states of Massachusetts, New York,
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Illinois. In terms of regional breakdown,
forty-one per cent resided in the Middle Atlantic states, thirty
percent in the East-North-Central states, eleven per cent in New
England, eight per cent in the West-North-Central region, four per
cent in the South Atlantic area. The remaining six per cent were
distributed among the East-South-Central, Y/est-South-Centol,
Mountain, and Pacific divisions of the nation. Ninoty-one
per cent
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of the unionists resided in communities with a population of 2,500
or more in i860. Only twenty-nine and one-half per cent of the
American population as a whole at this date lived in towns of this
size or larger, indicating the extent to which the traditional
labor leaders were atypical of the nation's populace. Twenty-
eight per cent lived in cities with a population between 10,000
and 100,000; forty-three per cent lived in cities with 100,000 to
one million inhabitants; and ten per cent lived in New York City,
excluding Brooklyn, which had a population of 1,206,299
•
Fathers of the old-school unionists were for the most part
laborers in an emerging industrial society. Only a handful of
leaders had fathers identifiable as professional or business men,
among these a sea captain, a soldier, a minister, a physician,
two shoe manufacturers, and a publisher. A slightly larger group
had fathers who were farmers or tenant farmers. Such exceptions
notwithstanding, the substantial majority of fathers were craftsmen
or industrial workers, with approximately one-third being skilled
workers, including miners, shawlmakers, stone-cutters, and coopers.
From this breakdown it is evident that a majority of the traditional
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unionists came from working-class families.
As might be expected of children from such a background,
the large majority of the men studied obtained a sixth grade educa-
tion or less and began work by age fourteen. Almost one-fourth of
the leaders, however, did extend their formal education beyond
primary school. Some went to night school, twenty are known to
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have attended high school, seven were enrolled in institutions
labeled "colleges", and four were involved in special training in
lav/ or theology. But for the most part, the traditional unionist
left school early in his teens and, if lucky, attained further
education through the apprenticeship system.
Only a small fraction of the future leaders, eight per cent,
went into business before or during their union careers. These
men were mostly of three types. A few were frustrated entrepre-
neurs like P. LI. Arthur of the Locomotive Fngineers, who as a young
man started a cartage business, or Thomas Talbot of the Machinists
who unsuccessfully attempted to open his own shop. Others resembled
John James of the Miners' National Association and Frederick Turner
of the Knights of Labor, both of whom had been blacklisted for
union activities and forced to open stationary or grocery stores
to earn a living. The Philadelphia Knights, in fact, provided
initial financing for Turner's store so the Order might continue
to have his services. The largest group, particularly among those
in business while in office, were men like Frank Foster and Joseph
Buchanan who edited labor papers. Yet as noted previously, the
vast majority of leaders remained v/agc-earners prior to running
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for union office. v
Starting work while still a youth, the typical old-school
labor leader was also quite young when ho attained his first nation-
al union office. Fifty per cent of the leaders were elected to
national positions before age thirty-five, and eighty-oight per
cent
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attained their posts by ago thirty-five. John Felirenbatchor was
twenty-six when elected president of the International Machinists
and Blacksmiths' Union; William Blair Prescott was twenty-eight
when he became head of the International Typographical Union; and
T.V. Powderly was chosen Grand Master Workman of the Knights of
Labor at age thirty.^"
A number of factors help explain why so many young men rose
to leadership positions during the formative years of American
trade-unionism. Early leaders usually obtained their start in the
labor movement during a membership drive or strike, and these
struggles were hard. The activists ran the risk of dismissal from
their jobs, the blacklist, and frequently bodily harm. Consequently,
older men, burdened with families, thought twice before talcing
prominent parts in labor struggles. Young men had less to lose.
If the union won, they might have a new career open to them; if it
lost, they could move on and find other jobs. Moreover, once these
men began in union affairs they encountered few barriers. As Eli
Ginsberg points out, "Unlike a bishop or a general, the labor
leader did not have to complete a lengthy course of formal instruc-
tion. '.That he had to know about his follow workers and employers
he was able to acquire during the first ten years on tho job. At
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twenty-five, he had a decade of experience under his belt."
Young men faced li ttle opposition in gaining office. The risks
and sufferings of the job—long hours, low pay, little security,
and social ostracism—frequently resulted in the number of union
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positions exceeding the number of candidates. As Jonathan Grossman
points out in regard to the early Holder's Union, offices often
went begging "for weeks at a time until someone was flattered,
cajoled or browbeaten into accepting."^
The unattractiveness of union office plus the short life-
span of many of the early national organizations, contributed to
making most careers in the labor movement of short duration. The
average official gained his highest office within the union a year
after attaining a position of national leadership, and his tenure
at this post was relatively short. The typical leader held his
highest post for a year and a half; eighty-two per cent for five
years or less. Their total tenure in national office was only
slightly longer, with fifty per cent in office for just over two
years, and seventy-eight per cent in positions of national leader-
ship for five years or less. The longest total tenure was John \U
Hayes's thirty-two years with the Knights of Labor, a larger pro-
portion of which occurred after it became an inactive organization.^
Although precise information is not available, it seems that
a clear majority of the old-school labor leaders divided equally
in political allegiance between the Democratic and Republican
parties. But at least twenty-four per cent of the traditional
unionists displayed third party proclivities at some time or other.
Ten were staunch supporters of the Socialist Labor Party. The
remainder wore distributed among the Greenbackers, Populists, and
various other groups. Like tho statistics on religion, the
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figures on party affiliation appear more indicative of political
involvement than of political preference. It is revealing,
therefore, that the affiliation of two—thirds of the sample is
unknown, suggesting that politics was not of vital interest to
most of these men.
Nonetheless, at least thirty-eight—or twenty-five per
cent—of our one hundred and fifty traditional leaders were
political activists. Nine were mainly involved in party affairs
—
threo for the Greenback-Labor Party, three for the Populists, and
three for the Socialist Laborites. A few individuals held posi-
tions of party leadership. Philip Van Patten of the Knights of
Labor was National Secretary of the Socialist Labor Party, whilo
Robert Schilling of the Coopers' International Union had been one
of the two laboring men at the founding convention of the Greenback
Party. Schilling also served as chairman of the central committoo
of the Wisconsin People's Party in 1894.^
The other twenty-nine leaders were active primarily as
political candidates. Including those who sought more than one
post, ten ran for local positions, twenty were candidates for state
posts, and six sought election to national offices. About half
ran on third-party tickets? one third as Democrats; and only a
handful as Republicans. Ultimately, about half of the candidates
were elected to some public office, although many ran several
times
before achieving victory. In general, success seemed directly
proportional to the homogeneity of the constituency and
inversely
25
proportional to the size of the electorate. Eighty per cent of
those seeking some local office eventually won, although only
fifty per cent of those who coveted mayoralties were victorious.
On the state level, ten of seventeen leaders who campaigned for
district seats in various legislatures were successful, hut none
of the candidates running for state wide executive offices ever
won. Of eight candidates seeking election from various districts
to Congress, three were successful. Eugene Debs, needless to say,
never attained the Presidency. Among the more notable political
victors were Congressman Martin Foran of the International
Coopers 1 Union, and Terence Povvderly of the Knights of Labor, who
in I878 was elected mayor of Scranton, Pennsylvania, a city of
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45? 000. y Finally, nine of twenty-nine leaders active as political
candidates v/ere semi-professional or professional politicians,
50having nun for office three or more times.
A small minority of traditional labor leaders, approximately
twelve per cent, held appointive posts in government. Most of
these appointments seem to have been made in light of the union
official's expertise in industrial affairs; fifteen of the eighteen
men were given posts concerned with labor problems. Ilobert
v/atchorn of the United Mine V/orkers was Chief Factory Inspector
of Pennsylvania; James R. Sovereign of the Knights of Labor wa3
Commissioner of Labor Statistics for Iowa; and John LlcBride of the
Mine V/orkers held a similar post in Ohio. Other leaders worked
in various state labor bureaus and served on state and fedoi\al
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investigatory commissions. The United States Immigration Service
was the particular sphere-of
-influence for the trade unions. A
sizeable number of former union men worked for the service, and
two prominent leaders served as Commissioner-General of Immigra-
tion—Terence V. Powderly and Prank P. Sargent of the Brotherhood
of Locomotive Firemen. In the final analysis, however, the pro-
portion of labor leaders appointed to governmental posts, like
the number active in politics, was small
Relatively few traditional unionists attempted to establish
themselves in business or the professions after leaving union
office. Of those in our sample, thirty-one, or twenty per cent,
followed this path. Not all of them were attempting to escape
from the working class and its problems, as proved by tho eleven
who became editors of labor journals. Six of eleven who started
small businesses did so because their reputations as champions of
the workingman made it impossible to get jobs in their respective
trades. Six other leaders, mainly among miners and typographers,
accepted management positions in pro-union firms from which, they
rationalized, they could promote better labor relations, two of
the three men who became lawyers, Martin Poran and Terence Powderly
(who claimed ho could not get a job at his trade after leaving the
Khights), continued to work for labor's betterment. ^ About a
third of those who went into business did attempt to become success-
ful businessmen without working-class connections. Only one,
however, actually achieved this goal. Combining luck with talent,
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Robert V/atchom went from trapper boy in a DorbyGhj.ro mine at the
age of eleven, to Secretary-Treasurer of the United Mine Workers
in I89O, to Chief Factory Inspector for Pennsylvania in 1891, to
an official in the Immigration Service from I893 to 1908, to vice
president of the Union Oil Company. He was a major benefactor
of the University of the Kedlands at the time of his death in
1944. Such success, however, was entirely foreign to the over-
whelming majority of old-school labor leaders who spent their
entire lives in the ranks of the wage earners.
Information on the social clubs and reform organisations
to which the old-school unionists bolonged is available for only
sixteen per cent of the sample. Lack of data on this point illus-
trates the weak foundation on which the accepted stereotype of the
54traditional labor leader has been build. ' Quite clearly no mean-
ingful conclusions can be made from available information. At
best it can only be. pointed out that the twenty—four leaders under
consideration were members of six fraternal organisations, the
Masons being the most popular. The reform groups to which these
men gravitated included the Henry George Club, the National
Citizens Alliance, and the Irish national Land League. The most
prominent reform was the temperance movement to which five leaders
devoted some of their time.
The foregoing statistical analysis suggests a portrait of
the old-school labor leaders which stands in sharp contrast to tho
traditional stereotype. The middle-class origins, third-party
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proclivities, and other characteristics "by which such scholars as
Gerald Grob, Selig Perlman, and Norman V/are have identified the
traditional labor leaders are seen in perspective to be rather
the attributes of a few exceptional unionists. Instead of having
been an advocate of a passing rural, middle-class America, the
average old-school union official appears as a working-class
pioneer in an emerging urban-industrial society.
In sum, the ideal-type traditional labor leader was bom in
I844 to parents of Irish-Catholic or English origins. He was
raised in Hew England or the Lliddle Atlantic states in a town of
five thousand. From a working-class family, he was only able to
attend school until age fourteen and then began his life's labor.
Joining the union of his trade, he rose quickly through the ranks
and became a national officer before age thirty-five. His stay in
office was usually only for one or two years. Once his term was
over, he returned to the rank-and-file and his previous activities
as a laborer. His life, then, was neither glamorous nor bizarre,
and except for his brief period in union office, marked by few
distinctions.
IV
Eighty-two per cent of the business unionists studied wero
born during the twenty-five year period from 1855 to i860, with
1869 representing the median year. Like the traditional labor
leaders, they were overwhelmingly white males of Western European
extraction. Only five of two hundred loaders studied were women,
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and only two were black.-'-' Of the one hundred and twenty leaders
whose ethnic backgrounds are known, over half had ancestors in
the British Isles. Thirty-three were Irish-Catholic, nineteen
were English, ten Scotch, five Welsh, and five more Scotch-Irish.
No doubt a majority of the six Canadians also had ancestors in
Great Britain. Seven leaders were of German parentage; another
six were Scandinavian, including two from Iceland; five were
Italian and one Dutch. The most significant new ethnic group to
appear in the ranks of union leadership was the East European
Jews, whose activities were concentrated in the needle trades.
In terms of religious background, fifty per cent of the
future leaders v/ere Catholic, about thirty-five per cent were
Protestant, ten per cent Jewish, and the remaining five per cent
confirmed non-believers. These proportions were arrived at by
inference, since, as in the case of the traditional unionists,
the actual statistics seem more illustrative of active church
participation than of religious belief. Following this assump-
tion, about half of the leaders were active church goers. While
this proportion would hardly please priests or parsons, it does
signify increased church activity, since only a third of the
old-school labor leaders seemed to have had institutional religious
ties. The cause of such growth in religious devotion and partici-
pation seems to rest clearly with the activities of Father Peter
Diets, the Militia of Christ for Social Service, and the Knights
of Columbus since it occurred primarily within the Church of Rome.
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During the Gilded Age, the Protestants and Catholics were about
equal in the number of church activists, but in the Progressive
Era Catholics outnumbered Protestants in participation by almost
56three to one.
As was true of the traditional labor leaders, the majority
of business unionists were American born. Approximately forty-
57two per cent, however, were immigrants. Of the seventy-one
foreign-born leaders whose countries of birth are known, forty-
three per cent came from the British Isles. England accounted
for fifteen leaders, Ireland nine, Scotland six, and 77alos one.
The British colonies contributed another fifteen per cent of the
leaders, ten having been born in Canada and one in New Zealand.
Six leaders were born in Scandinavia, four in Italy, three in
Austria-Hungary, and one each in Germany and Luxembourg. Again
fourteen of the leaders in the garment industry were immigrants
from the Eastern European countries of Russia, Poland, and
Lithuania*
Unlike the foreign-born traditional labor leaders, immi-
grant business unionists tended to come to America while still in
their teens. Of the fifty-four persons whose ages at immigration
are known, fifty per cent arrived in the United States by age
sixteen, and seventy-eight per cent by their tv/enty-first birthday.
On the other hand, fifty per cent of their earlier counterparts
were over twenty when they arrived in bhe United States. Immigra-
tion at an early age meant that few of the foreign-born buaindes
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unionists were active in the labor movements of their home
countries. Only twelve of the seventy-one men are known to have
had such experience, five of them in the miners 1 unions of the
British Isles.
The majority of the business unionists wore native born,
and like the majority of traditional labor leaders grew up in the
more industrial states east of the Mississippi River and north
of the Mason-Dixon line. The four leading industrial states of
New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Illinois were the birthplace
of fifty-four per cent of the American born business unionists.
In terms of regional distribution, the Middle Atlantic and East-
Worth-Central states each accounted for thirty-two per cent of
the leaders, v/hile the V/est-Morth-Central and South Atlantic
states each accounted for twelve per cent. The East-South-Central
area was the birthplace of seven per cent and New England of four
per cent. The remaining one per cent came from the .Mountain
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region*
Business unionists tended to be born in the same general
urban environment as their earlier counterparts. Whereas only a
quarter of the American people lived in towns of 2,500 or more in
1870, sixty-six per cent of the leaders were born in communities
of this size or larger. Forty-one per cent had birthplaces with
populations greater than 10,000; twenty-two per cent greater than
100,000; and seven per cent were born in New York City, including
Brooklyn, with a population of over one million. The statistically
average leader was born in a town of six thousand. Many of those
bom in places with fewer inhabitants still came from industrial
environments. This was particularly true of those who came from
small mining communities in Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Ohio.
Finally, the majority of immigrant labor leaders also appear to
have been born in major population centers. ^°
Raised in the more urban and industrial areas of the
nation, the men who led labor during the Progressive era, like
their earlier counterparts, came from predominantly working-class
families.^1 The occupations of one hundred and seven fathers
are known. Five per cent were professional men, mostly lawyers
and ministers, and eleven per cent owned their own business.
The majority were petty entreprenuers—saloon keepers, grocers,
small manufacturers—but one, the father of Max Zaritsky, was a
62businessman of considerable stature. Another twenty per cent
were farmers, including the fathers of such prominent leaders as
'warren Stone of the Locomotive Engineers, Arthur Wharton of the
Machinists, and James Patrick tfoonan of the Electrical Workers ^
The remaining sixty-four per cent of the sample were wage earners,
with over two-thirds of these being skilled or semi-skilled
workers.
Like the traditional labor leader, the typical business
unionist attended school until the age of thirteen or fourteen.
The majority of the new leaders received a sixth grade education
or less before entering the mines and factories of industrial
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64America. A significant minority of at least thirty-five per
cent, hov/ever, achieved more than a primary education. Fifty
leaders attained some high school education, including John L.
Lewis, who unlike most miners of the period was ahle to finish
65all hut his senior year. J Twenty leaders graduated from high
school and attended more specialized institutions. Thomas
Rickert of the United Garment Workers and William Doak of the
Trainmen were enrolled in "business colleges where they mastored
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skills useful in union administration. Law schools attracted
to their doors a number of leaders including Matthew tfoll and
Prank Morrison of the APL, both of whom attended Lake Forest
University's lav/ school where they gained knowledge valuable in
shaping the unions' internal rules as well as in meeting the
unions' ever increasing legal obligations with government and
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business. And a few of the future labor leaders received
liberal arts educations. John Brown Lennon of the Journeymen
Tailors' Union and treasurer of the AFL for eighteen years spent
a year at Oberlin College, while Ben H. Williams of the Industrial
Y/orkers of the World was an "All-American Boy" while at Tabor
College—center on the football team, editor of the campus maga-
zine, president of the Phi Delta Literary Society, and winner of
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several debating and oratorical awards. Although men with more
than a sixth grade education were the exception among business
unionists, their advanced education did enable them to cope better
with problems that their unions faced in an increasingly complex
industrial society.
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fith a significant minority of business unionists coming
from non-working class backgrounds and attaining more than a
primary school education, it is surprising that so few are known
to have attempted self-employment before gaining union office.
Evidence of independent business participation before assuming
union office is available for only three per cent of the sample.
This fact does not indicate absence of entrepreneurial drive
among the leaders, as will be seen later in discussing their
business activities during and after office. Rather it suggests
four phenomena. First, as was pointed out earlier, two-thirds
of the business unionists "were of working-class backgrounds,
received only a minimum of schooling, and went to work while in
their early teens. Thus they rarely if ever had the education or
capital to start out on their own. Secondly, even those with
better schooling and coming from non-working class backgrounds
found it increasingly more costly and less appealing to start a
small business in an age in which largo firms wore pushing under
their smaller competitors. Closely related to this was the
mounting evidence that through the union movement one could
increase his status and eventually move into a managerial position
with a good business firm, accept a comfortable governmental job,
or even transform the union into a quasi-corporation which not
only took part in labor relations but also managed banks, insur-
ance companies, holding companies, and other ventures. As early
as 1900, AFL president Samuel Gompers felt compelled to warn his
followers that "with this marvelous growth of the trade union
movement, a few persons hero and there have endeavored to foist
themselves upon our organization, and, without using a harsher
term, the purpose sought by them is not calculated to promote
the welfare of the cause for which organized labor stands* Self-
seekers, political hucksters, and financial charlatans have sought
to fasten their fangs upon some organizations, and particularly
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upon those newly formed," ' Finally, and not to be underestimated,
was the sincere desire of many business unionists simply to
devote their lives to the advancement of the working class.
At the time of their election to national office, eighty-
two per cent of the business unionists were living in towns
which had populations of over 8,000 in 1910. Proportionally,
this was more than twice the national average of urban concentra-
tion. Sixty per cent, moreover, lived in cities of over 100,000
inhabitants, and thirty-one per cent resided in the metropolises
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of New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia, As the statistics on
place of residence suggest, a significant majority of the leaders
—
sixty-two per cent—lived in the five most urbanized and industri-
alized states: New York, Ohio, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and
Massachusetts. The actual geographical distribution of tho
leaders at tho time of their elections, however, reveals to some
extent the westward advance of industrialism. The East-North-
Central states, which had ranked second to the Middle Atlantic
area as place of residence of traditional labor leaders, now
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attained top honors, thirty-two per cent to thirty per cent. The
Y/est-South-Central area, moreover, tied New England for third
place each with ten per cent. The South Atlantic and Mountain
states were each the home of five per cent of the leaders; the
Pacific region of four per cent; and the East-South-Central and
West-South-Central areas of two per cent.^
Surprisingly, "business unionists were a few years younger
than their earlier counterparts when they won election to their
first national post. Y/hereas the average age of the traditional
unionist at the time of his first election to national office was
thirty-five, and eighty-eight per cent were in office by the ago
of forty-five, the average age of the new labor leader was thirty-
three, and ninety-two per cent were at their posts by age forty-
five. This slight decrease in the ago of the union leaders seems
to result primarily from the changing dynamics of the labor move-
ment. It is almost axiomatic that new unions are founded by
young blood, and the last decade of the nineteenth century and the
first two decades of the twentieth witnessed a virtual organiza-
tional revolution. In I87O there were only twenty-nine national
trade unions. By 1920 the number had increased to one hundred
and sixty-three. The majority of these unions, moreover, were
formed in the years after 1-390. As more unions were founded, more
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young men became national labor leaders.
If the average business unionist was younger than the
traditional labor leader upon assuming national office, he was also
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older than his counterpart when attaining his highest national
office. The traditional unionist had generally reached his
highest post in the union hierarchy a year after joining the
national administration. The new generation, however, spent an
average of five years moving up the ladder of power. This
longer time period suggests both an increase in the number of
career labor leaders and an increased rigidity in the union
structure.
Also indicative of these trends are the statistics on the
length of time in office. As observed above, the average old-
school labor leader held his highest post in the union for only
one and a half years and had a total tenure in national offices
of just over two years. The situation for the business unionist
was drastically different, for the typical new labor leader held
his highest post for twelve years and experienced a total tenure
in national offices of a decade and a half. Indeed, seventy-one
per cent had union careers of over five years, and a few individ-
uals such as Matthew V/oll of the AFL, William Llahan of the Street
Railway Employees, and Harry Herman Cook of the Flint Glass
Workers spent over a half century in positions of authority in the
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1abor movemen t
.
Attaining office while still relativoly young and subse-
quently enjoying a lengthy tenure in office, the majority of the
new generation of labor leaders remained in the labor movement all
their lives. Less than ten per cent actually loft tho labor
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movement to engage in private business. Yet this does not mean
that the majority of them were aloof from the desire to gain
wealth through the capitalist system. Lack of adequate records
makes it difficult to know how many of them invested in stocks,
bonds, and real estate, but the number seems to have been quite
significant. At the time of his death in 1924, Samuel Gompers
had developed an estate of $40,000 through such investments.^
Emmet C. Davison, who became General Secretary-Treasurer of the
Machinists in 1917 * was: also vice-president of the lit* Vernon
Savings Bank, vice-president of the District Securities Company,
secretary-treasurer of the Hampton Head Ship Repair Corporation,
president of the Potomac Holding Company, and a member of the
75board of directors of the Commercial national Bank. y Similarly,
George L. Berry of the Printing Pressmen v/as a stockowner in the
Clinchfield Hydro Electric Company, president of the International
Playing Card and Label Company, ov.Tier and publisher of the Rogcrs-
ville, Tennessee Review , and chairman of the board of directors
i r
of the Citizens 1 Union Bank of Rogorsville. The spirit of such
enterprise v/as expressed "by John Uitchell, president of the
United Mine Workers, when he advised his friend V/.D. Ryan that
"if we could organise a company of three or four, with a capital
stock of five or six thousand dollars, vie would clean up a hand-
some little stake each year."77 By following his own council,
Mitchell was able to accumulate an estate worth $244,295 upon his
death twenty years later. Among his assets were honds of Armour
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and Company, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and the Hew York
Central, all firms hardly friendly toward unionism.^8
Several leaders, particularly those in office in the 1920 's
and beyond, became corporate executives within the union structure
as various organizations began their own enterprises. The pioneer
in these endeavors was Warren Stone of the Brotherhood of Loco-
motive Engineers, an his recommendation, a thirteen-story
building was erected in Cleveland in 1910 which paid for itself
v/ithin ten years and thereafter was listed as a 2)3,000,000 asset.
So successful was this project that the union built a second
structure in 1925. Stone also launched the first labor bank, the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers Cooperative Bank of Cleveland,
in November, 1920 with a capital of $1,000,000 and a surplus of
SI, 000, 000. It was followed by other banks in New York, Phila-
delphia, Boston, Minneapolis, and elsewhere. The union also
incorporated the Brotherhood Holding Company with a capital of
$1,000,000 and the Brotherhood Investment Company with a capital of
$10,000,000 and then acquired a controlling interest in the
Empire Trust Company of New York, Other investments were made
under Stone's direction so that by the time of his death in 1925
,
the resources of the Locomotive Engineers had reached <»145> oco > 000 «
Other unions followed the path blazed by the Brotherhood, and
before long men like Albert Bcrres of the Pattern Makers, Edward
Manion of the Telegraphers, Edwin Weeks of the Railway Carmen,
John L. Lewis of the Miners, and Anzuino Marimpietri of the
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Amalgamated Clothing Workers were directing the affairs of banks,
insurance companies, and other business endeavors* 80 Indicative
of the new activities of union officials was the identification
of Warren Stone in Yflio Wag Who as "labor leader and banker" and
the National Cyclopedia 's characterization of Matthew Y/oll as
"labor leader and insurance executive," 81
The majority of business unionists, like the majority of
traditional labor leaders, supported the two established political
8?parties. The actual statistics, however, are more revealing
of strong political commitment than of the party preference of
the group as a whole, for information of this nature is unknown
for a majority of the officials. Some of these men concealed
their political affiliations to prevent tensions within their
unions, while others simply lacked political consciousness.
Among those whose party allegiances are known, there was a dis-
cernable preference for the Democrats. Forty-six per cent
supported the party of V/ilson and Bryan while thirty-five per cent
championed the Republican cause. This bias appears to have been
both a cause and a result of the AFL's increasing friendliness
Q A
with the Democrats after 1903, 4 At least nineteen per cent of
the business unionists displayed third-party sympathies. Two-
thirds of these were supporters of the Socialist and Socialist
Labor parties, while the rest at one time or other backed the Pop-
ulist, Bull Moose, or LaFollette Progressive parties.
A minority of twenty-three per cent of the business unionists
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were actively involved in politics. Approximately one-third wero
Democrats, one-third Republicans, and one-third supporters of
minor parties, with half of these being Socialists. Fifteen of
the men studied were primarily party activists, ranging from the
Longshoremen's Richard Butler, who as a Tammany Hall leader, to
the Carpenters 1 William L. Hutcheson, who managed the Labor Divi-
sion of the Republican Party in 1932.^ Thirty other leaders
were at some time political candidates, running for a total of
thirty-nine offices and succeeding about half the time. Among
these was the future president of the American Federation of Labor,.
William Green, who was elected as a Democrat to the Ohio legis-
86lature in 1911 and 1913. William B. Wilson (Dem.
,
Pa.) of the
United Mine Workers, Frank J. McHulty (Dem,, N.J.) of the Inter-
national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, John J. Casey (Dem.,
Pa.) of the Plumbers, and Frank Buchanan (Dem., 111.) of the Bridge
and Structural Iron Workers were all elected to the United States
87
Congress. Finally, nine business unionists were professional
or semi-professional politicians, running for office more than
twice.
Before America's entrance into World War I, approximately
thirteen per cent of the business unionists received appointments
to various governmental posts and commissions. As had been the
oase with the traditional labor leaders, their positions were
generally concerned with labor problems. At the local level
unionists served as factory inspectors and street railway commis-
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sioners. Several leaders were associated v/ith state commissions
of labor and one was a justice of the Michigan Court of Arbitra-
tion. Concomitantly, a significant proportion of business union-
ists were appointed to positions in the national government.
Three were members of the 1913 United States Industrial Relations
Commission, while two more served with the Bureau of Immigration.
One former union official, William B. Wilson, became the nation's
first Secretary of Labor in 1913, and another, William. Doak,
would fill this post during the Hoover administration.
Once the country began to mobilise in 1916 to meet the
German threat, the number of labor leaders receiving government
appointments increased dramatically. At the national level alone,
one hundred and twenty-two positions were established on war boards
and commissions for representatives of labor. These posts were
filled by sixty-five leaders, a third of whom wore on more than
one board, and one, John R. Alpine, serving on five. Twenty-three
labor leaders were also delegates on various missions to Europe
"to acquaint the working people of the war ridden countries of the
88
stand taken by .Labor in the United States." Finally, an unknown
number of leaders served on various state and local councils of
defense and other war related bodies.
Business unionists displayed a propensity to join social
clubs and reform groups. The eighty-four leaders on whom informa-
tion is available belonged to a total of fifty-nine organizations.
On the average, each leader was a member of at least two groups.
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The reform bodies were basically of four types. First and Bios*
prominent were organizations such as the National Civic Federation
and the Foundation for the Promotion of Industrial Peace which
were designed to promote improved labor relations. Second, were
religiously oriented groups such as the Militia of Christ for
Social Service and the Federal Council of Churches. Third, were
societies established to promote world harmony. Among them was
the National Arbitration and Peace Congress which in its 1907
proceedings listed Samuel Gompers as a vice-president and twenty-
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tv/o other unionists as delegates. Finally, although less
significant, was the cause of temperance with at least five sup-
porters including John B. Lennon, the AFL treasurer, who wrote
90
several pamphlets for the Anti-Saloon League.
In perspective, the number of leaders who belonged to reform
groups was far less than the number belonging to social clubs.
Indeed, the fraternal connections of such labor leaders as Martin
Lawlor, James Lynch, or William P. Clarke would put Sinclair Lewis's
Babbitt to shame. The most extensive fraternal ties wore thoso
of George L. Berry of the Pressmen who belonged to the Masons,
Elks, Odd Fellows, Shriners, Rotary, and the Lambs 1 Club. Ho was
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also a founder and National Vice Commander of the American Legion.
The Masons and Elks were the most popular groups, each with twenty-
seven leaders. Other organizations such as the Moose, Eagles, and
Knights of Columbus drew their fair share of union officials, but
the most significant indicator of the development of labor union
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leadership was the fact that the business unionists were entering
the more exclusive social groups. Three had gained entrance into
athletic associations, six v/ere members of the budding country
club set, and ten of various city clubs.
^
The cumulative portrait of the typical business unionist
which emerges from the above statistical analysis is somewhat
different from the accepted stereotype. As scholars correctly
have pointed out, the working-class origins, urban-industrial
background, long tenures in office, and lack of political involve-
ment of the new unionists suggest a professional labor leader
whose primary concern is with his union. Where they have erred,
has been in neglecting certain characteristics such as club
membership and business activities which are indicative of middle-
class aspirations and the increased social status of a professional.
V
When the statistical portraits of the traditional labor
leader and the business unionist are compared, it becomes evident
that they do not represent two distinct types, as maintained by
earlier historians, but rather different but continuous phases in
the evolution of union leadership. The most outstanding compari-
sons between the old-school unionist and the new labor leader are
the similarities which they shared, rather than the differences
which divided them. Moreover, the differences that do exist are
either the result of the professionalization of union leadership,
or are simply minor differences of degree rather than kind.
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Sociologically, the traditional and the business unionists
were quite similar. Of the full three hundred and fifty leaders
analyzed in this study, less than one-half per cent were black
and only two per cent female. Moreover, more than ninety per cent
were of Western European extraction with a majority of each group
having ancestors in the British Isles. Over the sixty year period
from the l860's to the 1920 «s there was a gradual decrease in the
number of foreign-born leaders, but until the end of World V/ar I,
immigrants accounted for over forty per cent of the samples. The
native traditional and business unionists, who constituted a
majority of both groups, were born in roughly the same size urban
communities and resided in comparable cities at the time of their
elections to national offices. Finally, the overwhelming propor-
tion of leaders of both groups were from working-class families.
A number of important behavioral patterns of the old-school
labor leaders and the business unionists are also comparable. By
the age of fourteen the majority of both groups had dropped out of
school and begun work. Moreover, at least half of the leaders in
each period were elected to their first national union office by
age thirty-five. Except for an increase in Jews, the religious
affiliations of the leaders were roughly similar, with over half of
each sample apparently having very loose church ties. Likewise,
a majority of both groups were little concerned with politics.
Although the number of Democrats increased during the Progressive
Era, third-party supporters represented loss than twenty-five per
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cent of each group, and political activists were also less than
a fourth. Before the outbreak of World V/ar I at least, only
twelve per cent of the traditional labor leaders and thirteen
per cent of the business unionists were appointed to governmental
posts or commissions.
The differences that did exist between the two groups were
primarily the result of the institutionalization of the union,
and the simultaneous professionalization of union leadership.
Most indicative of the rise of careerism are the statistics on
tenure in office. The labor leaders of the Progressive Era spent
much longer moving up the union hierarchy than did their predeces-
sors, and upon attaining their highest office remained there for
considerably more time. Whereas fifty per cent of the traditional
leaders were in office for barely over two years, half of the new
unionists held their posts for fifteen years or more. The longer
tenures in offices were to a large extent proportional to the
length of time the union had been inexistence. In the Brother-
hood of Railroad Trainmen, founded in I883, the first president
served for less than a year, the next four were in office for one
year each, the sixth president served for ten years, the seventh
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for thirteen, and the eighth for nineteen year3. Accompanying
their longer tenures were higher salaries appropriate for profes-
sionals. As will be demonstrated later, the financial rewards
for union work rose from at best a token fee in the iGyO's to
salaries of eight, nine, and ten thousand dollars in 1920.
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Allegedly shocked by some of the incomes union officials report-
edly received at the latter date, Literary Digest ran an article
"Labor Pays its Leaders Capitalist Wages," the title of which
contained at least a grain of truth.
^
The rise of professionalism is indirectly suggested in
other statistics. As union leadership assumed more of the features
of an occupation, business unionists re j acted some of the behav-
iorial patterns of traditional labor leaders and adopted new ones.
vThile concerning only a minority of both groups, it is significant
that the number of leaders with business career interests outside
the union dropped from twenty per cent of the old-school unionists
to ten per cent of the new leaders. The number of leaders belong-
ing to social clubs, on the other hand, increased markedly. This
development is suggestive of the greater status labor leaders began
to enjoy as unionism became a more accepted part of American
society.
The rise of professionalism was a phenomenon noticed by
observers both inside and outside the union movement. Reporting
to the Thirty-Fifty Annual Convention in 1915 » "the AFL Executive
Council observed that "it was not so many years ago that an organ-
izer for the labor movement was regarded as a dangerous man in a
community. He was a marked man, blacklisted, denied opportunities
for any kind of work, starved and persecuted, but since the labor
movement has grown in power, and has been recognized as a movement
for humanity, it now is regarded as a great constructive agency in
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the community.
. . .
Formerly one of the indispensable qualities
of an organiser was ability for physical self-defense and protec-
tion." But, the Council went on to point out, things have changed
over the years. "Where industrial statesmanship has been developed
to a degree that co-operation with the organized labor movement is
sought, there the work of the organizer of the labor movement
becomes largely administrative and educational."^
Discussing the labor leader of 1920, Literary Digest
noticed a similar trend:
The office where these men hold forth, we are told,
by no means resemble the labor headquarters of yore,
which often were dark and dingy and sraelled of stale
beer ajid tobacco. The head office of a labor organiza-
tion of today is equipped with good desks, the latest in
filing cases, and other modern office devices, and it is
manned by alert clerks and stenographers. The entire
establishment bears the stamp of high-power business
efficiency, and this it seems, is the principal charac-
teristic of the man in charge.
The pioneers in labor history also perceived the rise of
professionalism in trade union leadership as one of the character-
istics of the stereotype business unionist which distinguished him
from the traditional labor leader. Yet these scholars never fully
understood nor explored the development of careerism in the labor
movement. Instead, the "business unionist" and his earlier coun-
terpart became casualties in the ideological warfare between the
Wisconsin School of Labor Studies and the more radical students
of unionism. They were transformed from tools of historical
understanding to issues of debate which in many ways were divorcod
98from reality.
49
Hopefully avoiding this tempting pitfall, the pages
which follow are an attempt to analyze the rise of professional-
ism in the labor movement. In particular, they are concerned
with certain basic questions which have been too long overlooked
or lightly handled by scholars." Why, for instance, did pro-
fessionalism develop? What form did it take? And what were
the consequences both for the labor movement and American
society?
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labor leaders refute this conclusion.
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CHAPTER II
FOUR IMAGES OP UNIONS
I
The preceding chapter outlined the evolution of labor union
leadership "between I87O and 1920 by analysing the sociological
and behavioral characteristics of the leaders. Approaching the
problem from a different perspective, the present chapter analyzes
the labor leaders' changing conceptions of their unions, tho rank
and file, and their own roles. Such a task demands a different
methodology. From the precision of figures, we turn to the
looseness of impressions. That the main themes may be discerned,
minor differences must at times be underplayed and disconnected
voices blended.
As a lot , labor leaders were not pensive men and spent
little time or ink evaluating their roles. Still in their speeches
and writings they used numerous similes, metaphors, and references
to describe their unions, their followers, and themselves. Many
of these rhetorical devices were intended simply for audience
appeal in an age of oratory. But four images—tho union as a
fraternity j a democracy? an army; and a business—had singular
import. They were repeated constantly by a groat number of
leaders and thus became part of many labor leaders' informal as
well as formal tools of reference. Time and again, tho leaders in
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outlining policies tried to transform the four images into reality.
By studying the content of the four primary images which labor
leaders used to describe the unions, it may be possible to under-
stand how these men perceived their roles, the roles of the rank
and file, and the nature of their organizations.
Images of the union were nebulous entities. In part, they
were idealized views of what their creators thought reality was
or should be. Moreover, they v/ere incomplete descriptions. The
concept of the union as a democracy, for instance, excluded
politics. Uor did the idea of the union as a business suggest
the estrangement of the executive from the stockholders, a phenom-
enon associated with the modern corporation. Indeed, at the
suggestion that such alienation was occurring, the leaders would
deny it by reverting to the concept of the union as a democracy,
thus revealing that the images v/ere in fact interchangeable and
1functional.
Over the period from ^Reconstruction to the end of World War
I the content of the images as well as the dominance of one image
over the others changed, directly reflecting the leaders 1 own
changing perceptions. To a large extent, the particular imagery
used at a certain time and place was related to the realities of
the union's internal and external environment. The concept of
the union as an army, for example, was most often voiced '//hen the
organization felt threatened; the union as a business emergod when
the organization developed a sense of security and a degree of
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acceptance from business, government, and the external community.
In the main, the notion of the union as a fraternity was most
frequently advanced in the years before I895, while the image of
the union as a business was most often expressed after that date.
The concepts of the union as a democracy and the union as an army
appeared throughout the period from I87O to 1920, but the content
of these images tended to change over time.
The role of the images in the development of labor union
leadership remained complex. As suggested above, the particular
image which was dominant at a certain time mirrored the stage of
union evolution. At the same time, labor leaders, by conforming
to certain images, contributed to the development of unionism and
leadership along certain lines. A leader viewing his union as a
business, for instance, acted and established policies which
reinforced his own businesslike behavior. In short, imagery both
reflected the evolution of labor union leadership and also contri-
buted to determining the course of that evolution. But given the
nebulous nature of imagery, it is impossible to measure the extent
of such contributions.
II
The image of the union as a fraternity was alluded to
throughout the years from Reconstruction to the end of World //car I.
In 1920, as had been true many years earlier, it was standard
practice to refer to a fellow unionist as "Brother" and to sign
labor correspondence with "fraternally Yours." Yet, it was in the
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decades before the turn of the century that the image of the union
as a fraternity was most pronounced and had actual substance.
During the Gilded Age, the founders of many unions consciously
sought to incorporate in the names of their new organizations
words which would suggest the fraternal qualities of fellowship,
righteousness, and nobility—thus, The Sons of Vulcan, The Knights
of St. Crispin, The Industrial Brotherhood, and The Sovereigns of
Industry. Pounders of unions in later years, not as influenced by
fraternal imagery, settled for words with fewer emotional and more
structural implications such as "Amalgamated," "Association,"
"United" (meaning amalgamation rather than solidarity), "Federated,
and simply "Union."
The union as a fraternity was to an extent an artificial
creation. Early leaders such as Terence V. Powderly, Uriah S.
Stephens, Frederick J. Turner, and Charles H. Litchman spent long
hours developing symbols and rituals which would give their labor
2bodies the aura of fraternal organizations. In part, fraternal!sm
was used as a means of attracting and holding members when more
immediate gains of better hours, wages, and working conditions
were slow in coming, much in the way later unions would use death
and relief funds.
^
The appeal of fraternalism to unionists in the decades
following the Civil War was rooted to a large extent in their
extreme consciousness not only of their declining economic status,
but also of their deteriorating social standing. Tho "hopeless
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degradation of the toiling masses? was a theme Which appeared in
the preambles ox numerous labor organizations. 4 In the ritual of
the Industrial Brotherhood, the head of the lodge instructed newly-
initiated members to the effect that "the great aim and object of
our organization is to secure for the industrial classes that
position in the world and in society to which they are entitled
as the producers of the necessities and comforts of life."-*
Reflecting on the meaning of the machine and the factory to the
previously self-employed craftsmen, Terence Powderly bemoaned the
fact that the artisans "no longer carried the keys of the work-
shop, for workshops, tools and keys belonged not to them, but to
their masters.
. . .
They saw that they were no longer engaged
in that competition which is 'the life of the trade, 1 they realized
that it was a competition which ultimately meant death to manhood
and independence, unless through some means it became directed
into a different channel." The process of industrialism, under-
cutting as it did craft skills, also enabled individuals of
dubious social character to enter previously esteemed trades.
"It may not be generally known to the public at large," related
Chief Peter M. Arthur of the Locomotive Engineers, "that railroad
men in the early days, speaking of them as a whole, were given to
habits of dissipation and vice. Intoxication was quite general;
habits were bad, which finally led to the formation of this
brotherhood for the purpose of bettering the conditions of the
7
men. That was the primary object."
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The desire to improve the moral quality and character of
the worker, which originally v/as "the groat mission of the Brother
hood," constituted an important factor in the founding of other
labor bodies during this era. One of the goals of the Sovereigns
of Industry v/as "elevating the character 11 of its members. "The
Order will aim, 11 its constitution stated, "to cultivate in its
members generous sympathies, soundness of thought, comprehensive-
ness of policy and a supreme respect for the rights of others,
with an inflexible determination to maintain their own, while for
labor it will seek to secure full and free opportunities."^ The
Preamble of the Industrial Brotherhood and numerous documents
of the Knights of Labor expressed similar sentiments.
The ethos of fraternity v/as ideally suited for promoting a
feeling of dignity, morality, and character among workers.
Membership in fraternally-oriented unions was open only to those
whose lives were above reproach. The early Brotherhood of Loco-
motive Engineers, for example, required those admitted into its
fellowship to be of high moral character and to be locomotive
engineers of good standing with at least one year's experience
And while the Knights of Labor proclaimed that its doors v/ere
open to all producers, it established an elaborate system of
blackballing undesirables and, at one time or another, explicitly
forbade the membership of ouch allegedly "degraded" typos a3
lawyers, doctors, bankers, professional gamblers, stockbrokers,
and those who sold liquor or made a living by its sale.
11
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Moreover, the Industrial Brotherhood, the Knights of Labor, and
other such organizations had strict rules of conduct and proce-
dures for disciplining or expelling any member who by word or
deed showed his character unworthy of fellowship* In the mid-
1860 1 3 , the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers expelled its
former Grand Chief, William D. Robinson, for deserting his wife
12
and refusing to support his family.
Leaders also designed other aspects of union rituals and
laws to promote a feeling of dignity and fellowship among members.
Upon entering the Sanctuary of the lloble and Holy Order, a Knight
of Labor had to write his name on a card. Among the reasons
given for this practice in the Secret Circular :
The first is pride, for on entering the Sanctuary he
desires to do so on an equal footing with his fellow
member who can write his name. The second cause is
that his eyes are opened, for the first time, maybe,
to the fact that he is inferior to other men who can
write, and a determination seizes him to emulate the
example thus set before him, and which othor men
practice.
The rhetoric of the fraternally-oriented unions also served
to instill in the members a sense of dignity. As Charles Madison
observed, the grandiose thinking of the Knights of Labor's founder,
Uriah S. Stephens, "may have been over the heads of many members,
but none failed to appreciate his glorification of labor. And
workers were then in need of such comfort." ^ Speeches and rituals
constantly reminded the workers that they were fulfilling God's
will. "The v/ork to which this fraternity addresses itself,"
proclaimed one leader:
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is one of the greatest magnitude ever attempted in th»
history of the world. ... It builds upon^ the immu-
table basis of the Fatherhood of God, and the logical
principles of the Brotherhood of Man.
. . . Inspired
by these lofty principles, it moves majestically" for-
ward to elevate the race to a higher plane of exist-
ence,—a truer, nobler development of its capacities
and power, and a realization of the greatest good
Fraternity was important primarily for the ethos it gave
early unions. In terms of suggesting organizational structure
and the internal distribution of power, it was vague and contained
conflicting elements. In this sense, the image differed from the
concepts of the union as a democracy, an army, or a business, for
they not only involved an outlook, but they implied particular
power relations and structural forms.
In some ways, the fraternal tradition promoted a democratic
spirit. All members were to be of equal standing. The require-
ment that each Knight of Labor sign his name served to remind
participants that they were equal. Within the Sanctuary, moreover,
"all members, whether they hold positions or not, occupy the same
level." According to the Secret Circular :
This is to indicate that there are no degree of rank,
no upper or lower class—all men are admitted on an
equal footing. By this lesson the member is encouraged
to work in harmony with his fellowmember; he feels
that to him all are the same, and in our dealings with
each other this idea must be carried out so far as is
consistent with our teachings,
Other rituals and symbols of fraternal unionism, however,
supported a more authoritarian spirit. The pompous appellations
o-iven officers of these organizations struck many observers as
possible within the limit
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undemocratic* Y/riting to B.F. Gordon of the Brotherhood of
Railway Shop Employees, Samuel Gompers observed:
I am free to say that in rny judgment these high
sounding titles of grand master and grand chief are
both un-American and by all means not conducive to
the best interests of organized labor. It tends to
the belief as well as the practice that one man is
to be looked up to as a saviour as well as the all-
absorbing officer of the organization. It surrounds
him with strange notions and necessarily develops a
feeling of impotency as v/ell as destroys sovereignty
and manhood among the rank and file, nor do these
high sounding titles ennoble men. Plain men with
plain titles with officers and men having distinct
duties to perform, instills manhood, intelligence
and self—reliance as well as interdependence,-, und
finally results in fraternity and solidarity. '
Apparently Terence Powderly felt the same way, for ho took
pains to point out in his autobiography that "when the General
Assembly of the K. of L. was instituted we designated our officers
as 'Grand Officers. 1 Five years after in our General Assembly
/of 18837 we decided that the word grand smacked too much of
aristocracy and we changed it to general and since then our
18
officers are knovm as General Officers." In another instance,
he requested of his fellow Knights that "in addressing letters to
me, or in introducing me as a speaker, or addressing mo in any way,
to drop the HON. I detest titles? it is disgusting to notice how
men, who should strive to level all distinctions will make use of
these flummeries
—
plain Tom, Dick, and Harry, is good enough for
lt
19
any man."
The authoritarian impulse went beyond mere titles and was
embodied in a strict code of obedience. V/'orkcrs seeking membership
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in tho Knights of Labor, as was the case for most organisations
of this nature, promised "strictly to obey all luv/s, regulations,
solemn injunctions, and legal summons that may be sent, said or
handed" to him by officers of the Order. 20 Their sv/orn duty was
"Obedience to the 'officers of their choice V»21 Such submissive-
ness was not seen as being in conflict with individual values
and opinions, for all members of the brotherhood accepted common
principles and goals. Major ideological differences were not
conceivable within the fraternal spirit. In the eyes of Powderly
and many others, the fraternal labor organization was on a single-
minded mission:
and in that crusade v/e have burned the bridges behind
us; v/e have stricken from our vocabulary the word failj
we aim at establishing the complete rights of man
throughout the world; we take as our guide no precedent
ever set by mortal man unless it be right; we tolerate
no dissension, and will have no disbanding save as
ordained by the Great Master Y/orkman when He calls
from our ranks each individual m^ber and bids him
join that silent majority.
. . .
Despite the demand for obedience, the role of the labor
leader was not one of a tyrant, but pre-eminently that of a
teacher. The fraternal labor unions put great stress on education
as a means of social change. The first plank in the Platform of
the Industrial Brotherhood, for instance, dedicated the organiza-
tion to "making knowledge a standpoint of action." Similarly,
Powderly constantly reiterated that "the chief aim of the Knights
of Labor is to educate. . . % n As head of the Order, ho longed
to stand before great crowds, instructing the workers in the ways
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to a better world. He was constantly pushing for larger expend-
itures for educational work and was always bemoaning the fact that
so much of his time was taken up answering trivial correspondence.25
This idea of the leader as teacher put a premium on
oratorical and literary skills. Biographical sketches of labor
leaders prominent before the turn of the century emphasized their
rehtorical abilities, whereas sketches appearing in labor journals
at a later date stressed special skills such as knowledge of the
trade or finances. It was not uncommon to find a leader described
as "one of the readiest impromptu speakers," whose powers of
oratory were so great that even his opponents "cannot resist the
temptation of going to hear him." Another leader might be
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criticized for his "thinness of voice." The role of the leader
as an educator also placed a premium on journalistic skills, in
part accounting for the greater number of labor editors who held
union office before 1895* Administrative abilities, on the other
hand, were considered less important. Reflecting the general
dislike for such work, Uriah Stephens advised a local master
workman "to call to his assistance as many light-footed and com-
°8
petant brothers as will be necessary to execute trifling duties."
Ill
V/hereas the image of the union as a fraternity was to some
extent an artificial creation, it was natural that labor adopt the
image of the union as a democracy. Host union members were native
born or from the British Isles and shared a cultural heritage
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which sanctioned democracy as the only just form of government.
Viewing unions in terms of this ideal v/as compatible with their
social values. Moreover, immigrant unionists from cultures
lacking in democratic traditions often proved avid democrats as
they zealously protected their newly gained freedom. The Yiddish
emigres from Tsarist Russia who founded the United Cloth Hat and
Cap Makers in 1901, to cite just one of many cases, refused to
designate a president, viewing such a position as tending to
29
authoritarianism.
Democratic imagery v/as also a natural corollary to American
labor's interpretation of its historic mission to extend the
meaning of the Declaration of Independence. "Civil and religious
liberty and theoretical equality before the law we already have in
America," explained Uriah Stephens in 1871:
That was achieved for us by our revolutionary forefathers,
and bequeathed by them as a sacred legacy to us, their
descendants and successors. But an accursed slavery, a
heaven-denounced tyranny, a degrading atheistical idoltry
remains, has grovm upon us, which it becomes our duty to
our
•Lroy and utterly
7 — — 7 — _ „ — v
selves, to our prosterity, and to God and humanity,
o dest annihilate.
Virtually every labor leader expressed similar sentiments,
bjicL beginning in the mid-1880 1 s these became embodied in the concept
of "Industrial Democracy. "^ Concerned primarily with gaining for
labor a voice in the government of industry, the values of Indus-
trial Democracy nonetheless were carried over to the internal polity
of the unions. "There is something in the spirit of labor organiza-
tions," observed Henry White of the United Garment Workers, "that
73
brings out the democratic instinct. Y,rhotiier this instinct be
given practical expression or not, it is at least seriously
attempted. This democracy is perhaps identical with the striving
for industrial equality and the revolt against authority from
above, which is the mainspring of unionism.' 1 "^
Most references to democracy in labor journals and in
speeches of labor leaders focused on the role of the union within
the larger community. While of secondary importance, the idea of
the democratic nature of the union in its internal affairs received
significant airing. At such times the union was pictured not
simply as being democratic, but as "Democracy in its purest and
best sense. . . "The labor movement," proclaimed the United
Mine '.Yorkers j Journal, "is democratic through and through and no
organisation on earth is doing as much good work as organized
labor is doing for the betterment of humanity for justice, equality
and fraternity." 34 "In fact," 'A Miner's V/ife 1 declared, "if
anything on this earth can or should partake of the natural and
infinite justice it should be that institution whose foundation
35
stone is a blending of both, viz. a labor organization." "The
world over," concurred the Garment V/orker , "trade unions are the
foremost defenders and champions of democracy in all of its forms."
The leading booster of democratic imagery was, predictably, Samuel
Gompers. "Our trade unions," he proudly wrote, "are democratic in
character and recognize the sovereignty of the members and a fed-
eration of trade unions such as the A.F. of L. is, must depend for
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its success upon the good-will of every member in the ranks." 37
Although Adolph Strasser, president of the Cigarmakers, was nick-
named "The Prussian" because of his autocratic methods, Gompers
upheld the union as "one of the most democratically conducted
bodies to be found anywhere,"38 In his eyes, the AFL conventions
were "the freest forum in the world," 39 and its system of voting
"the fairest devised by any legislative body in existence." 40
"It is at the numerous annual conventions of the international
trade unions and the annual conventions of the American Federation
of Labor that the spirit, genius, intentions, and tactics of the
organised workers of America are clearly set forth by democratic
methods.
. . .
Indeed in no institution on earth is the control-
ling power so completely in the hands of the rank and file." 41
This theme of the sovereignty of the membership was the
basic premise upon which the role of leadership was developed.
"There are no leaders—no dictators among usj" declared V/illiam
Sylvis of the National Labor Union, "and none can occupy a posi-
42tion unless by the clearly expressed will of the majority." A
half century later, James Duncan of the Granite Cutters expressed
the same sentiment: "Wo officer controls or commands. He, in
turn, is commanded. The rank and file do the ordering." "The
term •leader' is tabooed in union circles," observed Henry White
of the Garment V/orkers. "However such a person may bo recognised
on the outside he has no existence inside. The officials are just
44
'servants' and the will of the mass presumably alone leads."
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In replying to criticism from the Denver Evening Post, Samuel
Gompers elaborated on the role of the leader:
You Gay that if I value my position as 'leader 1 of
the common people I should lead them now. This betrays
what a poor conception you have of the fundamental
principles of our labor movement. Your idea seems to
be that an executive officer of an organization should
be their 'leader. 1 You do not seem to understand that
a leader implies followers, and that where there are
leaders and followers, there are dupers and duped.
You do not know that our movement is based upon the
recognition of the sovereignty of the workers; that
when they declare for a purpose, they're presumed to
mean what they say, and to act in accordance with it;
that they require their executive officer, not to
lead them, but to execute their will.
Responding to similar criticism, John Mitchell of the UM1. 1/ wrote:
Now, I know you will think that as president i
ought to do something more than i do, or in other
words, i ought to take a stand and have them come up
to it.
But, Sir, let me say our organization is conducted
along the lines of Initiate /sic/' and Referendum.
I, while head, can only sugest but must be referrcul
back to the rank and file for adoption or rejection*
In this idealised view, labor union democracy was govern-
ment without politics. 11 'Wire Pulling, electioneering 1 , and
other methods paculiar /sic7 to the politician must not, will
not, be practiced in our order, " insisted Powderly.^ An
unidentified miner agreed: "We as sensible, practical men do not
want men who stoop to humor their constitutents merely to hold
their office," he wrote. "We want men who will do their duty
and stand by the dogmas of a constitution framed by uc—the law-
makers. 1 '48 Another miner, W.S. Glasgow, also advised his follow
unionists to "keep politics out." "Let the office seek the man
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and not the man the office," he argued, "and two to one he will
do us double service."^
Sensitive to such feelings, union officials constantly
sought to create the belief that they were beyond politics.
Typical of many labor leaders, Samuel Gompers proclaimed:
I never was an aspirant for any office in my life, in
the labor movement or fraternity or other body—never.
Office came to mo always, I never went after it. In
all my life I have never asked any man either to
nominate me for office or vote for me. Neither
directly nor indirectly have I made any request or
suggestion or even entered a caucus of any kind in
furtherance of any office for which I was a candidate. J
Completing the ritual, leaders were expected to swear, as Jolm
Mitchell did, that "When I have finished ray term of office I shall
return to Illinois and take up my pick among you. "-'''*' Coming from
the people, they returned to the people after doing the job which
the people asked them to do. This complete ordeal was in part
intended to buttress the democratic belief that labor loadoro
were "very much like the rest of us," and bore "a marked resem-
52blance to other folk."^
The union as a democracy had several functional purposes.
Desiring to win broad public support, labor leaders and journalists
used the concept for propaganda purposes. It was presented most
frequently and in most unconditional form in those publications
intended to reach a wide, non-labor audience. Counteracting
frequent accusations by anti-unionists that labor loaders were
unrepresentative of the workers and were out for personal gains,
union officials reiterated the democratic theme over and over to
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assure middle-class supporters that their organizations wore
liberal vehicles in the crusade "against those twin monsters,
tyranny and monopoly. 3 Moreover, the imago was often presented
in such a form as to convince genteel reformers that organized
labor was a vital force in meeting challenges to the "American
way of life" to which their audience was particularly sensitive.
The Textile V/orkor argued, for instance:
The real molting pot in which the nationalities who
seek asylum on our shores are fused and purified into
citizenship, is trade unions. The alien, first secur-
ing membership in a union, there gains his initial
ideas of freedom and independence, learns that he
controls himself, that without fear of king or poten-
tate he may voice not only his protests, but his
ideals and Ixis aspirations, and, what is equally
important, ho learns to express his civic ideas in an
orderly and responsible way#
Such sentiments no doubt struck a responsive chord among
many Americans v/ho feared the ri?:o of the masses and sought some
means of social control* Charles Board, for one, fully accepted
the image of the union as a democracy* "When the full story of
self-government in America is written « . . f " he wrote somowhat
overaealously
,
"pages on the cellular growth of local craft unions
will be placed beside the records of town meetings; while chapters
on the formation of national labor structures will complement the
sections on the origin and development of the federal Constitu-
tion." 5 ^
The imago of the union as a democracy was also useful in
managing internal union affairs. Policies which labor loaders
either wanted or opposed could be condoned or condemned in terms
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of their democratic character. Plans for reorganizing the manage-
ment of the United Iline Workers' Journal, for instance, were
praised as having "the genuine ring of popular government.
. .
On the other hand, the 1911 convention of the API rejected a
proposal requiring that one of their eight vice presidents be a
representative of the federal unions, "the convention not deeming
it advisable to make class distinctions when selecting members of
the Executive Council. " Jl In reality, this decision totally
ignored the fact that class distinctions existed within the system
of representation, so limiting the federal unions' strength as to
curtail their abilities to elect a member of the council outright.
The image of the union as a democracy enabled labox* leaders
to save face in times of trouble. The concept of the sovereignty
of the rank and file, Henry White of the Garment Workers observed
from his own experience, "is encouraged by the union heads who
at all times wish the members to feel that they merely execute
their wishes, especially so when the results are not fortunate."
Union officers, he continued, "encouraged the democratic sentiment
in order to make things surer for themselves. By securing the
apparent approval of the body of members, they could dodge blame
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for any ill conceived move."
The democratic facade provided an argument for discrediting
and suppressing dissension. By pointing to their own election to
office, labor leaders could dismiss critics as small, undemocratic
cliques unwilling to abide by the will of the majority. To the
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Typographical Journal such dissenters were "deraogogues and char-
latans who seek little less than their own preferment and advan-
59tage."-' "A majority of the martyrs (?) for union who now protest
against the policies of the different organizations," the miners'
Journal ridiculed, "are men who didnH get office." More
important than such calumny, was an underlying tendency to treat
the right of dissent a3 having no justifiable place within the
union. Typical of many labor leaders, a perplexed William Sylvis
could never discover a single reason why there should
he bickering or contention among workingmen. There
are no leaders—no dictators among us; and none can
occupy a position unless by the clearly expressed will
of the majority. While such perform their duties
faithfully, they should have their hands strengthened.
If they neglect them, the masses have the power to
remove them.
Now, with this plain, democratic system to govern
us, why should we encounter suglji drawbacks as discord,
jarring, and unjust criticism?
Expressing a similar view, a leader of the miners maintained:
that within this organisation there is no room fox'
strongly defined parties or partisans. When the
verdict of the majority has been ascertained and
announced it becomes the duty of all the members of
our great union to give their active support to those
who have been elected to fill the positions of trust
and responsibility; for without such unanimous sup- ^
port no official can deliver the best that is possible*
While the union as a democracy could serve practical
functions, it was not basically a deception used by labor leaders.
The image did have an essence of its own. Most labor leaders
truly believed that their organizations were democratic, and
when forced to resist the v/ill of the majority, they maintained
in all honest that "it has been proven by experience that to
give Democracy a fair chance of success it must to some extent bo
kept in check "by a conservative power.
. .
,"
6
^
"Leadership is
not inconsistent with democracy, 11 insisted the Mine Workers'
Journal, "In fact, it promotes democracy* In times of oriels
the mass can not get the breadth of view that those at the head
can. It can not know its own limitations or see the obstacles
to be overcome or the strength of the opposition, and when quick
action is required the mass is not competent to direct itself*"
-
The annals of labor contain numerous incidents in which
labor leaders attempted to behave in accordance with democratic
precepts, Uriah S. Stephens firmly opposed having the dolegate3
to the General Assembly of the Knights of Labor chosen from
district assemblies rather than from the membership at largo,
viewing such a practice as "Un-democratic an /a%o/ Oligarchy."^
Powderly, when asked to make a decision on a grievance, replied:
"Hear both sides, then judge, is my motto* I thereforo return
your letter with the request that you send a copy of it to your
assembly to be read, and ask of them to send me, under seal, the
other side of the case. If you do this I will be better prepared
to decide impartially."^ Gompers stood firmly for religious
liberty in the labor movement. "Tolerance of religious belief,
or non-belief is inherent in the Unions," he insisted, "and wo
have no right to permit the conscience of any man being shocked
67
either for or against religion in the meetings of our Unions."
And accepting the full consequences of democracy, Y/illiam Blair
Prctscott campaigned for the popular election of offioers during
his seven yo;<.rs as head of tho International Typographical Union,
only to bo defeated for ro-olection tho first time the referendum
was put into practice
.
Yet, while democracy was meaningful, unions were never
fully free to shape policy in its spirit. A sense of security,
political scientists generally agroo, i G vital for tho development
and flowering of domocracy in a body politic.^ During tho years
from 1070 to 1920, labor unions generally lacked such security,
facing attacks from government, business, competing labor organ-
izations, and other groups. Moreover, despite the commitment of
union founders to tho democratic tradition, they had come together,
as Hobort IIo:cie observed, "not primarily to establish and vindi-
cate a form of organization—the organisation is merely means to
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end—but to establish and maintain certain conditions of living."
In striving for these goals, genuine democracy—embodying as it
does two grave defects, a lack of stability and difficulty in
mobilization—was frequently abandoned in the hope of attaining
practical results. Finally, as tho German sociologist Robert
Michols demonstrated in his classic study, Politioat Parties
#
modern democratic organizations gonorato within themselves over-
bearing oligarchic tendencies. Those tendencies as they existed
in the American labor movomont are a major theme of tho prosont
study.
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IV
While insecurity widened the gap between the ideal and the
practice of democracy, it made the imago of the union as an army
more realistic. Participating in the most violent system of labor
relations in any industrial nation, labor leaders naturally gravi-
71tated toward martial allusions. "The struggle which organized
labor is carrying on," the American Federations st pointed out,
"resembles in some respects the campaign of an army. There are
72
organizations, officials, and encounters with an opposing force."
Within union circles it was common practice to refer to the rank
and file as "the army of labor" or the "organized army of dis-
content" and to label famous episodes in labor history "wars,"
73
"battles," and "massacres."
The military theme was prevalent throughout the period from
I87O to 1820. Many of the symbols of the Nobel and Holy Order,
for instance, had martial implications. The very name "Knights"
drew a parrallel with the crusaders of old, while "the lance which
confronted the member who knocked for admittance on the Inner
Veil signified •defence 1 ."' 4 "Our order is like a military
organization," wrote Powderly. "We require and must exact tho
strictest discipline and as a consequence our trials must be the
same as Court Martials, hence the existence in our laws of such
an officer as Judge Advocate."^5 Later unions tended to update
the image by making references to trenches, general orders, the
draft, and other aspects of modern warfare. "These are stern days
in the struggles of the workers," declared the Textile Worker
in
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1916. "They are days that call for supreme alertness, endurance
and endeavor. The trenches must be guarded and enlarged and
extended. The line of march must he steady, intelligent and
determined. Organisation! That's the word." To the American
Fedorationist
,
the principles of unionism "should be promulgated
as 'general orders 1 and our army made to obey, for we need a
unionism of 'Industrial Discipline * • This spirit wag captured
in a poem by Mrs. H.W. Brown. Written in 1916 and entitled "A
Voice Prom the Ranks," it resembled the enlistment literature
which was soon to encourage young men to go forth and fight the
Huns:
Join your brother—-get into your union,
Stand by him loyal and true.
He f s fighting your battle unaided
—
Y/ake up, man—-fight with him too.1
Be a volunteer soldier of labor,
Don't wait till they draft you to come.1
Get into the ranks with your brothog
And the battle is bound to be won.
Unlike the other images, the implications of the union as
a military unit in terms of power and authority were quite direct
the officers were to command; the rank and file were to obey.
"He who would be a good soldier," declared a typical editorial,
must not only join the army, but must obey without
question every command given him; must perform faith-
fully every task to which he is assigned, and discharge
his duty thoroughly* He who would be a good union man
must not be content to simply have his name on the
roster of a local: he must attend the meetings, take
a part in every movement for the advancement of the
brotherhood. He should be ready when the call of
forward is given to go; should be ready to retrace
his steps if the retreat is sounded. In fact, he could
follow the example set by tho soldier in many ways, and
he will profit thereby.'^
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President J.B. Rae of the coal miners expressed a similar
sentiment in an essay revealingly entitled "The Ideal Organization' 1 :
The lack of discipline in the ranks of labor is also
a hindrance, and indeed it is a real danger. To command
confidence and secure compliance, plans have to be dis-
closed before the time for action has come. Such unfold-
ing of plans makes it more difficult, if not impossible,
to carry them out. ... A general understanding as to
what is going to be done is proper, but the plan of
action and the time to move should be kept secret, and
the rank and file, like the army in the field, should
be prepared to move v/i^out question when the time for
action has come.
. . .
The non-ferrous metal miners were of the same opinion:
If the Western Federation of Miners is to live and
go forward in the battle for justice, the membership
must stand as a solid phalanx against the encroaching
power of the known enemy that is sparing no effort to
exterminate organized labor. Quibbling on frivolities
relative to the constitution and the laws which govern
the organisation will scarcely halt the known enemy on
its invasion into the very citadel of the labor movement.
V/ithin the image of the union as an army, then, the leader
was a general. He possessed special abilities and only he and his
general staff knew the full battle plan. To obtain glory, however,
he had to have strict obedience from his troops. "It OUgJat to be
inscribed, in mammoth characters, on every miner's mind," declared
the United. Mine Workers 1 Journal, "that the most efficient weapon
in this fight is peace and quietude, coupled with unanimity. If
we remain united and firm now, for a short time, the battle will
be ours ere long, with very little trouble." "The greater the
confidence of the rank and file in its officials," concurred the
AFL's official organ, "the more highly probable is it that a union
will win its victories."^ The martial spirit in the union, as in
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real armies, focused on the duty of the foot soldiers to obey
rather than the responsibilities of the generals in leading.
Simple and direct, the image had tremendous influence.
V
During the 1870's and l880's spokesmen for labor alluded
only occasionally to the union as a business. Far less pronounced
than the concepts of the union as a fraternity, a democracy, or an
army, the allusions to the union as a business initially called
forth visions of early industrial and commercial institutions.
Uriah Stephens related a local assembly of the Knights of Labor,
for instance, to "a 'business firm 1
,
every member an equal partner
as much so as a bank, a commercial house, or a manufacturing
establishment." As a partner, every member was "duty bound to
put in his equal share of money and time." Within the image,
distinctions between leaders and followers faded away. " 'As ye
sow so shall ye also reap, 1 fits exactly here as much so as it
does in the mercantile house, the factory or the bank," ho
declared. "There can be no 'silent partners' in this business. .
In the years after I895 the image of the union as a businos
became far more pronounced. Countless editorials in the labor
press argued "that up-to-date business methods should be adopted
by trade unions,"^ and delegates to the AFL convention in I9O5
expressed belief that, "In its capacity as a labor exchange, the
trade union cannot exempt itself from the necessity of compliance
with sound business principles," In 1909 the Journal of the
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locomotive engineers argued that the union was organized solely
on a business basis, and four years later the Typographical Union
proclaimed itself to be ,!A Large Business Institution. 1,87 "Trade
Unions," observed the Atlantic City Union Herald in 1901, "are
more and more being based on business principles, and are more
and more being managed by business-minded leaders who operate
according to business methods."
The reasons for the increased attraction of the business
image after I895 weafe related to several interacting factors. In
part, it was a direct outcome of the growing acceptance of the
AFL's philosophy of "pure and simple unionism." Gompers 1 approach
to the labor question, rejecting as it did broad social goals for
concrete agreements with employers on hours, wages, and working
conditions, put a premium on internal union discipline and proper
administration. "We had developed discipline as an essential of
trade unionism," the AFL leader wrote in his autobiography:
With discipline the movement emerged from confusion
of thinking and practice to a definite trade union
philosophy. A practical business administrative
system within unions had provided offices, salaried
officials, and the beginning of systematic labor
records. All these things were necessary to sustain
contractual relations with employers.
Equally important, an increase in union membership and an
expansion of union activities contributed to the adoption of the
business-like image. From 1899 to 1903 total membership in the
AFL rose from 349,000 to 1,465, 000.
90 The United Mlnfc V/orkers,
who pushed their roster from a mere ten thousand members in 1897
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to 200,000 five years later, stimulated much of this growth. 91
But the unionizing impulse was felt far beyond the coal fields.
In Connecticut, to cite Just one case, the number of labor organ-
izations increased from 214 in 1899 to 591 in 1903.^2 V/ith the
expansion of union membership, administrative problems became
more complex. Organizations had more records to keep, larger
funds to manage, and additional services to provide. In 1909,
Daniel Tobin of the Teamsters described his union as "a set
institution having regular standing monthly expenses that cannot
be avoided and must be paid, amounting to at least three thousand
dollars per month. I refer to office rent, salary of help,
salary of officers, per capita tax to American Federation of Labor
monthly publication of the Journal & c»" Similarly, a writer
outlining those features which made the printers 1 union a business
establishment emphasized that its executive council had just
invested six hundred thousand dollars of the union f s reserve
funds in bonds that would net about four per cent. Continuing, he
pointed out that "v/ith its increasing membership, its Printers
Home in Colorado Springs, its old age pension fund, its school
for apprentices, not to mention other union activities, the
International Typographical Union has grown to be a great insti-
tution requiring a high degree of business ability in its manage-
ment.^ 4 The imperatives of running large organizations was one
of the main factors which historian John Laslett sees as forcing
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left-wing unions to become more conservative.
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Another force which contributed to the increasing use of
the image of the union as a business was the emergence of a new
system of values in American society around the turn of the
century. Championed by groups which Robert V/iebe views as "A
New Middle Class 1 ' (among whom were labor leaders), the new ideas
"were bureaucratic ones, peculiarly suited to the fluidity and
impersonality of an urban-industrial world," "Instead of liking
society to a clock's simple gears in perpetual motion,' 1 ,/iebe
observed, "men were now thinking in terms of a complex social
96technology, of a mechanised and systematized factory." Effi-
ciency became a guide to action, expertise a necessity for the
solution of social problems, and regulation and structure a
requirement for social order and stability. Labor leaders found
the image of the union as a business in harmony with the new social
ethos.
In both outlook and practice, unions accepted the values
of modern corporate enterprises. "There is not an investment
known," declared the Textil e Worker, "that has paid dividends
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equal to that which has been earned by unionism." The Garment
Worker developed the theme that labor as well as capital was work-
ing toward a basic end, "namely: To regulate the production and
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distribution of wealth. I,y Decisions whether to organize an area
or not began to be expressed in terms of profitability. "It will
cost a barrel of money and we cannot see any way of getting it
back," commented Daniel Tobin on the prospects of unionising the
99
New York City mail drivers.
"
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The gospel of efficiency become a major influence in the
labor movement. In I898 the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,
introducing more businesslike methods, ended its practice of
destroying the year's accumulation of correspondence after each
convention. 100 Form letters began to constitute more and more of
the correspondence of labor unions. Long tenures in office and
higher pay for labor leaders were accepted on the ground of
promoting efficiency and expertise, while the referendum system
of union government came under attack for its inefficiency.
Prom 1915 to 1918, the Typographical Journal published a long
debate on ways to transform the printers* annual meeting from a
pleasure outing to a business convention. 10^ Reflecting the
trend, the delegates to the 1912 convention of the AFL first
decided "that the president should have the power to appoint
convention committees, as their election would take up considerable
of the time of the convention and accomplish nothing of benefit
to the labor movement," and secondly refused to elect permanent
general organizers, "declaring a convention less qualified to
pass on qualifications and especial fitness for certain work than
the Executive Council." 10 "^
Labor leaders, like their corporate counterparts, were
viewed as having special abilities and character. As defined by
>
the United I.Iine ./orkors 1 Journal, union officers were "men who
are making a study of organised labor and know how to advise the
lay member." 104 They were "trained in the school of experience"
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and able to present the workers' side of every controversy
"convincingly and with national, yes, and international scope. 11
They were also "able enough to cope with the best brains that can
be procured by the employers.
. . #
"
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A spokesman for the
printers agreed: "There is not a single corporation in the United
States or Canada, that requires as high an order of ability, and
that has anywhere the amount of business to be transacted as the
International Typographical Union.
. . #
»
106
Under such circum-
stances, another printer maintained, the position of leadership
called "for men possessing qualifications acquired only by
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specialization."' "What the American workman mo^t needs to-day,"
concluded the American Federationjlgt, "is a leadership which in
point of mental endowment and moral stamina, surpasses the capital-
ist leaders. Intellectual strength always subdues inferiority,
and moral worth will, in the long run, win the staunchest
following."
Mirroring this development, biographical sketches in union
journals put emphasis on the leaders 1 education and training in
industrial affairs, rather than the oratorical ability stressed
ten or twenty years earlier. In 1892. 5 for instance, the United
Mine 'workers 1 Journal described a leader as an eloquent speaker
who "caused the tears to trickle down the cheeks of men whose
nature is not such as to be wheedled into rapturous joy by mere
sophisticated jargon. . . . 1,109 The same paper in 1910 described
another officer as not only possessing "a wide knowledgo of men
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and human character, but is considered a walking budget of matters
pertaining to the coal industry. ... In addition he has a very
good technical knowledge of coal mining, and taught evening
classes for six years, many of his pupils qualifying for posi-
tions as mine managers."
The image of the union as a business was leadership oriented
Extended references to the rank and file were seldom. The latter
were the stockholders who willingly transferred control of their
institution to a board of managers. Once having selected their
executives, the membership was to refrain from activities which
would upset the operations of the union and follow the directives
of the officers in order to attain maximum efficiency and benefit
from the organization. Reflecting the emerging bureaucratic
order, Samuel Gompers wrote to the Brewery '.Yorkers' secretary:
... if there is any hope entertained for the success
and permanency of the trade union movement in our country,
it must be by the individual member yielding his judg-
ment to the decision of the local union of his trade,
the local union yielding to the international union, and
the international union in turn complying with the
decisions of the highest tribunal of Amejjjan organized
labor—the American Federation of Labor.
Only occasionally would labor leaders refer to members as
their employers, particularly when they wanted more rank and file
responsibility, salary increases, or some other program like the
establishment of "a pension system for those who had given their
life service" to the labor movement.
112 For the most part the
members were treated as silent partners, a view far
removed from
Uriah Stephen's early concept.
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VI
Within the four images of the union existed too inter-
related thematic conflicts, the ultimate outcome of which had
major implications for the nature of union government and the
development of labor leadership. The first conflict was between
the concept of the leader as r, one of the gang" and the leader as
unique and superior to the rank and file. As has been pointed out,
the images of the union as a fraternity and a democracy had
several elements in them which tended to treat the leader as one
among equals. Moreover, the early view of the union as a business
was of a partnership rather than a professionally managed corpora-
tion. On the other hand, the pretentious titles of fraternal
unionism and the concept of an elect within democratic unionism
tended to elevate the leader above the membership. And elitism
was fundamental to the images of the union as an army and a
business, both of which explicitly viewed organizational structure
as hierarchical.
Closely related to this problem was the second thematic
conflict—between individual freedom and discipline. Again, the
images of the union ao a fraternity and particularly the concept
of the union as a democracy contained aspects promoting individual
freedom. Yet they also had undertones demanding members to
sacrifice personal desires for the good of the whole. This theme
of obedience and conformity was even more forcefully expressed in
the image of the union as a business and was at the heart of the
union as an army.
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Given the inconsistencies inherent in our four images, it
was extremely significant that by tho end of World V/ar I the
concepts of the union as an army and the union as a business wen
far more prominent and influential than the ideas of the union a:
a fraternity or a democracy. In effect, it meant that by 1920
labor leaders and their followers most fully related to those
images which put a premium on the leader as unique and the need
for rank and file discipline. Such attitudes both reflected and
continued to shape the nature of labor union leadership.
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CHAPTER III
UNIONS, MANAGEMENT, & LEADERSHIP
I am not suggesting that the leadership has played a
wholly passive role in the process of acquiring power
or that it lias not sought to add to that which was
dictated by market forces. However, it seems to me
that the personal ambitions of leaders have been far
less significant in the building of their power than
the market factors over which they had no control ....
Emanuel Stein
I
Prom I87O to 1920, American labor devoted the bulk of its
energy to direct economic action. Concern for "bread and butter' 1
issues characterized the "business unions" of the American Feder-
ation of Labor as well as most other unions # To be sure, during
the formative years of unionism, some workingmen united primarily
to advance the moral character of theii" class and provide mutual
assistance. Unable markedly to improve the living standards of
their members by these methods, such organizations either lost
their following and faded from the scene or altered their focus
2
to include direct economic action." Likewise, unions advocating
replacement of the wage system in reality exerted most of their
effort toward improving the laborer's welfare under the existing
economic arrangement. Even organized labor ! s extensive involve-
ment in the political field was secondary to economic action.
The AFL continually placed political agitation in a subordinate
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role, and "reformist" organisations like the Knights of Labor had
extensive union-management relations, an aspect of the Order which
scholars have unjustly ignored
•
The evolution of industrial relations from I87O to 1920
strongly influenced the institutional structure of unions as well
as their ideological outlook. The continuous efforts of unionized
workers to improve their lot tended to transform their organiza-
tions from loose conglomerates of semi-autonomous locals into
centralised bodies in which the national office commanded obedi-
ence from its subdivisions, performed a multitude of functions,
and managed sizeable funds. More important, economic action
helped forge professional labor leadership. 3y 1920, the pattern
of union-management relations was increasingly confined to
interaction between employers and the leadership of labor.
The story of industrial relations during this era resists
simplification. A multitude of unions confronted a variety of
employers, market situations , skill requirements, and technological
innovations. Ho two unions faced identical environments, and
even for an individual union conflicting conditions often pre-
vailed simultaneously. During the first decade of the twentieth
century, for example, the Iron Holders' Union negotiated with
the Stove Pounders 1 Association at the same time that it was in
5bitter conflict with the National Founders 1 Association.-7 To any.
generalization about the development of union-management relations,
therefore, exceptions abound. I3ut a pattern of change emerges,
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and by focusing on significant events, clarity and order can be
derived from confusion.
II
Labor relations from the Civil ,/ar to tho 1890' s were
primarily localized and marked by a spontaneity edging on anarchy.
Throughout the era, industrial conflict raged. According to the
Federal Bureau of Labor, 9,663 strikes and lockouts occurred
between 1881 and 1890. In the year 1386, the climax of labor's
"Great Upheaval' 1
,
1
? 432 strikes and 140 lockouts threw 610,024
employees out of work, Most of these struggles were confined
to local communities—the Hocking Valley of Ohio, the three
anthracite fields of Pennsylvania, the textile mills of Pall River,
Massachusetts—and pitted local workers against local management.
Rebellions against the few large, nation-wide companies were
generally directed against a local branch. Strikes of national
or regional dimensions were largely confined to the railroads,
and these were often the simultaneous outbreak of a number of
local conflicts with little central coordination. As the committee
established by the Pennsylvania legislature to investigate the
"Railroad Riot of 1877" reported: "each strike was independent
of those on other roads, each having a local cause particularly
its own." The large number of non-union conflicts reflected
the spontaneity of labor unrest. In 1881 and again in 1882,
approximately fifty-two per cent of the struggles were not
initiated by labor organizations* During the l880 ? 3 the figure
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slowly declined, yet it averaged thirty-nine per cent for the
decade.*^
Although the industrial disputes of the Gilded Age grew
out of several issues, the primary question was that of wages—
the resistance to wage cuts, the desire to reestablish previously
reduced wage rates, or the demand for increased compensation.
Of the 1881 strikes which can be traced to a single issue,
seventy-three per cent concerned wages, six per cent focused on
union recognition and union rules, and only three per cent
related to the hours of labor. For the entire decade of the
1880 f s remuneration was at issue in approximately sixty per cent
of the single cause conflicts."1*0 Preoccupation with immediate
economic returns rather than union recognition in part reflected
the large proportion of non-union strikes and also the local
orientation of union-management affairs. As will be pointed out
subsequently, the issue of union recognition was of greater
concern to the national leadership.
While wages were the primary issue in dispute, the cause
of industrial strife generally stemmed from the manner in which
labor relations were conducted. The practice of collective
bargaining was in its infancy. A few unions attained written
agreements, including the iron workers in 1866 and the anthracite
coal miners in 1869. Yet these contracts were generally short-
lived and represented the exception rather than the rule.
Likewise, although a number of unions including the Knights of
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Labor called for arbitration of industrial disputes, this was an
unusual procedure for the age. 11
rmThe more customary practice was for labor or management
to establish labor standards unilaterally. On the one hand,
management would boldly announce that on a certain date new
conditions would prevail. Faced with the decree, employees had
few alternatives. If the boss agreed to meet with the workers to
discuss the change, he would most likely insist that they approach
him individually or that they select representatives from within
the firm's work force. In either case, management had the upper
hand through control of the jobs. Y/hen such pleading failed,
employees could either submit, leave the firm on an individual
basis and seek work elsewhere, or band together and strike.
On the other hand, workers also took the initiative in
unilateral action. The standard practice was for employees to
meet together and determine under what terms they would labor.
The final decision was held as non-negotiable and presented to
the employer. If he accepted, all was well; but if he turned
down labor's proposal, the workers had either to submit or go on
strike. If they took the latter course, the chances of success
were roughly fifty-fifty, and usually victory was achieved at
.12
great cost in human suffering and loss of wages. Defeat not
only multiplied personal grief, but frequently resulted in the
demise of the union and dismissal from employment of its most
active supporters*
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The local orientation of labor relations following the Civil
War mirrored existing economic conditions. As economist Emanuel
Stein observed, "the locus of power within a union is going to
be found at the point where the collective bargaining takes
place, and this in turn is determined by market considerations." 13
Despite trends to the contrary, the nation's market system in the
I860«s and l870«s remained localised. Economically, as well as
socially and politically, America was a country of "island
communities." 14 This was particularly true in some industries
where strong local unions were developing—printing, bricklaying,
carpentry. By I89O, however, technological developments had
fundamentally altered the situation by encouraging a national
market network. Yet localised labor relations persisted into the
latter period, demonstrating the lag between environmental change
and institutional response. The business history of the era
was in large measure the story of efforts to cope with change in
the size of the market and new forces of technology. Hot until
the I890«s were acceptable solutions found in the form of trusts,
finance capital, large corporations, and employers' associations
to dea.1 with labor.
In a similar manner, organised labor reluctantly adapted
to change. Originally, craftsmen had banded together to protect
their interests in the immediate economic community. Over time,
however, they became aware that their efforts were being thwarted
by outside competition. In some instances products made in other
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towns by workers laboring at lower wages found their way into the
local community where they sold for lower prices. Local manufac-
turers were impelled to cut wages and reduce prices in order to
compete. In other instances workers who had mastered their trade
elsewhere moved into the community and accepted employment below
the prevailing wage, thus forcing down the standards of the local
workers. In order to meet the problems posed by an expanded
product market and increased labor mobility, the local unionists
sought alliances with organised workers in other communities.
Out of these efforts emerged the national labor unions. 15
Thus, the majority of national labor organisations during
this era grew from the bottom-up (as opposed to organisation from
the top-down characteristic of many CIO unions). And in joining
together into a larger association, the local bodies, like the
thirteen colonies uniting under the Articles of Confederation,
hesitated to surrender too much sovereignty. This was due in
part to the desire of the local power elite to maintain control,
in part to fear of allowing outsiders lacking knowledge of local
conditions to interfere in their affairs, and in part to a belief
that the problems did not warrant centralised control. As a
result, most early national unions were loose federations of
local bodies, much like America of the 1780's."''^
Duties of the early national officers under this arrange-
ment were limited and routine, which helps explain why the
17
secretary was often the first paid functionary. The primarily
clerical tasks assigned to the Bricklayers' executives led
Resident White to report to the 186? convention that his job
"for the past year has not been very severe, owing to our worthy
Secretary, who has always been willing to do my correspondence,
and relieve me all that lay in his power." 18 Presidents of the
International Association of Journeymen Plumbers were primarily
responsible for managing the union's cooperative shops in
Milwaukee, a task they so mishandled as to cause the failure of
both the businesses and the union. 19 Some constitutions did
grant national officers more extensive duties, but the reluctance
and niggardliness of the locals frequently prevented their ful-
fillment. The chief executive of the Bricklayers was instructed
"to visit subordinate Unions, and inspect their proceedings,
either personally or by deputy," but the convention delegates
continuously refused to provide sufficient money, either in
salary or traveling funds, to allow compliance. 20 For similar
reasons, Thomas Phillips, president of the Boot and Shoe ,/orkers,
was unable to accomplish his constitutional obligations. 21 Even
if funds were available, the influence a national leader could
exert on autonomy-minded locals was limited. In I874, president
John Siney of the -.liners' National Association issued a general
circular advising against strikes. Later ho learned that several
local officers had collected all circulars sent to their territory
22
and incinerated them before they could re;;.ch the rank and file.
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The national executives' lack of power was particularly
marked in union-management relations. Officers of the Internal
al Typographical Union, founded in 1852, played no role in calling
strikes until the establishment of a defense fund in 1805. Like-
wise, the Cigar Makers, who organised a general union in 1864,
rejected centralized strike control until 1879 . Up to then the
executive board was obliged to sanction without question all
strikes except those for wage increases. 23 Lack of discretionary
authority caused the secretary of the Miners' Association of
Western Pennsylvania to complain in 1880 of the "iron jacket
orders from convention." 24 For several years after its formation
in 1859, locals of the Iron Molders 1 Union remained largely auton-
omous. Finally, in 1863, the Molders made the initiation of
strikes subject to approval through a general referendum. This
practice at least gave the national officers a chance to persuade
the membership. Yet their influence remained limited. Union
rules required the president to prosent all the facts in hi3
possession when issuing strike circulars. The information,
however, was attained from the local which wanted to go out and
frequently displayed bias. Moreover, locals would approve eacli
others' strike requests in anticipation of the day when they would
want reciprocal support. Not until 1882, twenty-four years aftor
the establishment of the national union, did the chiof executive
25
attain absolute control ovor strikes arid lockouts. Tho typo-
graphers, cigar makors, and iron molders wore part of tho labor
Ill
vanguard; they v;ere among the first to organize as well as to
establish strike funds and some centralized authority. For most
organizations, the process of enlarging the national officers'
power in union-management affairs did not begin until the 1890'-
and after.
With power concentrated at the local level, it was here
that the first professional labor leaders in the modern sense
developed, u'hile national loaders, denied a critical role in
industrial relations, concentrated on broad labor reforms, local
leaders were developing skills in union-management negotiations.
Among the Carpenters, for instance, P.J. IIcGuire, partly of his
own choice and partly due to the locals' desire to preserve their
autonomy, guided the national admini stration toward broad reform-
ist ends with organize-agitate-educate means. Concomitantly,
salaried business agents emerged at the local level. Concerned
With day-to-day relations of labor and management, they developed
characteristics similar to those of the national union official
26
of the future. A similar development occurred in the Knights
of Labor v;here ntional leaders devoted the greater portion of
their time, after administrative work, to the broad issues of
labor reform. Meanwhile, specialists in labor-management affairs
were in the marking, particularly in assemblies of skilled crafts-
men. In I879, for example, local assembly 322 of Pittsburg
glass blowers passed the following resolution:
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Whereas we believe the time has come when v/e should havean officer vested with power to settle all difficulties
and to give his whole time for the advancement of the
trade, Therefore be it resolved, that this Assembly
elect a President with power to chose four counselors
of the Assembly. The duty of the President shall be
to take charge of all correspondence and when any
difficulty arises between the employees and employers
it shall bo his duty to proceed to the place of conten-
tion and shall order such action as he may deem proper
and in such cases of emergency the orders of the' Presi-
dent shall be law. He shall keep him self posted in
the market so as to know when to ask for an advance or
accept a reduction and keep him self posted in every-
thing that will tend to the advancement of the trade.
He shall be the organiser and Initator for the Assembly
and his term of office shall be one year. His salary
Shall be 015.00 per week and expenses. The Assembly
reserves the right to impeach the President for viola-
tion of pledge taken., incompetency or for any other
good or sufficient cause or dispense with, the office
if dearned necessary by a two-third vote.""'
A corps of professional labor leaders failed to emerge,
however, within moat union locals or assemblies of the Knights
of Labor. The administration of the labor movement during this
era remained chaotic, due in large part to the inability of sub-
28ordinate officials properly to perform their obligations. The
labor demogogue often triumphed over the strategist. For the
rank and file considering a strike, an early student of the labor
movement observed:
the appeal of the cause rather than the prospect of
success has been their chief consideration. The
meetings called to decide whether or not to declare
a strike are often influenced by emotionalism, en-
thusiasm, and excitement. Fiery orators declaim about
the wrongs of labor, and declare that the threatened
reduction in wages must be resisted since the union
can never retreat, or that the principle of the
closed shop is the backbone of trade unionism and
must be upheld at any sacrife. Questions of expedi-
ency, such as the amount of money in the treasury,
the prosperity of the industry, or tfaa number unemployed,have been too frequently overlooked.^ P ^ '
The fate of the Miners' National Association revealed the
ultimate consequence of loose national control and local precipi-
tancy. Pounded in 187 3, the union established a strike fund which
allowed national officers little discretion in granting benefits.
Aid was almost automatically granted when locals went out—a
course they followed imprudently. Vigor and gallantry character-
ized the strikes at Johnstown, Pennsylvania and in the Hocking
Valley of Ohio in I874, as well as the I875 struggles in Brazil,
Indiana, the Shenango Valley of Pennsylvania, and the Mahoning
and Tuscarawas vallies of Ohio. Yet the depression of 1873 had
thrown out of work hundreds of miners who were eager to replace
those who struck. Failure to consider prevailing conditions
resulted not only in the loss of the strikes but also in the
bankruptcy and demise of the union. ^°
To prevent similar destruction, a number of conscientious
unionists sought to stabilize their organizations by centralizing
control. As noted earlier, a few unions including the Cigar
Makers and Holders eventually gave the top officers control over
strike funds. The practice, however, was not widespread during
this period.^1 More significant was the informal extension of
the leader's influence. Although unauthorized by the Iron
Holders' constitution, William Sylvis set out on a tour of the
locals in the early 1860's. Heads of other unions soon followed
suit, and distressed locals welcomed the aid which such
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perambulating officers could give. 32 Local workers felt an
understandable insecurity Ufa* dealing with management. As John
Mitchell observed, "The employer knows the state of the market
both for his goods end for the labor v.hich he wishes to purchase,
and he
. . .
has probably made a practical study of the art of
bargaining for labor, whereas the unorganised worlnnan, unaccus-
tomed to haggling or bargaining, is consequently at a disadvan-
tage." 33 To offset their vulnerability, local unionists
increasingly requested assistance from national officers. The
rising demand for the executives' services increased their
influence and work load. Reporting to the Railway Conductors,
President Austin Garretson pointed out that "a much greater
amount of time is consumed in the settlement of difficulties
than was formerly the case and on account of this development the
staff of officers has not been large enough to meet the demands
made upon it." 3^ Eventually the responsibility of the officers
to travel and aid subordinate bodies was embodied in various
union constitutions. In I876, over a decade after Sylvis had
begun the practice, the Holders' officially granted their chief
executive the "power to visit subordinate Unions, and inspect
their proceedings, either personally or by deputy." J The
authority of the president in union-management affairs, however,
was not explicit. He could advise and influence, but apparently
the spirit of local autonomy still prevailed.
III
Early efforts to strengthen the powers of the national
executives served as a foundation for tho surge in union central-
ization which occurred around the turn of the century. Prom I89O
to I905 numerous labor organizations transferred authority in
union-management affairs, as well as in internal matters, from
local bodies to national headquarters. Suggestive of tho change
was the redistribution of power among the top leadership. In
the early days of unionism, when the duties of the central office
were primarily clerical, the seeretary-treasurer was often tho
central figure, as with, the Carpenters and Bricklayers. In other
organizations, such as the Iron Holders and the Glass Bottle
Blowers, the president was more prominent but performed mostly
secretarial duties. Increased involvement of the national office
in union-management affairs reoriented the officers' roles. The
burden of administrative work kept the secretary-treasurer tied
down to his desk at headquarters. Meanwhile, the president
assumed the responsibilities of visiting, organizing, and guiding
locals, directing negotiations and conflicts with employers, and
establishing the policy priorities of the union. An increasing
staff of organizers further expanded his influence over subordin-
ate bodies. In short, ho became the focal point of union
36
activity, and as such his power and prestige grew.
For most unions, the impetus toward centralization derived
from tho changing economic and technological environment. By the
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turn of the century the localized market system of the Civil V/ar
era had been transformed into a nationwide network, 'workers had
to be far more conscious of labor standards in other areas of the
country. In industries such as coal, clothing, and textiles,
bitter competition between numerous firms operating in an enlarged
market undermined hours and wages. In such an environment, it
was imperative that a strong, national organization be established
with power to standardise labor conditions and remove them as an
item of competition between companies. 37 The growth of large
firms with a number of divisions characterized other industries
such as steel and tobacco. To cope effectively with such enter-
prises, all plants had to be unionised and the locals made to act
in concert. Otherwise, if one plant were struck, another would
continue production and offset any loss to the company. 38 In
industries such as construction, which still operated in a
limited product market, expansion of the labor market provided
the imetus for centralization. Wot only did non-union workers
invade the job territory of unionists and undermine their stand-
ards, but the advance of technology reduced the skill requirements
needed for a job and allowed employers to hire common laborers to
perform tasks previously done by craftsmen (a reason why appren-
ticeship control was a constant issue of conflict in the building
industry)
.
Technological developments also encouraged jurisdic-
tional disputes. As new materials were introduced to an industry,
outside unions claiming authority over the item would compete for
11?
work with established organizations in the trade. These struggles
were a prime reason for centralization within the United Brother-
hood of Carpenters. In their effort to retain control over all
things once made of v/ood, the carpenters granted their national
officers extensive powers including the right to intervene in
local union-management relations.^
Augmenting these developments were changes in the field
of industrial relations. The years surrounding the turn of the
century witnessed the most important advances in this area until
the Hew Deal. Increasingly, organized labor confronted organized
employers at the national level. Although employers' associations
dated back to the colonial period, most had been short-lived,
local organizations created to achieve a specific goal. Not
until the late 1880's did national employers' associations emerge.
In response to several railroad strikes, the General Managers'
Association, composed of twenty-four roads centering or termin-
ating in Chicago, was formed in 1886. The same year the Stove
Founders' National Defense Association was established to combat
the Iron Holders' Union. The following year, the United Typothetae
of America organized to resist the demands of the International
Typographical Union for a nine-hour day. Over the ensuing decade
and a half, manufacturers in a variety of trades banded together
to protect their interests in labor affairs.^ At Coeur d 1 Alenc
in I892 the workers confronted the i.Iino Owners' Protective
Association^ at Pullman in I894 the American Railway Union met
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defeat at the hands of the General Managers' Association. 41 In
1897, sixteen strikes occurred in Indiana alone. All v/ere against
organized groups of employers. 42 In countless other instances,
organized labor faced national or regional associations in its
drive for better v:ages and hours.
These struggles against organized employers taxed the
resources of labor and escalated local conflicts into strikes of
national dimensions. V/ith both sides throwing their weight behind
the contending parties, the stakes became greater than the
immediate success of the local involved, for the future of unionism
within the industry was often at issue. Labor mustered its fall
resources in the struggles and the cost of conflict mounted. The
Machinists' national office spent over two million dollars from
I89I to 1910 in strike benefits. This amount was meager compared
to the strike expenditures of the United Lline Workers. Prom 1900
to 1910 the union paid benefits totaling $8,089,986.16; the
conflict of 1902 alone cost 01,834, 506,^3. 45
The high stakes of combat abetted the drive for centralized
authority. Huge war chests had to be maintained to ward off
challenges from employers, and locals became far more aware of
the need for properly administered strike benefits. "The funds of
the International Union," one labor journal pointed out, "aro the
life blood and backbone of the organizatio2i; they constitute
strength, stability, and permanency. " In 1903* the United Mine
Y/orkero alone maintained a defense fund of one million dollars.
To promote efficiency, control of strikes passed into the hands
of the national executives. For the period I85O to I879, nine
unions required consent of their national officers or general
executive boards before a local could initiate a strike. The
figure jumped to fifty unions for the period 1880 to 1900. 46
Moreover, the discretionary authority of the national officers
was expanded. Unions required the national presidents, either in
person or by deputy, to visit the locals involved, investigate
«
the causes of contention, evaluate the chances for a successful
strike, and attempt to negotiate a peaceful settlement. V/hen
conflict occurred, they remained on the scene and guided the
struggle to a conclusion. The transformation of national officers
into professional strike managers added to the more structured
nature of labor-management disputes after 1900,^
The increased prominence of national officers in labor
disputes ironically contributed to their public image as irrespon-
sible agitators. Typical of such feelings, the St. Louis Globe
Democrat commented in I894 that "the coal miners strike could be
settled in an hour if men like MbBride ^president of the UMjjjy
were not interested in prolonging it for the purpose of personal
notoriety and pecuniary advantagesi" "The worst enemies of the
laboring men," the paper continued, "are the vain-glorious and
irresponsible leaders who persuade them to strike where their
intelligence tells them they have no reason for doin^; so # "^
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Such views grossly distorted reality, for most labor
loaders acted as conservative influences.
-The statement that
strikes are caused by Walking delegates," John Mitchell wrote,
"is as naive as the childish belief that it is the gong which
makes the train move. ... In nearly all unions, the officials,
from the local business agent or walking delegate to the inter-
national president, are elements for peace, not for war, and in
actual practice the aggressive clement is represented by the
members of the union, and the steadying and conservative element,
by the officers." To the simplistic argument that labor leaders
encouraged strikes for personal pecuniary gains, the Mine workers'
president roplied:
As a matter of fact, the shoo is entirely uoon tho other
foot. The work of the union official doubles and trebles
as soon as a strike is declared, and, likely as not,
his salary is lessened. The remuneration of the union
official is not unlike that of the Chinese physician,
who, it is said, receives pay only while his patient is
well. During the Coal Strike of 1902, the officials of
the United Mine workers contributed yj>)o of their monthly
salary of C>70 or :';75 a month, ran into debt while work-
ing for the union from twelve to fifteen and more hours
per day. Unless, therefore, tho union official stands
for the principle of more work and less pay, he will
not call strikes for his own selfish purposes.
. .
.
°
The source of labor leaders 1 conservatism went beyond tho
detrimental effects of strikes on their income. Men like Mitchell
were sensitive to the human suffering involved.
Tho sobering sense of responsibility which under these
circumstances comes to the union official, is radically
different from tho reckless spirit in which it is claimed,
tho loader of labor in this country evoke strikes* . . .
On the one hand, tho le; der feels the growing discontent,
the increasing recklessness, the sullen irritation of
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idle men, the hatred between the men who strike *ndthe men who work; he fears the clash between the morereckless on both sides; he fears blows and violenceperhaps even murder; he dreads the hardships, the
'
wivf^ >th* priVati0n ' the of men'whoseives and children are famished and freezing, thedespair that comes at the end and destroys the slowpatient work of long years. On the other hand, hesees unfold before him, the whole history of labor;the upward striving through effort and courage and
sacrifice; the temporary losses through cowardice orshrinking from the fear of evils, a movement ever
upward and onward, but ever beset with difficulties,
of lif^
8r
'
offering, and> it my bQ w . th lo
»
s
In more personal terms, labor leaders recognized that their
own positions were often at stake in the outcome of a strike. The
legacy of Martin Irons, the rejected leader of the 1886 Southwest-
ern Railroad strike, hung heavily above the heads of later leaders. 51
"It is an unwritten law of the labor movement," observed John
Brophy, "that lost strikes produce an aftermath of recrimination. 1,52
"Feeling against our officers who signed the compromise runs high,
with no sign of abatement," one correspondent wrote pertaining to
the unsuccessful 1894 coal strike, "nothing short of their resig-
nation and its acceptance will satisfy us."5 -* In I904, Michael
Donnelly, president of the Butcher Workmen, was blamed for the
failure of the packing house strike and forced to resign. Branded
a traitor, sentiment against him was so inflamed that he was
brutally assaulted and left for dead on the streets of Chicago.
To avoid personal odium, President T.J. Shaffer of the Amalgamated
Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers attempted to place
the blame for defeat in the 1901 steel strike on John Mitchell
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and Samuel Gcmpers,55 Tho more Moe for ^
follow, ht^ever, was to enter upon strikes reluctantly and only
when the chance of success seemed good.
The concern of leaders over their own fates paralleled
their desire to preserve their institutions. As unions developed
strength, their officers became victims of the Iron Law of Oli-
garchy: championship of the cause became secondary to the preser-
vation of the institution. The expanded authority of the national
leaders resulted from the desire by all concerned to protect the
union from destruction. The duty of national leaders during
labor conflict, Adolph Strasser maintained, "is to represent the
interests of the International Union, regardless of the local
instructions of the stride committee. It is also their duty to
bring about an amicable and honorable adjustment of the trouble as
speedily as possible, thus saving the funds of the International
Union, which would be otherwise wasted; and to maintain the honor
and reputation of the International Union for fair dealing with
union manufacturers."^ 6 Like Strasser, John Mitchell revealed
the emerging institutional outlook when he argued against a strike
and for the acceptance of a wage cut in 1904. "This wa3 a differ-
ent leader than the young man who assumed the presidency of a
loose union of 40,000 in I898," his moot recent biographer relates:
He had constructed a solid organization which now
embraced 300,000 men, by far the largest union in the
country. But along with this tremendous organizational
growth came an unwillingness on Mitchell's part to take
chances for fear of something happening to damage this
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union over which he presided. As he said to thedelegates: »I believe that, rather than see this jointmovement disrupted, rather than hazard all v/e have
it would pay us to accept this reduction.'^'
Only on the issue of union recognition, which directly
bore upon the survival of the institution, were union leaders more
adamant than the rank and file. "The members, if left to them-
selves, would be satisfied simply with bettor pay and treatment,"
observed Henry 7/hite, the rejected leader of the Garment 'Yorkers:
These granted, they were ready to moke peace with the
boss. It was my experience that employers were usually
willing to moke concessions of this kind to avoid
trouble. The leaders, however, regarded concessions
made direct to the employees as a blow at the union*
s
authority and at their own prestige, and any such
arrangement was strenuously resisted. It meant to
the leaders buying off the workers for a 'mess of
pottage 1 to forestall the union.
Recognition of its authority by both workers and
employers is thus the first object sought in every
dispute by the union leaders. Wage conditions are a
secondary matter and are even of trifling consequence.
That authority recognized, the desired pay, it is held,
will follow.
. . . This matter of union control as an
issue is always pressed, and is, as I have^maintained,
the vital element in the union situation.
^
As national leaders extended their authority, the number
of strikes for union recognition increased from a low of six per
cent in 1881 to thirty-one per cent by 1905
. Meanwhile, the number
of strikes over Wages decreased from seventy-three per cent in
1381 to thirty-three per cent in 1905$ the number of strikes over
59hours remained relatively constant at five per cent.
The conservatism of the national leaders both encouraged
and reflected the devclonrnent of more amicable relations with
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certain employers. While the period from 1890 to 1905 waa marred
by extensive industrial strife, a number of companies experimented
with peaceful coexistence. The movement by businessmen toward
more friendly relations with Organized labor was an aspect of the
general trend to rationalise the economic system. The same period
which witnessed the highest development of negotiator? employers'
associations, coincided with the great increase of trusts and
other business combinations. In forming such groups, businessmen
utilised labor unions. "Negotiator* associations made trade
agreements with certain unions," relates Clarence Bonnott, an
historian of employers' organizations, "and by means of those
generally forced the independents to come into the combination
or conform to the prices set by the combination if their businesses
were not ruined." 60 Organised labor was also interested in
rationalizing the economic system, and often encouraged and even
aided the formation of management bodies. President Martin Fox
of the Iron Holders' Union was instrumental in establishing the
National Founders' Association in 1898 in order that trade agree-
ments in the industry might be better drawn up and enforced., 61
John Mitchell also recognized the need for management to unite.
"Harmony in the industrial world," he wrote, "will be best
obtained by the creation and strengthening of labor unions and
employers' associations, and by the inculcation of a permanc;itly
62friendly feeling between organised labor and organized capital."
The Uj.I./ leader continued:
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. .
.in a general way the trade union, in matters offriendliness to employers' associations,
,e a lo
follow
Gm
^CrS "Mch latter couldWntage^usfSiw; /hGre aPe many emPloyers Who refuse to dealvi on trade unions because they render labor more formid
r^^^Tf;^' m°r° even though ?hey
mS ^ GffeCt °f tlV"de is°also toake the men more reasonable and more conservative
xraae unions recognize that an association of employersbe
!
ter t0 combat them than a number of individualcompeting employers; but they also recognize that theassociation is, as a rule, more responsible, more conser-vative and better disposed than the individual employersox whom it is composed. The incentive to oppose laboris less strong and less direct. ... In many cases,
organisations of employers, by the very fact of their
association, make concessions to their workmen whichnone the individual employers could separately have
Mitchell's optimistic attitude toward employers' associa-
tions derived from recent developments in union-management rela-
tions. "The clarification of the conception of the trade agree-
ment," Professor Selig Perlman wrote, "was perhaps the main
achievement of the nineties." 64 Although sustained collective
bargaining existed in a number of industries in the 1870' s and
1880 's—most notably railroading, glass, and the building trades-
the national contract entered into by the Stove Founders' Defense
Association and the Iron Holders' Union in I891 has frequently
been described as the first modern national trade agreement.^
In I892 national contracts ',/ere signed in the glass container
industry and in stone cutting, and numerous local and regional
arrangements were negotiated in other sectors of the economy.
The depression of the l890's temporarily halted the spread of
collective bargaining, but with the return of prosperity the
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an
pera-
10
trend moved on„ard. After a strike in l8o7 , tho Mtuminous ^
industry established the Interstate Joint Conferee for collective
bargaining. 66 The International Typographical Union wrought
.
agreement with the United Typothotae in 10?8. In 1900 the 0
tive Potters attained a national contract, and in December of «
same year the Bricklayers and Masons entered into accents v.dth
contractors in various parts of the country providing that all
differences that arose v,ere to be sent to the national union's
headquarters for adiustnent 7 TO T„ +ftTO( ,. , _cHij ura n-B, ine International Typographical
Union, Printing Pressmen, and Stereotypers and SlectrotyPers all
formed national agreements wltfi the American Newspaper Publishers
»
Association in 1 901.
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The following year seamen in the coastwise
trade of the Pacific, particularly out of San Francisco, entered
into formal collective bargaining which was to last nineteen years
with various employers' associations. 69 Other agreements in
these years occurred in iron molding, stove mounting, brass
polishing, machine shop work, overall manufacturing, and Great
Lake shipping. 70 "Though stoutly resisted in certain sectors,
collective bargaining was widely regarded and publicized as a
method of industrial peace," relates Philip Taft. "It and unionism
probably never were more favorably received by the American
public than during the five or six years caround 1900. Those were
the honeymoon years of collective bargaining."71
Initiation of collective bargaining lay primarily in the
hands of business, for organized labor had always favored
negotiation over belligerency. ******* willingness to ncgo-
tiate was encouraged by a favorable economic environment. Collec-
tive bargaining reached its high point in the five years from 1G98
to 1902, a period which embraced both the Spanish-American and
Boer wars. The increased commerce resulting from these conflicts
stimulated prosperity and a demand for skilled v/orkers. To
guarantee continuous production, employers v/ore willing to make
agreements which in less prosperous times they would resist. 72
Complementing the economic boom was a desire on the part
of both labor and management for stability and order. In the
late I89O 's many sophisticated industrialists came to realise that
the reckless tactics of the "Robber Barons" were detrimental to
business and created adverse public opinion which might stimulate
unfavorable legislation. A number of such men joined the National
Civic Federation to "help shape the right kind of regulation"
rather than to have "the wrong kind" forced upon them. 73 Moreover,
they recognized—often after a prolonged strike—that organised
labor was hero to stay and that some accommodation was necessary
in order to prevent the rise of more disruptive radicalism.
"Experience shows," the National Civic Federation's orgr.n declared
in 1903, "that the more full the recognition given to a trade
union the more business-like and responsible it becomes. Through
dealing with business men in business matters its more intelligent,
conservative and responsible members come to the front and g;dn
general control and direction of its affairs. If the energy of the
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employer is directed to diSOourafie,„ont and repression of the union
he need not be surprised if the more radically inclined sabers
are the ones most frequently heard. 1,74
Labor's reasons for desiring accomodation paralleled those
of management. Industrial strife not only had disastrous effects
on the union as an institution, but brought upon labor the vvrath
of the American people. "The permanency of our movement, the
success of our cause," Gompers realized, "depends largely upon
not only the confidence and respect of our fellow members, but of
the public in general." 75 To allay public fears, Gompers and
other conservative labor leaders emphasized the union's role as
a middle-class institution. Participation in collective bargain-
ing, membership in conciliatory organizations like the Civic
Federation, and unwavering opposition to radicalism, they felt,
were the best tactics for surviving within the American environ-
ment.
The rise of collective bargaining contributed to the expan-
sion of the national executives' authority. Local labor leaders,
who generally worked full time at their trade, were illsuited to
deal with the complex issues negotiated or the expanded area of
coverage. Increasingly locals demanded specialists from the
national office to handle union-rnanagement affairs. "There will
not be any lasting social progress," wrote one correspondent in
the Typographical Journal in I899, "until organized labor under-
stands that it must create a first-class civil service, and by
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good pay and tenure of office, hold men in its employ who know
how to conclude good union bargains with the employers."76 On
each side of the bargaining table there was a feeling that the
other side had the more capable negotiators; this sense of unease
led to an escalation of industrial relations expertise. During
the period of localized union-management affairs, as mentioned
earlier, the employees felt at a disadvantage in dealing with their
bosses and eventually either established local business agents or
called upon the national executives to give aid. Appearance of
these leaders produced a sense of weakness among management.
"In bargaining ability," Clarence Bonnett observed:
the unions have specialists long trained in meeting
every type of employer. In knowledge of wages, labor
supply and demand, the union officials again have the
greater advantage. ... In strikes, the average or
ordinary employer is a novice, the union officials
are experts with long and varied experiences, since
they spend all their time at such matters while the
employer must generally devote more of his time to
problems other than labor matters. '
'
The desire to offset this disadvantage, Bonnett argues, was a
prime reason for creation of employers' associations retaining
their own labor specialists.
In negotiating contracts as well as in enforcing agreements,
the leader required effective control over the constituent bodies,
the extent of centralization is suggested by the changing author-
ity of the Bricklayers' national executives. The primarily cler-
ic 1 duties of the national staff in the 1860's and 1870' s have
previously been observed with regard to the limited duties of
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early officers. By 1897 their role had eha„ged. The nev, oonetl-
tution of that year granted them:
this XjliorTsMr-
C
°f
°
f^ executive business ofUnion, when not m session, viz., all grievancesrelating to and all strikes and lockouts, tk
"
ment of all disputes between bosses or exchankefantmembers of this or Subordinate Unions, and the con-currenoe in the appointment of all specia d u Lor committees. They shall have^Tll'^d compleScontrol over all strikes.
. . ,
78 L
The increased authority of the national officers as well as
the introduction of more business-like methods in collective
bargaining were also seen in the adoption of the concerted wage
movement by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers in 1902.
Before then, writes George James Stevenson, "the employees'
interest in bargaining lay in the hands of the local or general
committee of adjustment, and the role of the Grand Chief Engineer
was to represent the sustaining power of the whole union for the
employees directly concerned, and to act as a mediator between
the contending parties." After 1902, with negotiations occurring
on a larger regional basis, his activities expanded: "... the
initiative was taken by the Grand Chief Engineer, not by the
members, although they gave him their endorsement."^
Under collective bargaining, it was to management's advan-
tage to encourage "conservative" union leadership. Businessmen
have always been ambivalent on the question of union government.
While publicly they have favored democratic control, as a practical
matter they have perferred well-disciplined, "responsible" unions
with strong leaders. There is much truth in William S. Foster's
contention that "the employers seek to develop the trade union
bureaucracy as a buffer, a shock-absorber, between them and the
masses of workers, to break up and demoralise the later's aggres-
sive attacks against the employers and capitalism."80 The research
of James V/einstein and others support the original allegation of
Duncan McDonald~a prominent Illinois Socialist and leader in the
m and the AFL of the fight against the National Civic Federa-
tion—that such groups as the Federation had been conceived to
"chloroform the labor movement into a more submissive mood." 81
Businessmen realized they could make deals v/ith leadership-
dominated unions without fear of shifts in rank-and-file senti-
ment. In the pressed and blown glassware industry, for instance,
employers complained that although their conferees had complete
authority in negotiations, labor's representatives had to submit
all important matters to the membership for approval. The result-
ing inconvenience and uncertainty annoyed management, although
few decisions v/ere actually reversed. Finally in March, 1904,
the National Association of Manufacturers of Pressed and Blown
Glassware notified the American Flint Glass Y/orkcrs' Union that
it would not negotiate unless the labor conferees had full author-
ity. The threat was not carried out, but thereafter the union's
executives were given more independence in their dealings with
. 82
management
.
The employers' desire for conservative labor leadership
was also a factor in the breakdown of collective bargaining
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between the Iron Holders' Union and the National Founders' Associ-
ation. Union president Martin Fox had been instrumental in creat-
ing the employers' association, and his co-operative attitude had
encouraged management to negotiate from I899 to 1904. In the
later year, friendly relations broke down. In explaining their
new belligerent posture, the founders cited two causes related to
"irresponsible" union leadership: first, the inability of the
officers to prevent workers from breaking the contract and strik-
ing illegally j and second, the succession of Joseph Valentine to
the union's presidency. Whereas leaders of the association had
held Martin Fox in high esteem, they regarded the new president
as socialistic and irresponsible.
IV
From I9O5 to world War I, collective bargaining continued
in numerous industries—including shoemaking, newspapers, coal
mining, railroads, coastwise shipping on the Pacific, glassmaking,
8/1
and pottery—although not v/ithout occasional strife. 4 In 1913,
the secretary of the AFL reported that forty-five international
unions had made 3,190 contracts without resorting to strikes.
The actual number of agreements existing that year was far
greater, for unexpired contracts made earlier were not included
in the figure and several unions simply reported "a great number"
85
of settlements. The National Window Glass ,/orkers alone had
86
contracts with fifty-six firms during the blast of 1916-1917.
133
The complexity of contract details made negotiations a
long and specialized task. In 1917 a committee of the Holders'
Union and the Stove Pounders' National Defense Association spent
nineteen days hammering out an agreement. The union had thirty-
if
one trained conferees at the session, "men skilled in all tech-
nicalities of the work—who specialized in handling of so-called
grievances and demands for their union." The association v/as
represented by "practical employers v/ho knew precisely the
conditions of the trade and how its interests should be conserved." 87
Hot all negotiations were carried on with so extensive a staff.
Within the United Garment Workers, Secretary Henry ffhlte domin-
ated the scene. "In dealing with employers," he related, "I was
as undisputed as I was in the control of the union. At my dis-
cretion firms were selected for a strike or boycott. The privi-
no
lege of the union label was mine to grant. 1 ' In 1910, President
Tom Lewis of the IBM chose to deal by himself with the operators
of western Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana. "Thus Lewis," the
union's journal pointed out, "assumed full responsibility for
the success or failure of the effort of the miners to obtain the
increase in wages they demand. Lewis has kept his own counsel,
just as he said he would, and the result is that no one knows
five minutes ahead what his next move will be. This is earning
for him the title, which one of the operators accorded him, of
89
'the best politician in the whole outfit 1 ."
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Stable collective bargaining contributed to the conserva-
tism of many union leaders. Through years of dealing with each
other, union and management conferees developed mutual respect.
According to economist Hilton Derber, the domination of a handful
of participants in the glass container industry's negotiations
since 1896 "meant experience and mutual understanding on both
sides of the bargaining table, a restraining hand on nev/ and
impetuous representatives, trust in the v/ord and intent of the
other party, an understanding of the rules of the game and a
willingness to abide by them."90 In a few industries, union and
management collaborated on various projects. The manufacturers
of boots and shoes employed trade union agents to advertise the
label and also to lobby in 'Washington for favorable tariff legis-
j • 91lation. Unions in the glass industry also joined management in
lobbying at the state and national level, particularly in regard
to tariffs and prohibition. 92 The National Window Glass V,forkers
went further and conducted advertising campaigns for their employ-
93
ers' products. The outstanding collaborative effort prior to
World War I was the creation of the American Railway Employees
and Investors Association in 1907. Based on the philosophy of an
identity of interests between employer and employee and supported
by the railroad companies and the loaders of 1,660,000 workers,
the Association lobbied in various legislatures for the railroad
industry. The head of the organization was P.H. Morrisey, who
had resigned from the presidency of the Railway Trainmen to assume
the post which reportedly paid 015,000 a year. 94
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Such cordiality occasionally resulted in the labor leader
moving to the other side of the bargaining table. John Alpine,
president of the United Association of Journeymen Plumbers and a
vice president of the AFL, got along so well with the employers in
the sprinkler industry that in 1919 he resigned his union post to
become an assistant to the president for labor relations of the
Grinnell Company. 95 Alpine was not alone in his willingness to
change colors. Even labor's hero, John Mitchell, had aspirations,
writing to the president of the longshoremen, Daniel Keefe, a man
of equal ambition, the IWi leader related:
And bye /sic/ the way, Dan, the employing side of our
committee on Arbitration and Conciliation £of the nation-
al Civic Federation/ proposes to employ two Commissioners,
and Easley seems to favor myself and Justi. His proposi-
tion, if it is accepted, will be to give a three year
contract, with a salary of five thousand dollars per
year. Now I think that would suit me all right; and
while I don't want you to say a word about it to a living
soul, when the time comes I would like to have matters
fixed up all O.K.
V/here collective bargaining prevailed, the leaders' role
was no longer that of the adament champion of labor's rights.
"It is our intention," president J.M. I'Teenan of the Window Glass
Workers informed his constituents, "to be conservative and ask
for nothing but what manufacturers can afford to pay for our
97labor.
. .
." According to the Teamsters' journal, the 'Ideal
Labor Leader 1 "has often to act as a mediator between employer and
employee, and he must necessarily know the business of both and
„93
must keep faith v/xth both, which is at times difficult 1
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Mediation turned into bartering at the conference table, and while
labor leaders might preach of the humanity of labor, they dealt
with the worker as a commodity. "The function of your power is
bargaining. Buying and selling," lectured J.B.S. Hardman's imagin-
ary labor leader. "You sell labor to employers. I v;ill assume
you sell on the best of all possible terms. But you sell. Labor
is the commodity you sell. Like hot dogs."99
Once a contract was consummated, the union leader assumed
the role of policeman, endeavoring to make the rank and file abide
by the rules. Time and again, leaders of the Shoe V/orkers lectured
that "nothing can justify any union or member thereof for vio-
lating its contract or allowing it to be violated." 100 Officers
of the window Glass 'Workers concurred: "A contract, openly nego-
tiated and freely entered into, must be faithfully carried out,
else the whole doctrine of collective bargaining falls into dis-
repute and the trade union defeats the one great purpose for which
it is instituted." 01 At the UM,/'s 1902 convention, John Mitchell,
warned that "when the contract is made and signed, if we expect
the operators to carry out those provisions that are advantageous
to us, we, in turn, must carry out just as explicitly those pro-
• • 102
visions which are unfavorable to us." V;hen such exhortations
failed to produce obedience, more drastic measures were taken.
To cite one of many examples, in 1°04 when two locals failed to
return to work as ordered by the Mine workers' officials, not
only were their charters annulled, but the names of the members
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were placed on a HOT blacklist and sent to every operator and
local in the district. 10 -*
The leaders' insistence that contracts be upheld steamed
from their belief that organized labor could exist only as a
middle-class institution. Failure to live up to agreements would
alienate public support. After 1902 anti-unionism v/as on the
increase, with a number of employers who had previously negotiated
with labor becoming belligerent. In explaining their new posture,
U.S. Steel, the National Founders' Association, and other employers
argued that they had tried to get along with organized labor but
that unions were irresponsible and -would not abide by their
contracts.
V/hile there was some validity in this agrument, other
factors were equally important in the open shop movement of 1902-
1916. The economic boom which initiated the collective bargaining
honeymoon was declining by 1902 and employers whose earlier co-
operation with labor was a marriage of convenience were now
willing to resist union demands. Moreover, many employers foared
the strength of labor as union membership rose from 447,000 in
1897 to 2,022,000 in 1904. 105 The rise of trusts, as in the steel
industry, allowed management to direct a concerted attack on labor
where unionism had previously survived through dividc-and-rule
tactics. 10^ Finally, organisations composed of relatively small
manufacturers whose plants were highly vulnerable to unionisation
emerged to challenge labor. The open shop drive generally dates
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from 1902 when the national Association of mm£acturers, founded
in 1895 to promote foreign trade and dominated by leaders of largo
corporations, was captured by David Li. Parry, John Kirby, James
Van Cleave and other small producers and transformed into an anti-
union organisation, ^
The open shop movement used a variety of tactics to crush
unionism:
!• By successfully combating union strikes generally.
2. By eliminating and keeping union men out of an
increasing number of shops.
3. By promoting welfare work to destroy the human-
itarian plea of the unions.
4. By fostering trade schools and industrial educa-
tion, so that the supply of skilled nonunion workmen
would be adequate.
5. By prosecuting union leaders successfully and by
securing noted court decisions curtailing union cictivi-
ties, for instance, the Banbury Hatters 1 Case, whereby
a nationwide boycott by the union subjected the union
members to very heavy penalties under the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act.
6. By opposing the efforts of the unions to secure
relief from the use of the injunction in labor dis-
putes and from the application of the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act to labor unions; and by restricting the
success of the union in obtaining legislation limit-
ing the hours of labor on public contracts.
7» By political activities, in which the unions
failed to make the showing of strength necessary to
convince politicians generally of the potentiality of
the labor vote.
The activities of the National Association of I.Ianufacturers
as well as the League for Industrial .Rights, the Citizens 1 Indus-
trial Association of America, and other groups retarded and
limited unionism but did not destroy it. Prom its high of
2,022,000 in 1904, total union membership declined to a low in 1^06
139
of 1,907,300. The most important effect of the open shop movement
was to remove labor's weak foothold in the mass-production indus-
tries. Labor remained strong in industries which were technolo-
gically static or lacked unity and financial strength to push
labor out. Unionism abided in a few industries such as coal,
partly because management found it to be a stabilising force in
a highly competitive market. On the railroads, Labor's own
strength plus government intervention insured the survival of the
lOQ
unions. '
The impact of the open shop movement on internal union
government was to increase the authority of the national executive
and foster the leadership orientation of the rank and file. As
Kenneth Boulding argues in The Organisational Revolution
, insti-
tutions which exist in an atmosphere of struggle become agencies
of conflict. As such, more power is frequently delegated to
officials, with more secrecy and fewer controls than in organisa-
tions living in a loss tense environment. 110 Attacks on labor
leaders, moreover, mobilised the rank and file behind them.
William D. Haywood find Charles Moyer were union functionaries
before the Steunenburg Case. Afterwards they were working-class
111Heroes. John J. kcNamara, brought to trial for the Los Angeles
Times bombing, was unanimously re-elected Secretary-Treasuror of
112the Bridge and Structural Iron Workers, And with the threat
of going to jail hanging over the heads of Gompers, Mitchell, and
Frank Morrison as a result of the Buck's otove Case, the AFL
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convention of 1909 voted that if they were imprisoned, all three
would receive a salary of $5, 000. 11
In many ways the Buck's 3tove and Range Case capsulatod
labor relations in the decade before V/orld War I. The business
antagonist in the case was James Van Glove, president of Buck's
Stove and Range Company and a leading figure in the open shop
movement. The labor participants—
-Gompers, Mitchell, and Morrison-
were three of the most prominent and conservative national union
leaders of the day. To their assistance came some of the more
sophisticated representatives of capital, who although by no
means pro-labor zealots nonetheless shunned blatant anti-unionism.
Alton B. Parker, a fall Street lawyer, Presidential candidate,
and later head of the National Civic Federation, defended Gompers,
while the AFL's side of the case was in part secretly financed by
T 1 A
Andrew Carnegie, Tho case never reached a conclusion j after
several years it was dismissed by the Supreme Court on a techni-
cality. Although many capitalists would never have been taken to
court for a similar alleged offense, the case ended symbolically,
for the most prominent and respectable leaders of labor receivod
11 justice" similar to that which many of their business counter-
parts had long enjoyed.
With the outbreak of World War I, the open shop movement
lost momentum. Preparedness at home and war orders from abroad
again led some employers to take a more conciliatory stand
toward labor in order more fully to participate in the profit
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making. The few holdouts begrudgingly succumbed once the United
States began to mobilize and the Government increased its inter-
vention in the economy. Organized workers, led by Samuel Gompers,
promised their services "in the war for freedom and humanity," but
insisted "that their own rights and welfare shall not be filched
from them" and that "they shall participate equally with other
citizens in determining the mobilisation of the nation for effec-
115tive service."' Labor's participation was not fully "equal"
with other .groups, being denied representation on a few key boards
and committees, yet it was incorporated into the power structure
in an unprecedented manner. 11^ Moreover, in establishing the
National War Labor Board, the principle of "The right of employees
to organize in associations or groups and to bargain collectively,
through chosen representatives" was recognized. "Although this
statement of principles was not legally enforceable," economist
C. V/ilson Randle points out, "it is highly significant as a first
step in the government's recognition of the right to organize and
117bargain collectively."
In terms of union-management relations, labor's participa-
tion in the war effort strengthened the already dominant trend
toward union centralization. Inclusion of national labor leaders
on various war boards and committees served as public recognition
of their role as spokesmen for their organizations. Bureaucrats
of government and business fostered bureaucratization on labor
through the policy of having decisions arrived at by the national
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leaders in Washington passed down to the rank and file. Further-
more, the gap between the leaders and the led was widened due to
the increased complexity of the issues involved. In 19 17 the
United Mine Workers' Journal correctly interpreted the effects of
a proposal to establish commissions to regulate wages, prices,
traffic rates, and other subjects: "If such a law is adopted and
the provisions thereof put into practice, the miners will need,
as never before, a solid organization headed by able men who can
present convincingly the miners' side of any controversy that may
1 1 A
arise on prices or working conditions."
V
By the end of V/orld War I, the national labor leader's role
in union-management affairo had changed significantly from what it
had "been in the post-Civil War years. His functions in the l360 f s
and I87O f s were largely peripheral and informal, reflecting the
decentralized nature of unions. By 1920 the structure of many
unions had "become highly centralized and the national executive
emerged as a key figure in industrial relations. The ideal labor
leader was now a general commanding his troops in time of conflict,
a diplomat negotiating industrial peace, and a policeman enforcing
the trade agreement. Each of those roles raised the leader above
the rank and file and increased his insistence on obedience and
solidarity within the union. Not all unions had made the transi-
tion by 1920, but the pattern of evolution v/as outlined. ''As in
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biology, life forms repeat or recapitulate in a brief time the
previous slew stag^a of development," philosophised economist
George Hilton Janes in 1916, "so nor; unions by direct imitation
of older unions, or by stern necessity, approach in many respects
a common typo of policy." 11^
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1
Emanuel Stein, "The Dilemma of Union Democracy," Labor:
Readings on Major Issues, ed. Richard A. Lester (New York. 19&).
PP. 168-189. " *
2
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CHAPTER IV
LEADERS AND THE LED
• I
Among the adages which political pundists resurrect at
election time is the one about people getting the type of leaders
they deserve. While trite and at times condescending, the saying
contains more than a grain of truth for private as well as public
governments. In the labor movement from I87O to 1920, the rank
and file played a major role in shaping union leadership. They
were the ultimate source of authority, and any leader desiring
to retain his position had to be sensitive to their wishes.
Rigorous analysis of rank-and-file attitudes presents
numerous difficulties. Most obvious i3 a lack of non-impression-
istic documentation. Manuscript collections of "average unionists"
are non-existent. Letters to the editors of labor journals are
only partly helpful, for only a special group among the rank and
file engaged in such correspondence. The accessibility of labor
papers to all varieties of opinion is also questionable. The
historian must therefore rely on less direct sources such as
comments from those interpreting rank-and-file behavior, voting
returns, and biographical data of individuals who rose out of the
ranks to places of prominence. A second difficulty is the com-
plexity of group attitudes. The aggregate of thousands of individ-
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ual responses, group attitudes constitute an abstract construct.
Moreover, the distinctiveness of particular unions' memberships
become yet more diluted when blended into a larger conglomerate.
The present chapter does not present a comprehensive
portrait of the rank and file. Rather it focuses on those features
of union membership which influenced the development of labor
leadership. Sometimes these traits were real 5 at other times they
were largely figments of the leaders* imaginations. Despite the
subordination of individual unions' characteristics, the attitudes
and responses described were common to most organizations.
II
A leader of a national union, observed the American Federa-
te,onists, "finds himself surrounded by a large body of men who have
a faith in his integrity, a persistent group who assail that integ-
ity, and a small circle of associates who understand his nature and
know its honesty."1 In the more typical parlance of labor, the
three classes of followers were simply "the rank and file," "the
kickers and knockers," and "the boosters." Each group played a
distinct role within the union and had particular influence on the
development of labor leadership.
Of the three groups, the boosters, of course, were the most
pro-administration in outlook. Known in sociological terms as
"the activity," they were the backbone of their organizations'
everyday operations. They usually comprised the majority at the
sparsely attended local meetings, and from their ranks came many
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of the minor union functionaries—local officers, check-height
men, business agents, and convention delegates. At election time,
less active members often followed their advice, and when the
turnout was particularly small, the boosters virtually chose
national officers and determined union policy. In I898, for
instance, the International Typographical Union held a referendum
on whether it should withdraw from the AFL. One hundred fifty-
eight locals submitted returns, while two hundred thirty-three
others failed to do so. Of those that did report, five locals
had five or less members voting, forty had six to ten members
voting, and forty-two had from eleven to twenty members exercising
their rights, In short, fifty-five per cent of the fraction of
locals participating had less than twenty-one members voting yet
wielded tremendous weight. Labor leaders could not ignoro these
2few activists.
Realizing the boosters' importance, those in power referred
to them in the most favorable terms* To the leaders of the freight
handlers, they were "more in touch with the labor movement than
the average member.
. .
.."*' Mine Worker officials praised them as
"calm, sober, thoughtful, conservative men" who possessed "reason
and intelligence" and represented "an array of wise cautious con-
servative, diplomatic talent." The repetition of conservative
values clearly reveals the traits which established leaders per-
ferred in their most active followers.
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Boosters possessed two basic characteristics: commitment
and ambition. "During the early years of the union," observed
Henry White of the United Garment Workers, "the uncongenial and
trying nature of the organizing and directing work attracted only
men of earnest and self-sacrificing purpose."5 Typical of suoh
enthusiasts was Abraham Bisno who gave up a lucrative business to
become a wage earner when his fledgling union declared contractors
ineligible for membership. Revealing extraordinary altruism,
Bisno related in his autobiography: "I knew I could not be both
in the labor movement and earn a decent income, and my loyalty to
the labor movement was much stronger than my desire to have untorn
shoes or a decent place to live in, or fine clothes, or even expen-
sive food."
Although idealism continued to motivate many of the boosters
a number of individuals became activists out of personal ambition.
As unions matured, Henry White wrote
i
strange men with eyes intent upon the offices began to
appear. The labor union offered opportunities for quick
advancement to people that otherwise might have remained
bound to their trade. In that respect the unions were
not unlike the political ward clubs
,
excepting that a
somewhat different order of ability was needed. A little
fluency of tongue, a capacity to express the wants of
their shop mates, some knowledge of men combined with
personal aggressiveness were the requisites for promo-
tion to local places of influence. Once there, the
need of earning their bread in the shops by the sweat
of their brows had passed; for the demands of the cause
required their presence here and there at so much jser
diem, traveling and incidental expenses added. Prom
the local positions these aspirants found their way as
delegates to the National Union conventions, and the ~
foundations for careers in the larger field were laid.
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White was far too critical of his contemporaries than was
justified, in part owing to his own recent ouster from office*
Idoalism Was not necessarily incompatible with opportunism, Aa
William Sylvis responded: "To the charge of ambition we plead
guilty, and if to be ambitious to do good is a crime than we have
sinned. V/o aspired to the honorable position that v/o now occupy,
thinking that wo could better 3erve the cause in this capacity
Q
than in any other.
. .
Yet, White was correct in recognizing that in its institu-
tionalized form, the labor movement becamo a vehicle for social
mobility* In his autobiography, which reads like an Horatio Alger
novel, Robert Watchorn of the UMW revealed the success ethic
common to many workers*
Since thero was no place to go £&& a door boy in the
nines/ | tho stern necessity of sticking to the task
was too obvious for contemplation, but tho lamp of
hope shone none the less brightly in my perplexed
and baffled soul, and self-emancipation became a
ruling passion, resulting in a determination never
for a moment to relax the purpose to bo free at the
first opportunity from an occupation so terrible
depressing, so fraught with perils, and so lamentably
unrenumorativo
•
One day Watchorn f s opportunity came. Receiving a telegram
offering him a paid union post, he conferred with his family.
My mother wa3 obviously torn between her desire for
rny advancement and her duty to tho yourv:or children,
whom she loved no less. My withdrawal from them
would, she feared, perhaps imperil their lives. . • .
But she rose to tho occasion and, drying hor toars,
sho said, 'Bob, my boy, you have earned your deliver-
ance from your perilous calling^0and I can't
bear to
soo you throw tho chance away. 1
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V/atchorn proved more successful than most aspirants to
wealth and power, eventually becoming vice president of the Union
Oil Company, But even those who advanced more modestly reaped
the reward of greater social prestige. In her biography of John
Mitchell, Elsie Gluck observed that union office "was one of the
few means open to the miners to secure some distinction for them-
selves in the community."11 Edward Flore of the Hotel and Restau-
rant Employees, in one of the more blatant cases of ambition,
originally became a local union activist to gain power and a
following for a possible career in Buffalo politics. While
ambition led Watchorn, Mitchell, and Elore to positions of promi-
nence, most local activists simply received the benefit of
increased status within their own community peer group.
Cooperation between local boosters and the national leader-
ship centered on mutual respect and self-interest. On many issues,
the boosters sided with higher authorities out of commitment to
common principles and goals. At other times, the ties were more
pragmatic. Occasionally the local elite saw itself facing the
same opposition which challenged its national counterpart and
hence forged alliance of convenience. More importantly, the
national leaders could bestow upon local activists honors which
would promote their reputations in return for support at elections
and on various issues. A friendly sign of recognition from a high
official could improve a booster's standing within his local. At
convention time, the leader could promote a supporter's career by
159
placing him in a prominent position* Frank Farrington, "beginning
his rise in the United Mine Workers, requested President Mitchell
to assign him to the constitution committee* "You are aware," he
wrote candidly, "that I am going to be a candidate for vice pres-
ident of District 12 and I want to get before the convention all
I can.
. .
•" Mitchell had to turn down this particular request,
but suggested a post on the committee on the officers 1 reports,
"preferably secretary, it would give you a splendid opportunity
to get before the convention. 11 ^ National leaders also appointed
organisers, some on full salaries, others receiving commissions,
and still others purely voluntary but prestigious. Occasionally
the leaders could provide government jobs to tho faithful. In
I894, for instance, the executive board of the Knights of Labor
rewarded one convention delegate for voting along certain line3
with s deputy factory inspectorship.
1
^ John ilitchell was partic-
15
ularly successful in securing public posts for his followers.
Such activities, and others to be discussed later, provided strong,
bonds between national leaders and local activists when idealism
was not enough. The significance of the boosters in forging union
leadership lay in shaping the office in the mold of a political
boss, with backscratching, under the table dealings, and trading
patronage for support part of tho regular routine.
160
III
While the small group of pro-administration "boosters
attended to the everyday business of the union with commitment
and ambition, the majority of the rank and file seemed completely
passive toward such matters. "The most discouraging feature of
our work
. . . ," complained the Journal of United Labor, "lies
in the apathy and indifference of the class we would help. People
16do not care," "When there was neither strike nor political
campaign to arouse the workingmen," concurred Joseph Buchanan of
the Knights of Labor, "they became careless and indifferent. . . ."
Typical of most labor papers, the United Mine Workers 1 Journal
carried constant reports of apathy. A local in Wellston, Ohio
wrote: "The organization is in fairly good condition. The members
18
however, do not take the interest they should." Another group
from Maris sa, Illinois reported: "In regard to our local, we have
about 125 members, but we have very poor working material, because
the most of them are young men and don't take the interest as they
should. . . ' Summarizing such accounts, president Tom L.
Lewis informed his colleagues "that there is a feeling of indif-
20
ference existing among our members." The miners, however, wore
not the only union plagued by lack of involvement by the rank and
file. In I898, president William B. Prescott of the printers
warned
:
it is imperative that we do something to stimulate
interest among our members. There is not an earnest
worker in our ranks who has not been pained and
grieved at the slight interest taken in union meetings,
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as testified by the attendance, and I am constrained
to admit that from the best possible information
obtainable this lethargy is becoming more deep seated
and widespread, which does not augur well for our
future. And, sad to relate, the blight is not pecul-
iar to our organization, but has been responsible for
the steady decrease in raembershippOf every considerable
American union except our3. • ,
The extent to which rank-and-file unconcern increased
between I87O and 1920 is difficult to determine. To many observers
the rise was quite marked* "In the old days when men fought for
their unions,' 1 Daniel Tobin argued in the mid-1920' s, "there wa3
a certain militant spirit pervading the air, and you heard of the
union around the freight house, wharves, and other places, you
found men at meetings, you heard them out amongst their friends
discussing the work of the union. Today you seldom hear members
22discuss anything of serious importance about the union. 11
Several facts, however, suggest that the interest of early
members was not as strong as Tobin and others imagined. In 1884
Signs of impassivity appeared in the Knights of Labor when a survey
of more than one thousand locals on the co-operative issue elicited
2^
only two hundred twelve responses. The casualty rates of unions
in the l870 f s, l380*s, and l890*s was also extremely high, and
those organizations which did survive experienced extreme fluctua-
tions in membership. The International Typographical Union, for
example, lost forty per cent of its following during the lean
years of I873-I878. As time progressed, noticeable improvements
occurred; in the depression of 1893-1891 the ITU lost only ten per
cent of its membership including the withdrawal of pressmen and
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bookbinders into separate organizations. 4 In response to these
early signs of indifference, Gorapers became an advocate of sickness,
death, and out-of-work benefits. "I saw clearly," he related in
his autobiography, "that we had to do something to make it worth
while to maintain continuous membership, for a union that could
hold members only during a strike period could not be a permanent
constructive and conserving force in industrial life."2 -*
If Gompers* program of benefits indeed kept workers on the
union rolls, it did not convert them to activists. Apathy general-
ly characterized trade union life after the turn of the century.
Typical of many labor conventions, only one hundred twenty-four
locals out of five hundred thirty-six sent delegates to the Inter-
26
national Typographical Union's meeting in 1902. Western Federa-
tion of Miners* officials, assuming an eagerness on the part of the
rank and file to read "the memorable and immortal orations of a
number of brilliant Ciceros," published three thousand copies of
the proceedings of their 1910 convention at a cost of $4,, 000, only
27
to sell a scant six hundred. More revealing still were statis-
tics on the proportioii of members participating in referendums.
At its 1912 convention, the AFL presented the results of a survey
on the use of the referendum by national and international unions.
Thirty-four organizations using the system reported to the Federa-
tion information concerning their size, the type questions on which
referendums were used, the percentage of members voting, and
whether voting was compulsory. The results, while inexact, were
. 28indicative.
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The proportion of members participating ranged from a high
of ninety-six per cent for the Tobacco Workers to a low of five
to thirteen per cent for the Boot and Shoe Workers. The average
turn-out was between fif ty and sixty per oent. Those unions which
required voting had above average participation, but it was not
overwhelming. Compulsion generally produced fifty per Oent of the
Granity Cutters, fifty to seventy-five per cent of the Boiler
Makers, seventy-five per cent of the Brewers, and a high of
eighty-five per cent of the Tailors.
The proportion of members voting was inversely related to
the size of the organization. The ten smallest unions using the
referendum had an average of sixty-three por cent of their member-
ship participating, while the ten largest organisations avoraged
forty-three por cent. The comparison holds true when considering
only those unions which used the referendum for both selecting
officers and approving policy. The five smallest unions in this
category averaged seventy-one per cent; the five largest sixty-
one per cent. Thus, size played a significant role in determining
rank-and-file willingness to take an activo rolo in union affairs.
The questions on which referendums were hold also influ-
enced participation. Tho eighteen unions using the referendum
for both electing officers and enactment of laws avoraged sixty-
seven per cent of their me/fibers voting. The seven organizations
which used the system only for electing officers averaged fifty-
eight per cent, while the nine unions utilizing tho roforondum
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simply to enact laws had only thirty-three per cent participation.
Such evidence suggests that the rank and file considered electing
officers to be the more important function. In short, members
tended to he personality rather than policy oriented. 2^
Human fraility also contributed to the indifferent attitude
of the rank and file. Young, unmarried workers felt they had
better or more exciting things to do than attend union functions.
Urban laborers often preferred spending their free time enjoying
what recreation the city offered, while rural workers frequently
could not motivate themselves to make the long trek to a remote
meeting hall. Criticized for not appearing at a local gathering,
one miner considered himself a fool "to go after a hard day's work,
in the middle of the week, and walk six milles /slo/ after dark,
and in such weather to attend every meeting of said local union.
Many craftsmen no doubt reacted as James Maurer did when first
approached by a union activist. "He talked to me about justice
and labor's rights, of the need for workers to organize, of their
solidarity at the ballot box, and other ideas new to me. They were
subjects that I knew nothing about and cared less; he might have
well talkod about trigonometry or the nebular hypothesis for all
the impression he made on me at first." Tho soft-hearted Maurer,
who became Pennsylvania's leading socialist, started going to
union meetings with the activist "so as not to hurt his feelings,
for outside of what I thought were hia foolish notions, he was a
good fellow always ready to help me in my work."^
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Once in the union hall, workers frequently found the expe-
rience tedious. The details of everyday business were not stimu-
lating, and the meetings dragged on interminably. Moreover, as
the United Mine Workers' Journal observed, "the endless brawl of
the talkative man who seems to think that he and ho alone has
been endowed with a gift of speech and an understanding of business
methods, destroys the interest of many an otherwise entertaining
meeting and causes conservative, thinking men to leave the session
in utter disgust and thereafter remain away entirely," V/ith
business often consisting of trivial matters, many members respond-
ed like young John Brophy. "Perhaps because the union was success-
ful and no burning issue arose calling for active support," he
admitted, "I often found something else to do on meeting night.
Like most people, I took the union for granted because it was doing
well." 33
Such circumstances produce indifference in most groups.
Yet, one particular union policy vastly increased the extent of
apathy among the membership. After I89O, a number of organizations
turned to closed and union shops to attain security in their deal-
ings v/ith management. At times they achieved this objective only
after vicious and costly strikes. At other times the union gained
it in exchange for granting the business the right to place a union
label on its products. This approach was particularly fruitful in
those industries which produced or handled goods for a working-
class market where a pro-union label was seen as a means of attrac-
ting patrons. Whether attained by strikes or "label contracts",
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closed and union shops forced workers to join without first con-
vincing them of the value of unionism. Labor leaders and manage-
ment agreed between themselves that jobs would depend on union
membership. In defending this policy, the Garment Worker argued:
The ordinary workingman respects an organization
with power enough to force him into it, and he justly
reasons that only such an organization can be of
benefit to himself and the trade 5 hence it is why
such people eventually as a rule become good members.
A little training and education in the union soon
convinces the previously unwilling member that to
force him into the union is like compelling people to
take a bath against their own will or talcing a load
from the shoulder of a man foolishly bent into carry-
ing it to the top floor of a building and placing it
upon the elevator for him.
The reality of the situation was far different. Establish-
ment of closed and union shops brought into the labor movement a
sizeable group of workers indifferent to unionism, and many of thorn
remained indifferent after the union card was forced into their
hands. A study of female locals in the United Garment Workers
revealed, for instance, that those locals most likely to collapse
35
were established by such outside arrangements. ' Moreover, many
workers looked upon tho situation "as a sort of conspiracy between
the boss and the union agent to levy upon them a tribute for the
privilege of working.^ Powderly was aware of these facts and
opposed such methods:
No person should be forced to bocome a member of
our order by the manufacturer, or by the man or firm
he may be working for. Only those who join of their
own free will ought to be admitted to membership.
The man or woman who cannot cheerfully subscribe to
the declaration of principles of the order of tho
Knight3 of Labor cannot raako a good member and must
not be forced to join.
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Failure to attend union meetings or to vote in referendum*
was the extreme of indifference and apathy. The attitudes of the
rank and file most often took more subtle forms. Many of those
who did participate in some union affairs displayed what the
22£^„Vorker labeled "the lack of independence of character." 38
By and large, union members would submit to the wishes of the
leaders without giving the issue under review critical examination
Intending to make a different point, Samuel Gompers suggestod the
extent of suoh deference, "In every contingency or circumstances
in which I have had to deal with men
?
" he related, "I have found
that when a course was presented to them, giving reasons for that
position and I appealed to their better judgment to accept that
v/hich I advocated, they have voluntarily and gladly accepted my
position."
Such deference was in part rooted in the rank and file's
feeling of inferiority to the leaders. As sociologist Victor
Thompson observed, "people impute superior abilities to persons
of higher status, and this imputed superior ability is generalized
into a halo of superiority."^ Letters to the editors of labor
journals occasionally contained such revealing comments a3 "I
don't know much, not as highly educated as the honored /executive/
A T
board.
. .
Another correspondent was reluctant "to stand
face to face with men of experience and great knowledge with
42figures and all necessary aid to sustain their assertions."
One dissenter among the miners recognized this complex and
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lambasted his fellow unionists: "We have too much fear of our
officers] I say let no man who ha3 a mind of his own he afraid
of any officer.
. .
,"
43
"Do not let your officers do all the
thinking for you," pleaded another unionist. ".Remember, we base
all our hopes of bettering our condition upon the intelligent
action of the rank and file of the order, and not upon blind
obedience to the mandates of executive officers, without reason
why." 44
Far more important than a feeling of inferiority, however,
was a genuine appreciation among the rank and file for the work
the leaders were doing. "Though it grumbles occasionally," Robert
Michels observed of the working class, "the majority is really
delighted to find persons who will take the trouble to look after
45
xts affairs." ^ Beyond supporting thoir leaders at election time,
the rank and filo manifested its gratitude in more personal ways.
In 1901 , for example, the anthracite miners took a collection to
AG
finance a home for Mitchell. The Knights of Labor had earlier
raised a similar collection for Richard Trevellick. 4^ The Brother-
hood of Locomotive Engineers treated P.M. Arthur to a six month
vacation in Scotland, while the International Typographical Union
awarded James Lynch a $10,000 testimonial fund upon his retirement
as president in 1914. And when William J. Bov/en retired from the
Bricklayers, he was made president emeritus at a salary of $510,000
49
a year which he collected for the next two decades,
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A tentative case Ccin be made that the rank and file's
appreciation of their leaders was related to basic status anxie-
ties. American workers were deeply concerned with their place in
the emerging industrial society. In 1899, for instance, coal
miners responded vigorously to criticism that they were "abject,
immoral and ignorant individuals hardly worthy of citizenship or
being entitled to the right of suffrage. 1 '50 In another case, the
miners' Journal went out of its way to note "that among the names
thought worthy of honorable mention by this average daily news-
paper is found a goodly quota of minors as usual, and from this
last reminder we are persuaded that nothing but perversity or
despair on the part of our craft can prevent us as miners from
again taking our place among the respected and requited laborers
51
of the country. Such reaction suggests strong status anxieties.
The esteem given labor leaders by the larger society reflected on
and gave hope to their followers. Contemplating the meaning to
the workers of John Mitchell's newly gained prestige, his biogra-
pher Elsie Gluck wrote s
How men knew his name, knew that he had brought success
with him, had put back food in houses where there had
been none. They knew, in a vague way, of hi 3 childhood,
not unlike their own. They knew of his sudden rise to
a position where newspapers quoted him and political
figures associated with him. He was walking proof
that their own hopes might come true. He had given
them a dignity and importance in the country which
they had never had.
Martin B. 'Skinny 1 Madden, and early twentieth century labor
czar of tho Chicago building industry was very aware of these
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sublimated anxieties and strove to fulfill rank-and-file expecta-
tions. Living in an ostentatious manner, Madden responded to
criticism candidly, "Sure I have an auto," he admitted.
What of it? Don't the hod-carriers, plasterers, and
"bricklayers know it? They think a lot more of me
"because I sport it. They Gay, Well, there's some
class to our boss, ain't they?' I spend money. Sure
I do. But most of it is for the good of the service,
as the police department calls it. Nobody can tell
me about the best way to put up a front to the whole
class of workingmen. The more front you expose the
more they will think of you**
Rank-and-file gratitude at times became a cult of venera-
tion. Labor leaders were often referred to in the most eloquent
of terms. "Y/hen I listened to John Siney I could see Christ in
his face and hear a new Sermon on the Mount, 11 recalled Powderly.-^
Labor editor John Sv/inton viewed the pre-socialist Debs "as the
embodiment and exponent of the genius of the Union of which he is
President. The spirit of the Union is in him, and his spirit is in
55the Union." The workers who frequented the saloon where Ed Flore
worked mentioned Gompers 1 name "with hope in their voice. He
seemed to be their towering leader to free them from the grip in
which the big industrialists had them. They talked of him as if
he v/ere a knight in shining armor who would lead them in battle
56
against menancing ogres. uJ And for Agnes Nestor of the Glove
57
Workers, John Mitchell was the "great idol in the labor movement."
Several leaders had monuments erected in their memories,
a few were immortalized in song, and some had holidays declared
in their honor. In 1884, the Knights of Labor celebrated the birth
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of their late founder and leader, Uriah Stephana. 58 John Mitchell
led the hard coal miners of Pennsylvania on a pilgrimage to the
wife of John Siney in 1900.59 The re3identc of Arnot> permsylvania
set aside June 13, 1904 to honor their local hero, Off Secretary-
Treasurer William B. 'Jilson. 60 The greatest event among union
miners, however, was October 29th of each year when they would
lay off work and celebrate Mitchell Day. 61
Such adulation led to commercializing the leader's image.
"Every Loyal Workingman," declared one advertisement, "should
carry a Moyer-Haywood Souvenir Knife." "Union Men, Smoke the
Moyer-V/FM & ICC Cigar," encouraged a second ad. 63 A third pushed
"The John Mitchell $2.50 Shoe."64 Deluged with requests to endorse
various items, Powderly became very perturbed at "having my
picture used on every notion that men feel like putting it on."
Tho particular item of his scorn was discovering his likeness on
flour sacks." J
While individual leaders were eulogized, the position of
leadership was elevated to sanctified heights. Articles in union
papers placed labor leaders in the tradition of "the mon of '76
who signed the Declaration of Independence." They were also modern
day abolitionists fighting to end wage slavery just as "Brown,
66
Phillips, and Garrison" had brought tho demise of Negro servitude.
Even more prominent was the attempt to link tho labor leaders with
the saints and martyrs of Christianity. One article of this
nature was headlined:
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HISTORIC STRIKES
The Great Straw Strike With
Moses as the "Ring
Leader.
"
He Indulged in "Plain Talk" to the
Lord,
And Finally the "Chief Manager," Pharaoh,
Succumed. '
Other articles developed the theme of Christ as "The
Greatest Agitator." It was Jesus, the United Mine Workers' Journal
maintained, "who first espoused the cause of the poor and preached
and gave hope and encouragement to the downtrodden." 68 "Christ
was an agitator," the Miners' Magazine sermonized, "and because
the doctrines which He preached were at variance with the ethics
of the money changers whom He castigated in the temple, he was
branded as a criminal, crowned with thorns and finally condemned
to die upon the cross on Calvary.
"
6
^ Even the radical Industrial
Workers of the World employed this imagery. Ben Williams, editor
of the IWW's official organ, praised "the Hobo Carpenter from
Nazareth," whose call, "stripped of the mystical and mythical
veil of Constantino and his successors, and clothed in the original
garb of communism and brotherhood, continues to sound intermit-
70tently across the ages."
Completing the religious allusions, the leaders' agents
wero given the status of disciples. "Hot more righteous was either
Peter or Paul in their sacred work nor more free from sinful
affections than is the 'walking delegate*," preached one
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correspondent. "Labor is not only noblo, but holy, and the person
commissioned, under instruction, as an adherent of its purposes
and ends for the common weal is as holy in his office as were the
apostles as followers of the lowly ITazarone."'''1
Deference and adulation constituted only one trait of a
complex rank and file. The same miners who sot a day aside to
honor Mitchell, publicly insulted him in 1911 by demanding his
resignation from either the National Civic Federation or the
72
union. Other leaders mot similar fates. John Siney died a
73
rejected and lonely man. Both Powderly and Gfompera were thrown
out of office in the early l890»s, although the latter was able
to return to power. P.J. HcGuire, who almost single-handedly
guided the carpenters* union from birth to maturity, was ejected
from office in 1901. Adding insult to injury, he was paraded
through the courts on questionable charges of embezzlement*
Even "Big Bill" Haywood, whose name has become synonymous with the
117-7, was condemned by many l/obblies when he chose to live out his
75
life in Bolshevik Russia rather than dio in a "capitalist" prison.
Such events led labor leaders to view the rank and file as
fickle and ungrateful. "In all the train of vice there's not a
monster, more foul, more ugly than ingratitude," the United Mine
V/orkors \ Journal scorned.
76
"The strange part of it all," bemoaned
the American Federationint , "is that the general body of workers
seems to view with unconcern the unusual difficulties that confront
their struggling officers. . . ,"77 The ingratitude of the workers
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was constantly on the leaders' minds. In his last public state-
ment before his death, John Siney lamented: "I care nothing for
the abuse of our enemies—it never troubled me for a moment—
but the ingratitude of the workingmen cut deep into my heart."78
Over the desk on which Powderly conducted much of the Noble and
Holy Order's business, hung a picture of Christ, "the world's
greatest, most sublime agitator." At the foot of the cross he
tacked a special message:
Work for self and humanity honors you,
Work for humanity and it crucifies you.
°
Powderly met his fate in 1893 when he v/as ousted from the leader-
ship of the Knight 3 of Labor, his supposed friend John W. Haye3
playing Judas by pointing the finger of corruption at him. Even
Gompers, the most famous of Powderly haters, was saddened by the
episode. "I'll be frank with you," he wrote a friend, "I much
regret, not so much the fact of Mr. Powderly leaving the office
of the Chief Executive of the Knights of Labor, but rather the
manner in which he was forced to do so.
. .
. It is a repetition
80
of the old cry of Hosannah, followed by that of 'crucify him'."
At times the leaders' charge of fickleness was fair.
Often the loss of a strike, particularly during a union's forma-
tive years, resulted in the rejection of the officers from power,
whether they were responsible or not. John Mitchell was conscious
of this fact. After informing a friend that "the attempt to
inaugurate a National suspension /in 19027 is not of my choosing,"
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he continued "but now that we are in it I am going to stay with
the boys until they either succeed or fail; and if they fail I
shall join the ancient order of has-beens and used-to-be »s and
become one of its most revered members,"81 Periods of depression
also took their toll of leaders. During the lean years from
I893 to 1897, major changes in officers occurred in the Knights
of Labor, the AFL, the United Mine Workers, the Machinists, the
Railroad Trainmen, and several other organizations. While
factors other than the depression were involved, no doubt many
of the rank and file were simply reacting to the downturn in
business. As ex-president John HcBride told the delegates to
the I895 convention of the Mine Workers: "It is at such time3
that men forget the causes which are responsible for their
condition, and without giving a thought to surroundings or taking
into consideration their dependence upon craftsmen in competing
fields, give vent to their desires, and with their judgment
warped by suffering and prejudice and blinded by passion they
enter into a wholesale denunciation of persons and things; and
officials, no matter how honest, sincere or able they may be are
82
made the victims of their craftsmen's wrath and folly." "It
may be a great pity," concurred Gompors, "but it is a fact, that
when conditions of life and labor are keenly felt, those in
responsible positions, whether in government or in organized
labor, are blamed and criticized because they have not either
averted such a condition or have not remedied it."
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At other times, however, leaders saw ingratitude when other
factors were foremost. Fluently union officials held narrow
views of loyalty, interpreting independent action as at best
ungratefulness and at worst treason.
-It is somewhat discour-
aging how forgetful men can be of the services rendered them
during the time in which they are in trouble," Daniel Tobin
complained of a group of teamsters. "After what local No. 710
done for these people and what local No. 753 did, it seems as
though you would imagine they would always be, without hesitation,
loyal to the International organization, but there is nothing
that surpasses the ingratitude of some men who claim to be union
men today in the labor movement."84 Moreover, what leaders
mistook for fickleness was often simply another sign of apathy.
The ousting of Powderly and McGuire and the embarrassment of
Mitchell were engineered by an elite group, and while they needed
some popular following they lacked full membership support.
Indeed, many workingmen simply were too apathetic and indifferent
to union politics to rise up and defend the men whom they once
hailed s.s heroes.
Though leaders perceived their followers as indifferent,
submissive, yet potentially disloyal during the normal operations
of the union, they held a somewhat different view in times of
labor unrest. On the one hand, they suspected the rank and file
of being too quick to strike. On the other, thoy considered them
unpredictable once on the picket line.
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Leaders particularly attributed impetuous strikes to new
unionists, "The truth is," Compers observed, "that when workers
are unorganized they underestimate their own power and influence
and overestimate that of the employing class, and newly organized
workingmen flushed with enthusiasm really overestimate their power
and underestimate that of their opponents." 85 Jacob Magidow, an
early activist in the United Hebrew Trades, noted that newly
organized Jews "saw no difference between a union and a strike—
these were one and the same things to their minds." Like many
organizers, William J. Duffy of the Knights complained to his
superiors:
I find, no matter how careful I may be in organizing
an assembly, there will get into it an element that
is radical, and full of strike, and though the laws
in reference to strikes and lockouts have been fully
explained to them, the Organizer finds them out on
strike or lock-out, the minute he has turned his
back, and when I have been asked to come and see said
Assy 1
,
I have asked them whatgdid they strike for?
they were not able to answer. '
Such impetuosity distressed established leaders. "I do
not know and never did know a labor officer who did not view the
strike with gravest apprehension," reflected Powderly. "Nothing
can injure the conscientious officer of a labor organization more
than to lose a strike unless it be to win one. If he loses ho
is sure to be charged with selling out, if he wins ho 1 11 be
88
expected to keep on striking—and winning right along."
V/hen strikes commenced, leaders were never confident of
their followers. Y/ould they stand together in solidarity until
180
victorious, or would they break rank when the going got rough
and slowly wander back to work? Would they accept the agreement
negotiated by their officers, or would they demand more and
possibly bring down upon the union the full wrath of the employers?
Or still, would they demand too little, settling for better pay
and treatment instead of holding out for union recognition so that
their organization could continuously influence the firm's labor
policies? Such questions were constantly in the back of a strike
leader's mind.
Hank-and-file attitudes exerted strong influence on the
development of leadership. Apathy and deference allowed officers
to perform the everyday operations of the unions free from
accountability to a large, critically concerned following. Those
traits, combined with the membership's inclination to be person-
ality rather than policy oriented, fostered governments of men
as opposed to governments of laws. In the 1860's, William Sylvis
established "an unfortunate precedent in labor history" when he
used his personal prestige as well as the excuse of emergency to
expand his powers far beyond the limits of the Iron Holders
'
89
constitution. In ensuing years, numerous organizations followed
this lead and accepted the principle that their top officers wore
90free from the restraints of union law. This cult of personality
influenced the nature of union elections. In closely contested
campaigns, labor politicos resorted to name calling, accusations,
and "red baiting" to mobilize an apathotic electorate genorally
disinterested in policies. With dry humor, one printer noted:
"The International Typographical Union is to he congratulated
upon an election taking place without the vicious slander and
disgraceful charges usually the accompaniment of these biennial
affairs. It is true the prime cause for this unusual condition
was due to the fact that there was only one ticket in the field
headed by a candidate for president.
. .
Confronted by a complex and often contradictory rank and
file, union officials sought to manipulate their behavior. "The
leaders' policy was governed by their distrust of the worker,"
former Garment Workers offical Henry White maintained. "The
voluntary element in the union being small, many strange expedi-
ents were resorted to to keep the mass of members in control."^ 2
In hope3 of securing their positions, leaders developed two basic
courses of action. The first was to encourage those rank-and-
file traits which they saw as helpful to their cause. The second
was to institute means of checking seemingly harmful character-
istics. To accomplish these ends, they resorted to legalism on
the one hand and image building on the other.
The legalistic means by which the leaders sought to check
undesirable actions by the led ranged from the rules of the
national conventions to procedures to be followed before strikes
could be declared. Such policies had other purposes beside
simply preventing rank-and-file impulses. Moreover, the majority
of the leaders did not really want to thv/art tho will of thoir
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constituents if they could help it. Rather, the legalities and
procedures were intended to stop rash and impulsive actions.
Whether correct or not, most labor leaders sincerely felt they
represented the best interests of their followers. By forcing
the rank and file to consider a situation carefully before acting,
they reasoned, irrationality would be overcome and the views of
leaders and followers v/ould be harmonious.
Image building also relates to the mechanisms of power
since ultimately the leader's authority rested upon the active,
or at least passive, consent of the governed. To attain this
support, they mobilised the institutionalized tools of communica-
tion in a campaign which some modern observers might label "The
Selling of the labor Leader." Utilizing every forum from organ-
izing rallies to the convention floor, administration supporters
warmly proclaimed the virtues of their officers. "All we have to
do is keep a boosting and everything will come out all right,"
asserted one leader who went to the very heart of the image
building philosophy.^-*
The most important medium in this campaign was the union
journal. Recognizing the influence of the official organs, such
leaders a3 Gompers, Tobin, Jere L. Sullivan of the Hotel and
Restaurant Employees, and J.N. Neenan of the Glass Workers con-
tinued to edit the papers of their organizations despite the
94pressing demands of other work. In other unions like the United
Mine Workers, the editorship became a plum of the president,
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frequently changing hands each time a new top officer was
elected.^
The United Mine Workers' Journal illustrated the approach
of union papers in selling the labor leaders. From its founding
in 1891, the miners' press was pro-administration and quickly
assumed the task of rationalizing and legitimizing official
actions. The Journal unequivocally approved the cancelation of
the eight hour strike of I89I, and after the loss of the I894
strike it shielded the officers against charges of selling out. 96
The policy of defending the actions of leaders against criticism
became a positive function of promoting the administration's will.
Under the editorship of S.Li, Sexton, beginning in I9O3, the
Journal was firmly established as an organ of the hierarchy. In
March, I904, when the membership was given an opportunity to vote
on the practice of making interstate agreements, the paper fully
supported President Mitchell's stand and clearly implied that a
a vote to the contrary was tantamount to treason. 9 ''' Opposing
arguments were seldom presented, and then usually to serve as
targets for the editor to knock down. In 1903 and 1910 the
Journal endorsed Tom L. Lewis for the union's presidency and again
implied that to oppose him was to do injury to the union.
Besides openly defending and promoting the leaders' actions,
policies, and candidacies, the United Mine 'Workers 1 Journal
engaged in more subtle forms of image building. Letters praising
the administration frequently received front page exposure, while
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those critical were buried in the back. Each issue carried
accounts of the activities of the officials, and when opportunity
permitted dramatized episodes of their lives. Such stories
served to remind the rank and file that the leaders were working,
for their welfare at great personal cost. Moreover, they kept
the officials 1 names before the constituency, and at election
time the followers tended to vote for candidates who were best
known* Daniel Tobin of the Teamsters advised one aspiring
politico: "it would be to your advantage to keep acquainted with
the membership through the columns of the Journal, and it is
also a means of communication, which at this time, is necessary.
A more indirect method of image building was through
articles extolling leadership in general rather than particular
individuals. At times this took the form of Max Weber 1 s "routin-
100ization of charisma. 1 ' Labor journals encouraged the cult of
veneration mentioned earlier. Consciously and subconsciously,
the numerous references to heroes of Christianity, the Pounding
Fathers, great abolitionists, and pioneers of unionism transfered
to the leaders some of the charisma of these historic figures
and thereby legitimized their right to obedience. More often,
the Journal simply published articles which developed the themes
of the leaders 1 virtuous character and tho hardships and sacri-
fices which confronted one chosen to lead. This genre of litera-
ture was so common in labor papers that many of the articles in.
the Journal were reprinted from other presses. For instance,
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"He Must Be Perfect" by Prank Duffy, the general secretary of the
Carpenters, was quoted at lengths
We hear a great deal of late about the labor leader*
He seoras to be one of the most important personages
on the face of the earth. V/e are all anxious to°meet
him and find out whether he is a member of the human
family or not. His doings are heralded far and widej
his movements and his resorts are closely watched;
his actions are carefully and suspiciously scrutinized.
If he keeps the most select company, he is too re-
served and high toned—he is living on the fat of
organized labor. If he associates with politicians,
he is a political 'labor fakir 1 looking for a job.
If his company is not of the most reputable character,
he is a bum; and if he joins in the every day life
of the workers and allows himself to be entertained
by thera at their expense, he is a loafer. Yet he is
one of the most essential members of the labor move-
ment. We expect a great deal of hira. He must be
intelligent and educated; he must be a man of tact,
diplomacy, conservatism and reticence. These qualities
must be blended in his make-up, and yet to appearance
he must remain a workman. He must always do that
which is right, and never do wrong. He must always
bo a winner and never a loser* He is expected to
give advice and instruction on all sorts of subjects;
in fact, he must be 'perfection personified. 1 Don't
you think v/e are expecting too much from our leaders?
Does any other organization expect so much of theirs?
In the majority of cases we find fault with them—
give them no encouragement, not even a kind word. V/e
leave them to fight the battles of life, our battles
of injunctions, strikes and lockouts, without offering
them the benefit of our advice or assistance that we
ought. Let us in the future have a little compassion
and consideration for these men v/ho devote their time,
energies and lives that our conditions may be improved.
For those unconvinced by the laudatory portrait of labor
leaders, there awaited a special fate. On the one hand, innumer-
able columns of the Journal painted such individuals in an unfavor-
able light. On the other, the attempts of dissenters to express
their views were partly checked. Signs of censorship appeared
early in the United Hine Workers' Journal . Beginning in I89I,
letters to the editors contained statements suggesting that some
members were having difficulty airing their views. "Should these
few lines escape the bottomless pit of oblivion, viz. the waste
basket," wrote one correspondent. 102 Another began his letter:
"Believing the blue pencil was discriminate^ used on my last
correspondence.
. .
."
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"Now, Mr. Editor," insisted a third,
"I believe The Journal is the property of the miners, and that
it is to be used by the miners for the advancement of our craft,
and any miner or mine worker who has anything to offer for the
advancement of his craftsmen or the laboring people in general
should have space for same, which I was not allowed."10^
Editors admitted censorship, but defended their actions
by referring to a principle upheld by most of the labor press.
"Ho letter containing personalities shall be published in this
105Journal , " the first editor established. J His successors
reiterated this policy. In I898 roaders were reminded that it
was the editor's job "to obliterate all personal allusions here-
after from any and every communication that may reach us.
Again in 1916, subscribers were informed that the paper "doe3
not invite our members to a.ir their differences with officials,
District or International, or with other members of the organiaa-
1 07
tion." ' In reality, this principle only protected the national
elite. Some local leaders, and particularly known critics of the
administration were freely attacked in the pres3, their character
assailed, their sincerity questioned.
10
^ Moreover, the principle
became a means of preventing open discussion on candidates for
office. In I898, the Journal informed its audience that "all
references to the merits or demerits, if any there be, of can-
didates for office, at our coming annual convention at Pittsburg,
will be excluded from the columns of the Journal." The rationale
for this action was that "the Journal is the official organ of
the miners, their property, and it would not be proper to make a
campaign medium of it for the glorification of some miners and
the possible detraction or opposition of others."'1'0^ In reality,
the incumbent, in this case Mitchell, was able to propagate his
message in the pages of the Journal under the rubric of important
union business. Only the opposition was eliminated.
While proclaiming the Journal would not deal in personal-
ities, the first editor continued: "This does not prevent our
members from criticising the policy of the officers of the organ-
ization or to suggest remedies. ""'"^ Again, his successors re-
peated this corollary, but in practice it too was abused. Upon
leaving the editorship in 1899 to assume a vice presidency,
Thomas W, Davis nonchalantly confessed "we have tried to exclude
all extraneous matter from its columns, especially have we done
this when it was of such a character a3 to seem to us likely to
open up an endless, irritating, unjustifiable unity destroying
sentiment and action. . . ." ^ In response to critioism concern-
ing the absence of articles by dissenters, another editor retorted
in 1908j "The 'Knocker' never has any argument. He deals
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exclusively with prejudice and a presumption that everything is
going wrong unless he is directing its course." 112 Several years
later John Brophy met similar opposition when he sent his study
on nationalizing the mines to editor Ellis Searles. When it was
not published, he inquired as to the reasons. "Searles »s reply
was evasive," Brophy recorded:
saying he felt it was unwise to publish the program
because it appeared to be 'to some extent a denuncia-
tion of the policies of the union. 1 This referred
to my argument that collective bargaining, as we had
been practicing it for so many years, was inadequate
to deal with the basic problems in the industry. I
sought to allay his fears, but without sucoess; he
thought the program was 'too controversial, 1 even
though I pointed out that it followed the principles
laid down in the resolution of the 1919 convention.
I knew that he would not take this stand without
consulting the national officers, so I concluded that
they were opposed to the idea and concentrated on
educational work within my district. ^
Censorship, such as practiced by the United Mine Workers '
Journal and other papers, had unfortunate consequences for the
labor movement. Instead of providing a two-way corridor for ideas
to move between the leaders and tho led, communications increas-
ingly followed a one-way path from the top down. Rank-and-filo
sentiment had difficulty filtering up to those in powor, thereby
contributing to a gap of understanding between officers and
followers. Alternative policies which labor might pursue were at
times denied a heeiring in its market-place of ideas. Tho debates
on important union questions were frequently channeled into non-
union presses and other media. Most important, the inability of
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every member to receive a fair hearing undermined a fundamental
foundation on which viable trade union democracy could he built.
Other aspects of image building were more defensible. In
the realities of union politics, the leader charged with initi-
ating policy had to defend and explain his actions. More expli-
citly, he had the responsibility to convince the rank and file to
follow, and persuasion was preferable to force. Like Edmund
Morgan's John Winthrop of Puritan America, the labor leader was
confronted with the insoluble dilemma of determining how much
divergence a society could alio?/ and still remain a society. Also
like Winthrop, he faced the impossible task of living righteously
in an impure world. "^"^
IV
Much of the propaganda in labor jour2ials attacked the
third element among the led, the administrations 1 critics. Pejora-
tively labeled "grumblers," "union wreckers," "calamity howlers,"
"snarlers," and "whiners," they v/ere best known as "Tho Kickers
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and the Knockers." J They comprised "the fire in the rear" of
whioh labor ' leaders unendingly complained. "In all society,"
William Sylvis wrote in the late l860's, "we find a class of men
possessed of a superabundance of self-esteem, some brains, much
cheek, and a little learning." Within the Iron Molders, he con-
tinued, these men banded together in a "clique" seeking to capture
the union and divide "the profits and honors among thorn." "En-
deavoring to poison the minds of the union men" they conducted
their activities "below the surface; but, craving bolder as they
hardened in sin, they have lately openly proclaimed in favor of
secession.-116 Suoh men were a "tv/o faced, snarling crew, who
act the part of purile wiffets,
. . . fault finding by habit,
and treacherous by instinct.
. .
Sylvis 1 invectives contributed to his historic prominence
as a "Union Pioneer." In ensuing years, other leaders would view
the opposition in similar light. "The dectective agency," charged
the Miners' Magazine, "has discovered that the tongue of slander
is an effective weapon to shatter a labor organization, and the
man whose character is tainted with suoh traits of degeneracy
can always find employment as a Judas and receive the reward of
i 1 O
the 1 thirty pieces of silver ,
.
,,
"LXO
"Disruption, if it conies,
must come from within," insisted the United Mine Workers 1 Journal
.
"Dissappointed office seekers; revolutionists in a hurry—men who
can not wait for the slow "but necessary processes of evolution;
plain crooks masquerading as advanced union advocates, these arc
the disruptive forces that may "bring about the dissolution of any
119
or all of the great organizations of the toilers* 11
The nature of union dissent is difficult to determine. As
suggested a*bove, labor papers woro often hostile to opponents 1
views. Consequently, when their arguments were published, it is
questionable whether these reflected their true feelings or were
simply propaganda to win supporters. More important, the dissi-
dents 1 camp was comprised of a variety of men whose ideals and
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purposes were diverse and confusing. In perspective, "The Kickers
and Knockers" resembled the administration boosters. They too
were motivated by idealism and ambition. Some sincerely desired
labor to adopt an alternative focus; others were promoting their
own personal oareers. And like the boosters, these motives were
often intertwined. Also paralleling their counterparts, the
dissenters were active in union affairs. Much to the chagrin of
established forces, they attended meetings and at times gained
positions of influence.
The character of the disenchanted unionists and the right-
eousness of their causes was less important in shaping labor
leadership than the consequences of their actions and the response
of those in power. The presence of a group challenging the
leaders created strong tensions within unions. In its most
extreme form, the tension splintered organizations and encouraged
dual unionism. Sometimes, as with the glass workers, dual union-
ism weakened the workers' ability to cope with their employer,
for one organization would undermine the other in seeking favors
from the boss. On other occasions, such splintering improved the
workers 1 position with his employer. The disruption of the
lethargic United Garment Workers and the establishment of the
Amalgamated Clothing Workers resulted in a far more viable union
looking after the interests of the needle workers.
More trii.ditionally, dissenters remained within their organ-
izations Where they strove to gain power and remodel the union's
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program. To some extent, this struggle was healthy for it served
as a foundation for democracy. More often, it had detrimental
effects. It kept the union in a constant uproar, promoted in-
security, and created backlash. Many good officers, for instance,
resigned rather than face a barrage of criticism. In I89I,
Edward T. Plank refused to run again for the presidency of the
International Typographical Union. "At that time," the printers 1
journal later explained, "some alleged writers were beginning to
exude vile billingsgates and attack the officers by innuendo,
which was most offensive to a gentlemen printer like Mr. Plank
and he positively declined to be made the target for the mud
120batteries of self-seeking politicians." ' Likewise, the infight-
ing in the Mine Workers during 1894 and 1895 was so bitter that
121Secretary-Treasurer Patrick McBryde resigned.* With sensitive
men abandoning the field, union offices v/ent to those more fit
to survive in the jungle of union politics.
The dissidents also contributed to unions becoming govern-
ments of men rather than laws. Even when dissent rested on
policy, rebels freely resorted to name calling and accusations.
They too realized that the rank and file were basically indifferent
to issues and therefore hoped to arouse support by attacking
individuals. "We are called upon at all our meetings," complained
one unionist, "to listen, hour after hour, to long circulars
and charges and counter-charges, and call special meetings of our
local assemblies and local unions and stay up till 10 or 11 o'clock,
for what? To discuss the honesty and integrity of the McBrido's,
Penna's, Adams's, Hayes, Sovereign and company, instead of dis-
cussing trade matters and political economy and educating our-
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selves.' 1 " Such occurances placed attention on personalities,
and drove many of the rank and file from the meeting halls in
boredom and frustration. Moreover, these antics could lead to
backlash. The majority of the delegates to the I895 convention
of the Mine Workers, a reporter noted, were neutral in the con-
troversy then raging. While they would have liked to abandon
the old officers, they were reluctant to do so because the accusa-
tions of the anti-administration group v/ere ridiculous. Voting
out the established leaders would have been interpreted as
12^
approving the opposition.
Infighting also weakened the unions in their dealings with
employers. On the one hand, the bickering revealed to a union's
enemies the weakness of the organization* "Every time one of our
active and leading Members appears in the public Press harshly
criticizing Officers, Members, and Methods," pointed out A.A.
Carlton of the Knights, "the real effect is to aid those who are
exultingly calling upon the public to witness our dissension and
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our humiliation." " On the other hand, dissension diverted
union energies from confrontation with employers # "Vfe have a
common enemy to fight and v/e cannot afford to squabble among
ourselves," Powderly observed, "but it seems as if we must assail
each other more bitterly than wo assail the enemy if the least
difference arises between us." 125 Y/illiam Crawford of the Mine
Workers agreed and lectured his bickering comrades: "We can
console ourselves with the assurance that we are doing just what
the masters, our employers, want us to do. While we are quarrel-
ing among ourselves we are not troubling them.
. .
,'»
12^
Adverse consequences of dissension would not have been so
severe had those in power answered responsibly to criticism, but
in the desire to protect their unions as well as their own posi-
tions, many labor leaders reacted unscrupulously. The use of the
labor journal has already been mentioned and other practices v/ill
be suggested in the next chapter. The important point is that
long before Lewis, Hoffa, Ryan, or Boyle appeared on the labor
scene, their predecessors utilized some of the dubious practices
exposed by the IJcClellan Committee in the 1950' s and supposedly
outlawed by the 1959 Labor Management Roporting and Disclosure
Act. When the opposition captured the largest local in the Cigar
Makers International Union in 1881, for instance, president Adolph
Strasser nullified the election and placed a loyal partisan in
control*. ^ In 1887, Powderly had the Order expel his most vocal
12'
critics, Burnet te G. Haskell, Joseph Buchanan, and Thomas Berry.
He also pioneered in disbanding locals and then rechartering them
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without the dissident element. * Daniel Tobin approved of this
tactic. In 1909 he wrote a friend: "I am in hope that sorao day
we will have peace but the next time wo have peace it will be
when those who arc wrong will bo cut out of the gonoral member*-
ship."130 The teamster leader also appreciated the strategy of
building a power base on the "sleepy locals" throughout the
country. "The little towns and villages," he informed an organ-
izer, "help keep this organization going and are very little
trouble to this office, and my object is to try and get to the
little places in the woods and remote districts with our organiza-
131tion." In 1909, the Mine Workers adopted an amendment common
to many union constitutions:
Any member guilty of slandering or circulating, or
causing to be circulated, false statements against any
member of the United Mine Workers, upon being proven
guilty, shall be suspended from membership in the Inter-
national, District or sub-district or local union for
a period of six months, and not eligible to hold
office in the organization for a period of two years. 3
The means by which men were found guilty was the administratively
controlled judiciary system. The miners also established an anti-
insurgent fund, which in 1921 amounted to $27,000. 133
The actions which labor leaders at times took against the
opposition constitute one of the most unpleasant aspects of trade
union history. Yet, without justifying these deeds, they must be
placed in perspective. Thero were elements among the discontented
who would, if given their way, foiler;/ courses detrimental and.
perhaps even ruinous to the unions. Leaders felt duty bound to
prevent such developments by whatever means necessary. That they
overreacted was unfortunate but entirely human. Indeed, the degree
of suppression and manipulation by labor leaders was probably no
greater than that of politicians and far loss than that of the
"Robber Barons" whoso concern for democracy was academic.
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CHAPTER V
MECHANISMS OP POWER
It is necessary to stress at this point that the
tendency toward the upward shift and concentration of
power is inherent in the very nature of the organiza-
tion as it grows, its functions multiply, and its
responsibilities increase. Thirst for power, where
it does exist (and it naturally exists almost every-
where), is essentially a secondary factor, aggravating,
accelerating, but certainly not originating the
tendencey.
Will Herberg1
I
While a leader' 3 right to rule originiated from the consent
of the rank and file, his immediate authority derived from his
control and influence over the mechanisms of union government.
The evolution of labor leadership was closely tied to the insti-
tutional development of the trade unions. Over the years from
the Civil War to the end of World War I, union structure evolved
in a manner which placed the national leaders in pivotal positions
of power.
Several themes weave their way through an analysis of the
mechanisms of power. One is the progressive expansion of the
labor movement in both size and functions from I87O to 1920. In
I869 there were twenty-nine national trade unions. Despite the
high mortality rate among them, the number rose to seventy-nine
in 1889, one hundred twenty in I899, one hundred seventy-one in
1909, and one hundred sixty-three in 1919 (the slight decline
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resulting primarily from the merger of existing bodies). The
number of trade union members correspondingly increased from
roughly 300,000 in I87O to 865,500 in 1900, to over five million
in 1920.^ Membership in the International Typographical Union
grew from 25,165 in 1891 to 62,661 in 1918, while the increase
was even more marked for the Teamsters whose rolls lengthened
from 32,000 in 1903 to 112,453 by 1920.4 Union functions expand-
ed concomitantly. The increased involvement of the national
office in the field of union-management relations has already
been mentioned in Chapter III. Unions also initiated for their
members such activities and services as training institutes,
hospitals, clinics, retirement homes, and health and life insur-
ance. By 1913 > seventy-two out of one hundred thirty-four organ-
izations provided benevolent relief, and the funds disbursed
5
that year totaled $11,500,000. To support such programs along
with strike relief funds, unions increased their treasuries to
respectable proportions.
Closely associated with these developments was the con-
tinual conflict between the forces of local autonomy and decen-
tralization and the advocates of centralization and national
union dominance. This theme was also discussed in Chapter III
with reference to the evolution of union-management relations,
and many of the points developed there are equally applicable to
an understanding of trade union government. In the loosely
structured bodies of the l860's and 1870's the national office
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"secured little obedience from the constituent local societies"
which v/ere bound to it "by suoh slender ties that threat of sus-
pension had little effect in compelling obedience to international
rules." By 1920 trade unions had evolved into relatively cen-
tralized institutions in which a majority of locals were "a pro-
duct of the international or national, chartered by it, largely
directed by it, bound to obey it in matters of policy and method
or suffer revocation of charter, loss of counsel and financial
support in time of trouble—all of which ordinarily means speedy
dissolution." Absorption of power by the national union did not
proceed unchallenged, and a number of the institutions of trade
union government including executive boards and referenda were
originially designed as means of preventing concentration of
power in the hands of a few top leaders. Plan3 for decentraliza-
tion, however, were not always intended to foster trade union
democracy. In numerous instances, advocates of decentralization
were local power elites attempting to forestall encroachment on
their domain by the national office. Proponents of centralization,
in contrast, generally adhered to the images of the union as an
army and a business and explained their tactics in terms of the
need for order and efficiency.
An equally important theme underlying the development of
union government was the labor movement's rather weak adherence
to constitutionalism. V/hile all unions possessed a declaration
of their laws, policies, and structure, they did not hold these
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documents sacrosanct. "To a certain extent
. . . John Mitchell
observed, "the formal written constitution of a trade union is
rather a statement of principles and a formulation of present
policy of the union than a hard and fasb determination of its
future laws." Contributing to this situation was the ease v/ith
which the documents could be changed. "The constitution of the
United Mine Workers," Mitchell continued, "may be altered by a
majority vote in convention, and in a large number of other
organisations the fundamental law of the organization may be
changed by a majority vote either of the delegates in convention
or of the members voting by referendum, although in some unions
7
a two-thirds vote is necessary." The relative facility by which
constitutions could be, and were, amended undermined the sanctity
of the documents, for v/hat v/as accepted policy today could very
v/ell be rejected tomorrow.
Lack of an independent judiciary responsible for interpret-
ing the document also contributed to the weakness of constitu-
tionalism in the labor movement. Within most organizations the
national president or secretary possessed power to pass upon the
the meaning of the constitution, generally subject to review by
the executive board or convention, both of which increasingly
came under his dominance. The loaders v/ho exercised this function
wore not unusually devious, but they wore men of action directing
organizations designed for accomplishments. When officers folt
the constitution inhibited effective action, they did not
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hesitate to stretch or abridge its provisions, "I am prepared, 1 '
the president of the Iron Molders declared in 1867, "to lay the
constitution on the shelf and to do what seems best to save the
organization, believing that it is better to have an organisation
without a constitution than to have a constitution without an
Q
organization." Beginning in the l860«s when William Sylvis
extended his authority beyond its defined limits, the concept
emerged that top union officials possessed extra-constitutional
9powers* The Teamsters 1 General Secretary-Treasurer Thomas L.
Hughes revealed this attitude in a letter to a unionist request-
ing special privileges. "President Tobin is still President of
the organization," he wrote, "and I must receive any orders that
are contrary to the constitution from him before I will take
any action whatsoever." Again he repeated, "I do not intend to
deviate from the constitution, at least not without his instruc-
tions."^
The general attitude toward constitutionalism, ainong the
top leaders at least, is perhaps best revealed in a letter from
Samuel Gompers to an associate who complained that the document
restrained him in his work. "Dear Sir and Brother:" Gompers
replied,
At a railroad station a young man was about to enter
a car on the train. Seeing the conductor, he asked him
whether he could smoke his cigar in that car. The con-
ductor peremptorily said, 'No 1 , when the young man
retorted:
'Why, I saw a man coming out of that car smoking a
dirty old pipe. 1 The conductor replied: "Well ho did
not ask me. 1
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Your letter of the 7th to hand, and I make this
private reply*
Fraternally Youjs,
Samuel Gompers
II
In newly formed unions, the governing authority generally
resided with the convention. Here delegates from constituent
bodies gathered to determine the organization's priorities and
supervise the national officers. The delegates were the citizens
of the national body, and they chose the leaders from their
ranks. By 1920, however, the sovereignty of the convention had
been severely undermined. The servants had become the master as
union officials assumed responsibility for policy decisions and
guided the work of the delegates. Maneuvering by the leaders
only partially accounted for the weakening of the conventions.
More importantly, the system itself had serious shortcomings.
Trade union conventions have never been purely democratic.
The early gatherings were designed to protect the interests of
the locals and only indirectly to express the sentiment of the
members. Rigid instructions frequently circumscribed the author-
ity of the delegates, yet such pledges xvere primarily designed
"to safeguard the power originally held by the local unions"
rather than "to retain governing authority in the 'voice' of the
membership."12 Local unions were the actual constituencies of
the delegates, since the rank and file were not citizens of the
national organization.
13 Representation at conventions was
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initially based on the senatorial principle in which each local
received an equal number of votes regardless of size, and while
most organizations eventually moved to proportional representa-
tion, few, if any, unions achieved a stage where every delegate
represented an equal number of members ."^
The inability of locals to send delegates to the national
convention further hindered fair representation. "Nearly one-
half of our total membership of over 18,000," reported the
secretary of the International Typographical Union in IO85,
"are practically disfranchised in the way of representation in
the international body, owing to the poverty of small local
unions and the great expense necessarily incurred in sending
representatives long distances. . . As an illustration of this
disfranchisement, it may be mentioned that at the last annual
session of this body less than one-third of the enrolled unions
were represented at all." 'J Nor did the situation improve over
time: seventeen years later the union's journal published an
already familiar report of convention attendance. Of 536 locals
enrolled on the books, 124 sent delegates while 412 were unrep-
resented. Other unions experienced the same problem sinco the
cause was common to all: "The small unions simply can not
17
afford to send representatives."
Various unions instituted a number of reforms to rectify
the situation, but these measures in turn created difficulties of
their owrw One proposal suggested that the convention meet in a
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different region of the country each session so that small locals
might send delegates whenever the gathering was held in their
vicinity. This was no solution at all for the problem of in-
complete representation at each convention remained.
A proposal that small locals be represented by proxy,
when adopted, also failed to make conventions more democratic
for it concentrated power in the hands of the national executives
or leaders of a few large locals who controlled the absentee
votes, W«0. Pomeroy, for instance, gained dominance over the
Hotel and Restaurant Employees in the l890 ! s because from his
Chicago stronghold he was able to wield the proxies of many
outlying locals. Once in power, Pomeroy chartered ghost locals
with false memberships, and since he controlled the books, he
could avoid detection. If challenged at a convention to reveal
the state of the union, he could defeat the move by using his
. 18
proxies.
Payment of delegate expenses by the national administration
constituted a more constructive reform. The Iron Llolders 1 Union
had always paid the mileage costs of the delegates and beginning
in 1832 provided them with three dollars a day "to defray
expenses. 11 As a result, attendance at their gatherings was far
botter than at such conventions as the Typographers where there
was no provision for aid. The drawback to the plan, however, was
the financial burden on the union's treasury. From 1876 to 1902,
the length of the Iron ilolders 1 conventions doubled, the number
of delegates rose almost five-fold, while mileage and per diem
costs increased thirteen times, from $3,844.60 to S50,670.72. 19
Likewise the Journeymen Plumbers 1 1913 convention cost over
$72,000, the 1917 session over $96,000, and the 1921 gathering
20
a record $154*000. One of the more common reasons given by
national unions for resorting to referenda was the prohibitively
21high cost of conventions.
A more popular solution to the problem of poor attendance
was to hold conventions less frequently. Whether the expenses
of sending a delegation rested on the local or was assumed by
the national organization, this proposal reduced costs. More-
over, as unions matured and no longer existed in an openly
hostile environment, many labor leaders felt that frequent
gatherings were uncalled for* The sense of mission and solidarity
which early conventions stimulated was no longer necessary. Nor
was there need for frequent policy directives from the delegates,
as the administrative bureaucracy had developed a momentum of
its own. Indeed, many unionists perceived fewer conventions as
a means of stabilizing their organisations, for delegates to
annual gatherings seemed unable to resist the temptation of
tinkering with the union's structure and policies. Accepting
such views, the Journeymen Plumbers called off their 19°3 con-
vention to avoid the excessive cost and because "to make any
22
change in our constitution . . . would upset our system."
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Several unions allowed considerable time to pa3a between
conventions. The Cigar Makers' convention of 1912 was the first
in sixteen years. The Granite Cutters held a session in 1880 and
then did not convene again until 1912. In the meantime, business
was conducted in both organizations by referendum and specially
elected committees. 23 In 1939, the rank and file of the Tobacco
Workers had to get a court order to force the organization's
officers to call a convention, the last one having been hold in
241900. Most unions, however, met at reasonable intervals. The
Iron Holders held conventions annually from I859 to 1868, bien-
nially from 1868 to 1878, quadrennially from 1879 to 1886, bien-
nially from 1886 to I89O, and quinquennially from I89O to I899. 25
The Journeymen Plumbers, founded in I889, held annual sessions
until 1913 when the constitution was changed to require only
26triennial meetings. Tho International Association of Machin-
ists held annual conventions from I889 to I893 and biennial meet-
ings from I895 to 1911; it had no provision for a specified time
27from 1912 to 1916 but met quadrennially thereafter. Fewer
gatherings naturally resulted in less direct control over the
leaders* In many cases the term of office was lengthened to
correspond with the meetings, providing officers greater freedom
and flexibility in their actions.
When conventions met less frequently, the duration of each
session was often inadequate for tho amount of v/ork to bo done*
In 1913, economist Theodore Glocker clearly perceived tho probloia
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this development posed;
The governmental efficiency of the trade-union conven-tion is limited because it can be convoked so infre-quently and can remain in session such a very short
time. None of the unions hold conventions oftener
than once a year, and many of thera less frequently.
The length of each session has been more and more pro-
tracted as organisations have grown in size and nunber
of their activities. For example, the convention of
Iron, Steel and Tin Workers lasted for three days in
18?6 and for seventeen days in 1902; that of the Cigar
Makers lasted for five days in 1866 and for eighteen
days in 1896. Nevertheless, in fifty-six associations
from which information was obtained the average length
of the convention was seven days} in only twelve of
these was the convention in session for more than ten
days. The most protracted sessions are those of the
Iron Holders, whose delegates continued to meet to-
gether in 1902 for twenty days. Certainly a week ore-
even two weeks seera3 a very short time in which to
adopt needed legislation, clear the docket of judicial
cases, elect officers, audit accounts, levy dues,
appropriate funds, declare strikes, and transact the
numerous other items of business which have been accum-
ulating during the year or more since the last conven-
tion.
Added to these shortcomings was the increasingly large size
of convention delegations. Gatherings of the Cigar Makers, for
example, expanded in size from seven delegates in I877, to eighty-
five in I883, to two hundred forty-five in 1896. 2^ Likewise the
number of delegates attending the conventions of the Journeymen
Plumbers started at forty at the first session in I889, dropped
to twenty-two in 1897 as a result of the depression, rosa to two
hundred forty in 1906. after the national office started to pay
expenses, and reached four hundred sixty in 1917»
Enlarged attendance further contributed to inefficiency
and inability to supervise the executives properly. The early
21?
conventions of a union, generally small in size, were arenas for
conflicting views; the delegates were earnestly devoted to tho
serious business of building an organization and cared little
for social functions,-*1 A representative to an early Hotel and
Restaurant Employees 1 convention reported "I was under the impres-
sion that the principal business of the delegates was to have a
good time; but I was speedily made aware of my mistake, u^2 But
as time passed, the delegate's original impression became more
accurate, "In too many organisations," complained a printer in
1915 9 ""the trip to the convention is regarded as a junket, and
only a junket. In too many organisations tho practice prevails
of passing tho 'honor 1 around, first to this and then to that
personal favorite, to good mixers and to those whom we would like
33to give an occasional vacation because we like tho man,"
"Anyone who has attended our international conventions," argued
a mine worker in 1912:
must realize that they havo reached a size where dole-
gates can no longer take intelligent action on the
questions that come before them, . • • This convention
is so large that at least one-half of tho delegates
are paying no attention , . . because it is impossible
for them to hear the debates that are going on. And
if the mining industry is ever thoroughly organized in
this country, imagine the conventions we Y/ill have J
They will be mobs and nothing else , mob rule
would prevail more than intelligence
The delegate's fear that large conventions would bocome
mobs contained considerable truth. As sociologist Robert Michels
observed:
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It is easier to dominate a large crowd than a small
audience. The adhesion of the crowd is tumultuous,
summary, and unconditional. Once the suggestions have
taken effect, the crowd does not readily tolerate
contradictions from a small minority, and still less
from isolated individuals. A great multitude assembled
within a small area is unquestionably more accessible
than is a small meeting whose membprs can quietly
discuss matters among themselves. ^
Small, early conventions were described in the union press
as parliaments for debate and exchange of views, v/hile later and
larger sessions were defined as serving an educational function
and promoting harmony.^ An approving editorial in the United-
Mine Workers 1 Journal suggests the emerging moh-like harmony of
union gatherings:
Former conventions of miners have been more or less
marked by individual spleen and rancor, but these with
which we are now dealing were marked by a determination
on the part of each and every delegate to squelch any
notoriety hunter or common disturber who might have the
hardihood to shew his head at a time when the calamitous
and perilous position of our craft deraon&^unity and
harmony in as full a measure as possible.
Reformers continued their efforts to correct the short-
comings of conventions. The most popular alternative in the years
around the turn of the century was the referendum, to be discussed
shortly. Another standard proposal called for reduction of the
number of delegates attending the sessions. This plan was pro-
posed in the Typographical Union as well as the United Mine
Workers where it was defeated three times, the last in spite of
the disorder that prevailed at the 1916 convention when 1,5*1
delegates tried to negotiate business. The reluctance of
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delegates to accept the measure sometimes revealed a desire to
protect their own positions, yet it also reflected a yearning to
keep the union representative. Several plans, including one
advocated "by Mine Worker leaders, would transfer the unit of
representation from the local to the district level and thus
dilute the convention's ties with the average unionist,
^
A third reform would transform the meetings into "business
conventions." Most vigorously advocated within the Typographical
Union, this proposal reflected the emerging image of the union as
a business. "Instead of leaving ourselves to decide on a new man
or men every year," argued an advocate of the plan, "instead of
keeping ourselves in doubt as to whether we will be represented
at all or not, we ought to so change our constitution as to make
the delegate an officeholder with a term of three or five years,
send him off on business principles, pay him his regular union
scale just as if he were at work in his shop at his branch of
the trade, and meet his legitimate railroad fare and hotel
expenses in addition, and no more." y This plan to create a corps
of professional delegates had a number of variations. Among the
more popular was the designation of local leaders as representa-
tives, creating "a convention of subordinate union officials."
While appealing to the more bureaucratic-minded, the idea was
distasteful to rank and file unionists and not officially accepted.
Ironically, however, delegates to the national conventions came
increasingly from tho local power elites who developed an almost
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sacred right to the position. "At all the conventions, excepting
the early ones," recalled Henry Y/hite of the Garment Workers,
"the sameness of representation from year to year was a marked
feature. The faces at one convention could be counted on to
appear at the next. In the personnel of tho national officers
there was also this peculiarity. It seemed as if a settled class
of placeholders had grown up, a condition best adopted to the
development of a governing trust
The weaknesses of conventions made them susceptable to
domination by the national executives. In pre-convention planning
and during the sessions, the officers wielded the extensive in-
fluence of their positions and personal prestige. As national
unions centralized and local leaders, increasingly reliant upon
the blessings of headquarters, became delegates, the national
executive's powers of persuasion grew. In addition to the in-
formal pressures which the leaders could bring to bear, they were
granted certain explicit powers which enabled them to manipulate,
for good or evil, the nature and conduct of the gathering.
Control over membership records and charters proved one of
tho leaders 1 most useful tools. In 1914 the officers of the
United Garment Workers successfully prevented the seating of
delegates from locals, particularly in Hew York City, on grounds
that they were in debt to the union and consequently ineligible
for a voice in the convention.^
1 On the other hand, if a leader
wanted the representation of a friendly local which was in bad
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standing, he could conveniently arrange to cancel its debt. oce-
an
retary John Hayes of the Knights of Labor, for example, wrote
amenable local leader:
If you will write me a letter dated back thirty or
forty days, say about the middle of June, asking that
Iexhonorate them from back taxes and request that I
right their standing, that upon your recommendation I
have granted your request for their exhonoration, I am
of the opinion I can add them to the list of good pay-
ing locals in the future. Besides, if this is done as
I direct, it may be the means of seating you as the
3rd delegate in the G/oneral/ Assembly/. I have said
enough.
Similar tactics included withholding charters to potentially
independent-minded locals until after the convention, as Pov/derly
did in l887j or, as Mitchell did in I9O5, in requesting coopera-
tive loaders of largo locals or districts to buy several thousand
fake membership cards in order to send a larger delegation to the
forthcoming convention and thereby weaken a growing opposition,^
In daoh case the leader's power to appoint the credential commit-
tee chairman, and in some instances the entire committee, enabled
him to carry off the coup.
Other methods by which leaders numipulatcd conventions
ranged from holding them in a community favorable to thoir inter-
ests, to determining who should get paid, and how much, for ser-
vices rendered at the meetings. Examples can be found in numerous
biographies and union studies. Yet the cry of manipulation was
most frequently raised over the election of officers*
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The practice of selecting officers at the convention posed
basic philosophical and practical questions as to the nature of
representative government. Was it the delegate's duty to repre-
sent accurately the views of those who sent him by voting for the
man they desired? Or should he use his own judgment, independent
of the rank-and-file
•
s will, and support the man he felt most fit
for the job? In the main, the later concept received the greater
support from union leaders. "I do not believe in the practice of
pledging representatives to vote for any man at the General/
A/Tsembl^,
" wrote Powderly in 1886. "After they arrive on the
ground they may see a better man, or a man better fitted to
perform the duties than the man they are pledged to vote for and
if the interests of the order require it I believe the should pay
no attention to such pledges."^ The officers of the Garment
Y/brkers held similar views. "The best fitted to make lews and
elect officers for any international organisation are the men who
act as delegates to convention," they reportod to the AFL. "They
are usually the workers and know what is best for the organiza—
56tion." Underlying this position was a basic and not entirely
unreasonable distrust of the rank-and-file 1 s discretion. "The
rank and file is too far removed to have the requisite knowledge
of the personality of the officers to be as well equipped as a
delegate who has attended one or more conventions in estimating
the fitness of the man for office," insisted the leaders of the
Plato PrinterSr Likewise, Gorapers counselled the International
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Association of Machinists in 1903 to reject the referendum
because its members labored at their trade too many hours to
have time to understand complex issues and to ovaluato candidates*
Such feelings also led the AFL leader to disapprove of direct
democracy in his own organisation.^
In thoso unions in which the delegates chose the national
leaders, politics dominated the conventions. The high point of
the meetings was the balloting, and many delegates left for homo
soon after the choice was made, regardless of what business might
A9
still be pending. ^ Frequently, politics resulted in tho actual
work of the convention being conducted outside the hall. Praising
the adoption of a more democratic way of choosing leaders, one
mine worker pointed out that previously:
our officers were always elected in the hotel corridor
or on tho street corner or, in other words, the button
holing process. Under the old plan the rank and file
didn't know who would be nominated for offices in the
convention and consequently instructed their delegates
to vote for tho best man, but instead in a great many
instances they voted contrary to their own opinions and
why? Mr. A would have a man that he would like to bee
elected to a certain office; LIr. B has a man that lie
wants for tho same office tho consoquenoe is that thoy
will begin to hold caucuses and the one will say this
and that about tho other to defeat him, when in fact
both of them might perhappQbe the grandest rascals
in
the whole business. . . J
Along with politics and caucuses, the power of the incumbont
created suspicion against electing officers through conventions*
The maneuvering both before and during tho 1099 W convention
and John Mitchell's rise to tho presidency suggests tho uses of
the incumbent's power. In lato September, I898, UMW President
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Mike Ratchford, after emphatically vowing to the rank and file
during his re-election campaign that he would not accept a gov-
ernment appointment, succumbed to the temptation and assumed a
seat on the newly formed United States Industrial Commission.^1
He then proceeded to prepare the way for his First Vice President,
John Mitchell, to rise to the presidency. While remaining
official head of the union, Ratchford persuaded the executive
board to install Mitchell as Acting President, a post not pro-
vided for in the union's constitution. With this advantage
Mitchell was able to build up a following by freely distributing
strike aid to win support and by using his organizers to under-
52
mine the prestige of the opposition. At the January, 1899,
convention, Mitchell was immune to direct criticism, for Ratchford
was official president and as such presided. He appointed men
favorable to Mitchell to all the important committees, including
the one on credentials which admitted delegates and determined
voting strength. One of Mitchell's opponents, Pat Dolan, com-
plained of these tactics and charged National Secretary-Treasurer
V/.C. Pearce with making false entries into the cash book to pad
the roll of delegates in Mitchell's favor. A move to call for
the official union books was defeated and Mitchell won the
53
coveted office.
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III
The shortcomings of the convention—its inherent unwield-
iness, inefficiency, and susceptibility to manipulation—led many
unionists in the decades around the turn of the century to cham-
pion the referendum as a substitute for, or at least a supplement
to, the official meeting. Labor's interest in the referendum,
as well as initiative and recall, manifested Populist and Pro-
gressive influences. In the logo's and early 1900' s men from
all walks of life—farmers, lawyers, educators, doctors, as well
as workers
—
promoted a variety of reforms with the intent of
shaping government more closely to the ideal of participatory
democracy. Under this influence a number of unions and the
American Federation of Labor went on record supporting referenda
in civic affairs, and it was to be expected, given the democratic
impulse of the labor movement and the inadequacies of the conven-
tion system, that these reforms would be advocated for the trade
union polity.
While a few champions of the referendum in union government
say/ it as a means of manipulating their way to power, most workers
supported it on grounds of democratic principle—"namely, that
each individual member should be given a chance to express hi3
opinion on the questions submitted."-^ Bolieving in the wisdom,
of the masses, they felt that giving everyone a voice in deter-
mining policy and electing officers would prevent the riso of an
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oligarchy. To this extent, the referendum was a decentralizing
reform, transferring authority from the few to the many.-^
Advocates of the referendum also viewed it as a means of
creating greater support for the union. "The success of any law,'
a printer pointed out, "depends very largely on the extent in
which it is backed up by the sentiment of those to whom it is
applicable." "It is better that the members should retain the
right to pass upon all laws than that they should be restricted
to complaining about them for a year ^between convention $7",
56
without any opportunity to secure their amendment or repeal.
Finally, advocates of referendum saw it as a means of
supplementing conventions and making them more efficient. Fewer
sessions would be necessary when much of the business was con-
ducted by referendum. Within many organizations a direct cor-
relation existed between the use of the referendum and the fre-
quency of gatherings. During the sixteen year interval between
conventions of the Cigar Makers from I896 to 1912, and the thirty
two year span between Granite Cutter meetings of 1880 and 1912,
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both unions conducted most of their business by referendum.
The Furniture Y/orkers 1 Union held its sessions biennially, the
Machine Wood V/orkers 1 annually, but after they amalgamated, the
conventions were held triennially and the referendum was intro-
duced. The quality of conventions also improved with the
direct election of officors. "It was remarked on more than one
occasion by those at Syracuse who had also attended previous
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sessions," observed a printer:
that there was a marked improvement in the tone of the
gathering, and that it was more busineop-like in every
wagr, just because of the elimination of all the wire-
pulling and caucusing incident to an election. It has
been the experience at other conventions that the dele-
gates seldom really got down to work until after the
officers had been chosen, and as the practice was to
have this on the fourth day—a proper idea, too, because
it gave the delegates a chance to size up the merits
of the candidates—a great deal of time was wasted.
From the point of view of the transaction of convention
business alone the prpsent system of electing officers
ought to bo retained.
Influenced by such arguments, several unions introduced!
some form of referenda. In response to a questionnaire sent out
by the AFL in 1912, thirty-two unions reported that como form of
referendum was used to elect officers, although seventy-nine
reported that their conventions made the choice. At the same
time fifty-two of the unions stated that the convention was the
sole law making body, while another fifty-two also made use of
the referendum in determining policy, Whilo not a clear majority,
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the number of unions utilizing the system was impressive.
The gap betv/een the number of unions using the referendum
to enact laws and the number using the system to elect officers
leads to an interesting observation. Using the same 1912 AFL
study, it was pointed out in Chapter IV that while an average
of fifty-eight per cent of the membership voted in unions using
the referendum to elect officers, only thirty-three per cent voted
in those organizations U3ing the system only to enact laws. Prom
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this discrepancy it was concluded that the selection of leaders
seemed to he the important force in turning out voters and that
the rank and file were not policy oriented. 61 Yet the figures
ahove show that significantly more unions were willing to allow
the rank and file to vote on laws than wore willing to have them
elect officers. In short, the members were frequently given the
right to vote on subjects that did not interest them and denied
a voice on the business which they felt were important.
This discrepancy no doubt contributed to the failure of
the referendum to live up to expectations. Even the system's
most avid champions were forced to admit after time "that the
referendum as we have had it has not been all it was intended to
62be." In referendum after referendum, membership participation
fell short of even minimal expectations. In 1901 the Typographical
Journal lamented "Of a membership of 32,105 in the typographical
union and allied crafts, 11,741 succeeded in developing sufficient
6^
energy to cast a vote and have it counted." In 1912 the Sta-
tionary Engineers held a referendum on providing death benefits
in which only 3,000 out of 18,000 members participated.
6
^ In a
referendum on the constitutional amendments proposed by the I895
convention, only thirty-seven of ninety-three eligible unions
sent in returns, leading the Garment Worker to bemoan: "This
is not an encouraging showing, and indicates much apathy on the
part of the members in the important changes made in tho funda-
mental laws of the Union."
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"Our experience with what we call
referendum voting," summarized the Hotel and Restaurant Employee's
officers, "has been rotten. We have used every known device
except penalizing our members to secure a fair measure of action
and votes, but we have failed miserably. "^
Nor did the results of the referendum substantiate the
belief in the wisdom of the rank and file. There was, indeed, a
flaw in the logic of the system's proponents. "The referendum
was introduced because faith was lacking in the good, disinter-
ested judgment of the convention delegates," observed economist
Mark Perlraan. "It is hard to see, however, how venality or
stupidity among them can be prevented by referring all questions
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to the electorate who selected them." Time and time again
convention delegates would hammer out in debate resolutions
which when submitted for approval to the membership would be
defeated by the relatively few locals which bothered to vote.
Any resolution which threatened to increase the financial burden
on the members was almost predestined to defeat regardless of its
so
worth. A number of unions noted that the referendum resulted
in excessive and inconsistent legislation and made the introduc-
69
tion of minor reforms a cumbersome process. The Stationary
Engineers, who beginning in 1904 required rank and file approval
of all changes in their constitution, sought to clean up the
document v/ithout making substantial alterations in its content.
To do so they had to submit one hundred two different items to
referendum votes and in the end the entire process created more
70
confusion than it clarified.
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The judiciousness of the rank and file was most suspect in
electing officers. While the direct election of officers provided
a more democratic means of choosing leaders, it hardly improved
the quality of men gaining office nor did it hinder the develop-
ment of a power elite. Indeed, economist Theodore Glocker inti-
mated in 1913 that popular elections in unions tended to prolong
the tenure of existing administrations for "an outsider has
greater difficulty in unseating the officer in power under the
system of popular elections than under the system of election by
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conventions. 1" A number of unionists supported this view. "The
difficulty of changing officers is very great," reported the
ILG17U, "since the new men are unknown outside of their locality,
while the old officers can retain their position through their
influence* It is absurb for people to vote for officers whom
72they have never seen and know absolutely very little about."
"The failure or shortcomings of the initiative and referendum in
the election of officers," concurred the Granite Gutters, "is that
popular men are supported for election irrespective of their abil-
ity to perform their duty."^ "I believe our organization in
its entirety should have a vote on anything in regard to the
organization," maintained a member of the Stationary Engineers,
"but when it comes to the election of officers I want to know
how you are going to educate the members of your different unions
in regard to the men you nominate for office. ... if you cannot
trust the delegates who come here to the convention to elect
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proper officers you cannot trust your local organizations
. . . .
I can go back to Syracuse and say, 'Murphy is a good fellow,
Commerford is a good fellow, vote for them. 1 I cannot say that
in the convention. The delegates see for themselves.
Supporting these views, one correspondent to the Typo^raph-
i
,
cal Joiirnal related b. recent experience:
At the last election for officers of the International
Typographical Union, I went to the union rooms where the
election was held, picked up one of the "ballots and read
over the names. Out of the whole number I knew person-
ally three of the men whose names were registered thereon
a3 candidates. I knew their qualifications, past record
and general fitness for the offices to which they aspired,
and voted for thorn, not knowing anything of a tangible
nature of the abilities of their opponents. As to the
rest of the ticket I was in a quadary. There was a
wealth of names to choose from, but as to their fitness
or qualification for the offices they were after, I know
absolutely nothing. Finally I called the fact that our
union had endorsed one of the individuals for an office
for which I had not already made a selection. V/hy our
union had endorsed this particular individual I am unable
to learn, unless he v/as the first in the field to make
known to us his candidacy. On the strength of this
endorsement I gave him a vote. Still, there were quite
a number of offices left to be filled, and as I had
proceeded this far I resolved to go through to the end.
I made some inquiries of the members at the polling
place as to whether they could enlighten mo as to the
abilities of the candidates for the remaining offices,
but was unable to get any information, as they neither
knew or ever heard of them. I then voted the remaining
portion of the ticket from a geographical standpoint,
playing no favorites, and giving each section of the
country, as near as possible, a fair show. After depos-
iting ray ballot in the box I did not feol satisfied with
what I had done. The thought occurred to mo that it
might be the means of placing in some office of respon-
sibility an individual of mediocre ability or one in-
capable of filling the position, at the some timo dis-
couraging some bright, capable man, who would have
secured my vote without a doubt if I had only known him,
or had an opportunity to personally assure myself of his
capabilites* ^
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On top of these shortcomings, the referendum proved as
vulnerable as the convention to manipulation and corruption.
Resolutions could bo worded in 3uch a manner as to circumscribe
the real choice available to the electorate.^ 6 Another way to
induce the rank and file to vote according to administration 's
wishes was, as Samuel Gompers advised the Secretary of the
National Union of Textile V/orkers, to delay the referendum until
a period when "your trade v/ill be most brisk" and discontent from
unemployment reduced. Gompers also agreed to send out a circular
on the proposal to the union's members in order to lend his
77prestige to that of the officers. Desiring to circumvent the
"unfounded prejudice" of the "self-governing masses" against
increased levies, the delegates to one convention of the United
Garment V/orkers Union went into secret, executive session. As
Secretary Henry White recalled:
there each delegate was pledged to a plan to carry a
referendum vote in favor of the question by causing a
small attendance at the meetings at which the proposi-
tion was to be voted on, and by counting the absentees
as voting in the affirmative. The national executive
board being the court of last resort on all points of
law, the success of the plan was never in doubt.
Before the motion was carried, every aspiring delegate
had to be assured privately where he 'came in 1 on the
jobs. In the discussion ox the proposition of impos-
ing a tax in this way, the argument was made and gener-
ally assented to that the 'benighted masses 1 had to be
helped against their will, even by strategy and force.
Since the members were unwilling to pay for the self-
sacrificing work done for them, a way had to bo found.
Within the Typographical Union, reported one disgruntled
member, many locals "took no stops to enable any but those
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present at the meetings to vote, while in some cases the secretary
was instructed to cast the votes of the entire membership in
favor of or against the proposition without consulting them."^
Abuse of the system was particularly marked in the United Brother-
hood of Carpenters after the turn of the century. According to
Robert Christie, historian of the union:
One referendum vote compilation committee reported that
'the present method of election of General Officers
seems
. . .
to be a clumsy and costly one, and if contin-
ued will ultimately wreck the organization. 1 The report
went on to complain that the referendum system placed a
'premium on illegal voting 1 and that the recording sec-
retary of a local union could disfranchise the whole
union by making some minor mistake in filing the returns
'either through carelessness or intent. 1
Uor were such practices uncommon. Referring to the
1912 election, Thomas Ryan of New York, one of the tab-
ulators, said f You could stretch out fifty or one hundred
ballots on the table and even to a little curve on the
cross all were alike. 1 In the counting of the votes,
•ballots were thrown out because they were folded and
some were thrown out because they were not folded. 1
Almost every election from 1904 to 1912 was disputed.
The administration won each of them. President William
L. Hutcheson subsequently admitted that the election in
which he first assumed office (1913) was rigged.
After several years of actual application, enthusiasm for
the referendum began to wane among top union leaders and signi-
ficant elements of the rank and file. As early as I898, members
of the Typographical Union began considering modifying or aban-
doning the system, and members of other unions soon followed
Q-i
suit. By 1912, the comments of union leaders reporting to the
AFL on their organizations 1 use of the referendum wore for the
most part pessimistic and unfavorable. Only twelve of the
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thirty-four unions were enthusiastic enough to recommend that the
82Federation adopt it. In the emerging arguments against the
system, the opponents projected the values of efficiency, order,
and centralization, basic to the image of the union as a business.
In their eyes, the advocates of referendum were "radical students
of social and political rights." "The theoretical dreamer,"
declared one opponent, "who can study the returns from the recent
typographical union vote and not awaken to the futility of his
plans, and the absurdity of their performance, holds to a non-
sense which will, sooner or later, result in stoicism or idiocy."
"To my mind," he continued, "the future usefulness of the Inter-
national Typographical Union is gravely threatened by the recent
vote. Centralisation, the bugbear1 with which our agitators are
want to conjure, is the goal that means our salvation."^ Thomas
Kidd, Secretary of the Amalgamated Wood '.Yorkers concurred, and in
his parting remarks upon leaving office after fourteen years came
down hard on referendum while at the same time promoting the
virtues of bureaucracy:
No fault can be found v/ith the principles of the
referendum, because all men should have a right to a
voice and vote in the conduct and management of thoir
organization. They ought to have a voice in the
election of their officers. They ought, in fact, to
have as much to say about the affairs in which they
are interested, as any one else in the organization.
But, after all, democracy in unionism is a hideous
failure, and this applies with considerable force to
at least ^0 per cent of the advanced unions, including
the Amalgamated Wood Workers.
We 3end our delegates to conventions to frame laws
for us. These delegates adopt proposed amendments by
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unanimous vote, "but if these amendments are likely to
take a solitary cent from the pockets of the members,
the members defeat them. The same is true in connec-
tion with the election of officers. Members will abuse
the officials to their heart's content, and at the
same time manifest absolute indifference in electing
competent seccessors.
Democracy in unionism is a failure. This was never
demonstrated to us more clearly than it is demonstrated
in the Amalgamated Wood Workers 1 Union to-day. Certain
propositions were approved by our second convention that
would have meant much to our organization. Yet returns
at present indicate that these much needed reforms will
be defeated.
As we are retiring from the executive office of the
Amalgamated organization, we can say without fear of
being charged either with mercenary motives or a desire
to acquire additional powers, that from our experience
the only organization that can succeed effectively is
one where power and responsibility are centralized.
Never before have we been so firm in the belief that
the so-called one-man power is the best power after
all. The organization, however, should never surrender
its right to recall an official who fails in the per-
formance of his duty. If power and responsibility are
centralized on men v/ho are honest, able, and conscien-
tious, then the power and responsibility will be used!
for the common good of all.
IV
The conflict between the desire to prevent the aggrandize-
ment of power in the hands of a few and the desire for harmony,
unity, and efficiency also characterized the development of the
executive board as an instrument of trade union polity. Prior to
1873, executive boards as such were non-exi3tent among major
unions. The executive committees of such bodies as the Cigar
Makers and the Bricklayers consisted of the national officers
exercising judicial power j thoy did not represent distinct insti-
tutions.^ As unions matured and the powers of the national
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office expanded, however, delegates to union conventions—still
champions of local autonomy—saw the creation of executive hoards
as means of preventing the concentration of authority in the
national leaders. "After I875," Theodore Glocker observed, "a
tendency to form general executive boards became manifest, and by
1880 such boards were being maintained by practically all exist-
86ing national unions." To curtail excessive authority, powers
formerly exercised by the president and secretary were transfered
to the nowly formed boards. In many unions they became a court
of appeal in judicial cases; they were also given authority to
levy assessments, appoint temporary officers, and have a voice in
declaring strikes.
The composition of the emerging boards also revealed an
attempt to counterbalance the power of the national officers.
Unlike the earlier executive committees, the new bodies contained
significant proportions of non-administrative personnel. The
Iron Molders 1 revised constitution of 1879 explicitly stated
that board members must be "other than officers, 11 and in many
other organizations the executives were limited to a voice but
88
not a vote in their board's deliberations. In a few unions
including the early Carpenters, board members were chosen from
the locals in the headquarter city so that they could easily be
89
called together. Par more popular among unions was the practice
of choosing the members on a district basis so that various
90
regional interests would bo represented. A third method was
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for the board to be elected at large by the convention or the
membership. In practice this often evolved into informal geo-
graphical representation. In 18?2, for example, the seats on the
United Mine Workers' board were filled without Illinois or Iowa
having secured representation. As a result the convention simply
increased the size of the body from four to six and chose Mr.
Crawford of Illinois and Mr* Scott of Iowa as the new members.91
V/hether formal or informal, regional representation was a mani-
festation of decentralizing influences.
In the main, national officers strongly resisted the rise
of executive boards, and conflict between the two parties abounded
as long as the principle of checks and balances was upheld. Many
loaders, including Terence Powderly, felt hurt that their author-
ity and good intentions were questioned. To one correspondent
the Grand Master Workman revealingly wrote:
If the matter of which you speak concerns the G.M.Y/.
and he alone can attend to it, come up, if it requires
action of an Executive Board nature, it must go to Phila-
delphia, for I will never again assume any responsibil-
ities or take upon myself to do anything not strictly
in line with my duties as laid down in the law, then if
a wrong is done to any one it must be blamed upon the
law and not me. At any rate I will never again bo
called a dictator by men who profited most by the dic-
tatorship. There was a time when this Order could not
afford to employ an Executive Board, the G.M.W. then
did all the work and paid for the privilege of doing it;
the Order did not die under his management and if the
day ever comes when a like service is necessary, the
present G.M.V/. is willing to undertake the work, but
under present laws, under present conditions, and under
the present torrent of abuse that is being poured down
upon me without a, cause, I shall not stir hand or foot
^
except in accordance with the strict letter of the lav/.
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A large part of the officials 1 resentment derived from the
fact that the new boards attacked them personally. Thus, when the
Iron Molders created a board which immediately charged President
V/illiam Sylvis with misappropriating funds, he responded by diS-
CO
missing most of its members. J Adolph Strasser fought a bitter
battle with the Cigar Makers' executive board in I883 as it
sought to investigate charges that he had overstepped his author-
94ity. v/ithin the United Brotherhood of Carpenters the executive
board became an instrument of the opposition in their efforts to
overthrow the administration, first used in the 1890' 3 against P.
J. McGuire, and then in the 1900' s against the William Huber-
95Frank Duffy machine. J Upon assuming the presidency of the
Teamsters in 1908, Daniel Tobin was confronted with a cleavage in
his executive board with half of its members openly hostile to
him. In one instance the dissidents attempted to remove him from
office on grounds that his election was illegal; at the same time
they were encouraging a secession movement and organizing indopond-
,
. 96
ent unions.
Such disunity betv/een officers and board members hinderod
the effectiveness of the respective organizations. "I think that
it has been a detriment to our organization, 11 observed one team-
ster, "to have members on the Board that did not work in harmony
and it has handicapped us in lots of the fights that has /sic/
come up."^ Eventually, it became clear to unionists that somo
98
accomodation was needed for the sake of unity and efficiency.
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Within some organizations, officers were given a vote in the
board and were thus able to influence decisions. The Knights of
Labor went even further in 1888 by choosing board members from
a list of nominees drawn up by the General Master Workman."
As part of an administrative reorganization around 1903, the
Electrical Workers curtailed the duties of their executive board
and transferred many of their functions to the president. 100 The
Typographical Union simply reduced the size of its board in 1900
to include only the union »s president, secretary-treasurer, and
three vice presidents. "Many of us were afraid at the time we
were making the Executive Council too small," a convention dele-
gate later explained, "But we took the risk and the fruits of
that action are apparent in the history of the Typographical
Union. It has made the greatest progress since the £&Q®7
convention
. . and it has been duo absolutely I think to the
centralization of authority and responsibility in the hands of
a few men."
Along with structural changes, more informal forces under-
mined the independence of the boards. Most unions failed to
compensate board members adequately, forcing them to seek posts
as organizers from the officers and thus fall under their purview.
Moreover, the leaders' influence over conventions and referenda
meant that aspiring board members desirous of advancing in the
union hierarchy generally could not afford a direct confrontation
with the leaders. 1 ^
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Such developments, some consciously planned and others the
result of circumstance, transformed the executive boards in much
the same way as conventions had changed. The board 1 s independence
and its role as critic and conscience of the national union were
sacrificed for the sake of harmony. Rejecting a plan for re-
gional representation on the board, one printer expressed the
emerging ethos in 1908 when he wrote that his union "is, and
should be, one complete, harmonious, single body, in which sec-
tionalism has had, and should have no place # ""^ "To permit
the members to properly place responsibility for the ails of the
executive officers, 11 explained another printer, "there should be
no divided responsibilty. I|10^ Even the AFL desired harmony among
its officersj the 1908 convention went on record that it was the
duty of officers who disagreed with various policies to resign
their posts. "Such action would be honorcible to themselves and
105
advantageous to the movement."
The diminished status of executive boards had its most
unfortunate consequence on unions 1 judical processes. Unionists
frequently expressed discontent with the vesting of judicial
power in the hands of the national executives. "To clothe any
man or set of men with judicial as well as administrative power,"
one printer raged, "is undemocratic and un-American, is a viola-
tion of the rules of common 3ense and the laws of logic, and
ignores absolutely the lessons of history and the teaching of
universal human experience."
106
In response to such complaints,
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early executive boards were empowered to serve as a court of
appeal independent of the officers. Yet their authority in this
area was at times more fancied than real, as the following table
reveals:
TABLE 2
APPEALS PROM DECISION OP PRESIDENT TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD
IN THE CIGAR MAKERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION107
Number President's
°f Decision
Years Appeals Overruled
I883-I885 21 1
I885-I887 31 1
1887-1889 57
1889-1891 43 0
1891-1893 48 1
1893-1895 64 0
To be sure, the concurrence of the Cigar Makers' board in the
president's decisions reflect in part his basic judiciousness,
yet it also suggests that the board members were not as inde-
pendently minded as may have been wished.
While the institutions designed to supervise and check
the activities of the executives—conventions, referenda, and
executive boards
—
proved inadequate for the task, the position
of the national leaders was strengthened by the creation of largo
administrative staffs. In the sixty years prior to 1920, the
executive branch of trade unions passed through three general
stages of development. Among the early national organizations,
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when local autonomy prevailed, the rather limited powers and
duties of headquarters were divided among several officers. The
first constitution of the Typographical Union in I851 established
a president, vice president, recording secretary, corresponding
secretary, and treasurer, while the Iron Holders » constitution of
I859 created the posts of president, recording secretary, cor-
responding secretary, treasurer, and doorkeeper. In general,
the president acted as chairman of the conventions, the vice
president took his place when he was absent, and the recording,
secretary kept the minutes of the sessions. Between gatherings,
the corresponding secretary handled communications with the
locals, the financial secretary collected the dues, and the
treasurer managed the funds. Thoir work was seldom taxing. In
1863, the Iron Holders 1 financial secretary reported that he had
neither corresponded with any of the local officers nor performed
any work for the organization during his term. The union's cor-
responding secretary also complained of having too little to do,
while the president pointed out that in order to feel useful each
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officer had tried to do the work of all the rest.
As the responsibilities of the national headquortors
increased and a desire for some efficiency emerged, union
administration entered the second stage in which a single paid
officer performed all duties between conventions. Within the
Iron Holders after 1364, for example, all power—executive,
judicial, and oven legislative—was vested in the president
when the convention was not in session. Similar authority was
granted the head of the Sons of Vulcan. Within both organizations
the leader acted as financial and corresponding secretary, organ-
izer, editor of the journal^ as well as judge in cases over the
constitution and work rules. The only sphere where their powers
were limited was over control of strikes. In this area, as
pointed out in Chapter III, local autonomy still prevailed. 10^
The third stage of development and the actual "beginnings
of administrative bureaucracy occurred when the business of the
national office exceeded what one man could handle. Generally
after considerable agitation by the overburdened leader, the
offices of vice president, treasurer, corresponding secretary,
editor, and others were reinvested with power, given full-time
salaried status, and made supervisory over a number of assist-
ants.^ Prom the days in 1886, for example, when the office
of the newly formed AFL consisted of Samuel Gompers and his son
Henry who served as errand boy, the staff of the Federation grew
until by 1920 its payrole included one hundred twenty-five pciid
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organizers alone. That same year, the United Mine Y/orkers
employed two hundred tv/o persons and paid $408,324 in salaries
and another $368,223 in expense money* Beginning in 1916 there
were enough traveling auditors on the union's staff for them to
112
hold their own annual conventions.
Centralisation of power and an increase in staff did not
in themselves create an administrative bureaucracy. Equally
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important was the emergence of a bureaucratic mentality among the
participants, as the working-stiff was transformed into an organ-
izational man. "Students of trade union development," economist
Theodore Glocker cautioned, "must not forget that the early
unionist was ordinarily without parliamentary or executive
experience." ? What little administrative background they had
generally derived from dabbling in politics, membership in fra-
ternal societies, or in the case of some of the foreign born
leaders through participation in unionism in their home country.
New unions generally failed to establish any special criteria
for office holding. Hopefully, a secretary could write and a
treasurer could add, but on occasion their abilities were obvi-
ously limited. Men were often chosen for reasons other than
administrative skill. In the United Mine V/orkers of the 1890*3,
for example, both Patrick McBryde and Michael Ratchford were
placed in office partly because they had been injured in mining
accidents and were unable to work in the coal fields. 1 "1"^ Nor
were most early labor leaders able to gain much experience on
the job. Usually serving without pay, they labored at their
trade by day and performed their union work during their free
time at night. The responsibilities of leadership were so
burdensome and the compensation so poor that men would only
serve for a brief tiraej a number of offices consequently remained
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vacant. Moreover, some newly formed unions including the
Journeymen Plumbers, in order to protect local autonomy and
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prevent the rise of a ruling clique, prohibited re-election of
officers after a certain number of terms, thus limiting their
ability to gain competence through experience. 116 Finally, the
task confronting these ill-prepared men was enormous. "The
General Secretary," the first issue of the Teamsters' magazine
reported, "on taking hold of his office found himself in a posi-
tion few men have been in. Fancy a man starting a new business
venture without the customary preliminary of building up to the
high standard gradually, and you have the situation which con-
fronted the General Secretary on October first.
•
,11
'
7
"Hell is
paved with good intentions," Powderly had earlier explained to a
disgruntled unionist, "so is the office of General/ Secretary/
T/reasurer/, cond the work rolls in so rapidly that the good
liftintentions are sometimes forgotten."
The problem of creating efficient administration, however,
went beyond enlisting the services of skilled men for national
posts. One of the major difficulties of the early labor movement
was the fostering of a bureaucratic ethos in which each partici-
pant from the highest to the lowest would understand his respon-
sibilities. The work of the national leaders was doomed to frus-
tration unless their subordinates, particularly local and district
officers, cooperated and conducted business through proper
procedures*
Absence of bureaucratic values among early unions is
reflected in the fate of Terence Powderly a3 ho attempted to
direct the Knights of Labor. Powderly has been continually
faulted by historians for his shortcomings as an administrator
.
According to Norman Ware, he was "a talker, writer, agitator,
but lacked executive ability and inclination", he was "a windbag
whose place was on the street corner rousing the rabble to a
concert pitch and providing emotional compensation for dull
lives. They should have thrown him out, but they did not."119
To support their case, Ware and others have pointed to Powderly'
3
extensive complaining about being overworked. Yet an examination
of his correspondence reveals that these critics were insensitive
to the problem and unresponsive to the evidence.
Powderly may not have been the best of all possible admin-
istrators. Yet his conduct as mayor of Scranton, Pennsylvania
(a city of 45,000) from I878 to 1882, Commissioner-General of
Immigration from I897 to 1*902, and Chief of the Division of Infor-
mation of the Bureau of Immigration from I907 to 1921 suggests
that he must have had some talent along these lines. He accepted
the position of Grand Master V/orkman of the Knights in I879 on
a part-time basis, receiving &200 a year plus expenses while the
Grand Secretary, who was to do most of the work, received $800. 120
Thus he felt justified in dividing his energies between the Order
and his duties as mayor, his tea and coffee business, and the
121Irish Land League. Yet such an arrangement could not last
long j the rank and file, ignoring his part-time status and the
constitutional divisions of power, demanded his attention on
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every issue that arose. "One thing I do not like and that is
the manner in which I must perform my duty," he wrote in 1833 .
"I sit here day after day as busy as a nan can he for some eight
or ten hours and answer questions that should he answered else-
123where. ..." Under such pressure, he abandoned his other
activities and became a full-time servant of the Order. Yet the
burden did not let up. "From behind the piles of letters ever
before me," he wrote in I884, "I can see but little of what is
going on in the world except such matters as come directly before
the order of the Knights of Labor.
. .
."
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Powderly clearly perceived the lack of obedience and under-
standing of proper administrative procedures on the part of sub-
ordinates as a major cause of the Order 1 s administrative diffi-
culties. "I find as many letters ahead of me as you have at
your office all from new Assemblies," he wrote to a fellow
officer at the height of the Great Upheaval of 1386:
the organizers are woefully ignorant and I must add
very unreasonable as well. Nearly every one of them
ask for dispensation. There are over two hundred
requests for dispensation to organize, we must send
out another circular and tell these men that our
order was issued to be obeyed and if they do not feel
disposed to comply with it then send back the Com-
mission. If the men who teach will not obey their
superior officers, then it cannot^p expected that
those whom they teach will do so, ^
In another instance he wrote:
A man having in charge the welfare of hundreds of
thousands must necessarily have matters of groat
importance thrust upon him at all times. The groat,
weighty questions of labor reform, demand that his
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t0 the SGcret^ of the same, yeti he face of that, thousands of letters that shouldgo to brother Hayes are poured in upon me, this youwill see can have but one effect, and that, to takeup my time m matters of detail when I should be
allowed to watch over the field at large. 125
Typical of the "matters of detail" of which he complained
was the following:
Dear sir and brother;
—
The new charter was especially designed so that it
could be suspended from the walls of the sanctuary.
You do not require my permission to so suspend it.
With kind wishes I remain
Fraternally yours,
T.V. Powderly
G.M.W. 1
In a sense, the Knights and their sister organizations
served as schools for future union bureaucrats. A large number
of later labor leaders at both the national and local levels
gained their initial union experience in the Noble and Holy Order.
Here they learnt the rudiments of administration, often to the
detriment of the Order, by trial and error. The result of such
experience became evident in more mature unions by the turn of
the century. While not models of administrative efficiency,
their press, convention proceedings, and file3 reveal a certain
bureaucratic outlook. In selecting men for office, skills in
administrating a union became more important than rhetorical
talent. Local leaders knew their responsibilities and conducted
business through proper channels. Neither Tobin nor Llitchell
were flooded with the picayun correspondence which earlier had
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made its way across Powderly's desk. Moreover, the national labor
leaders could delegate authority to trained, competent subordin-
ates. Backing up Daniel Tobin in the Teamsters were Michael
Casey, George W. Griggs, Michael Cashal, John M. Gillespie, as
well as Secretary-Treasurer Thomas Hughes, all men with exper-
ience in running a large organization. A similarly competent
crew including William B. Wilson, Tom L. Lev/is, Chris Evans, Pat
Dolan, and others supported John Mitchell. Indeed, when Mitchell
stepped down in 1908, an excess of experienced men were eager to
replace him.
VI
One of the most important developments in forging strong,
national administrative staffs was the transformation of their
positions from part-time offices receiving little or no remuner-
ation to full-time, adequately compensated posts. During the
formative years of the labor movement, the desire to protect
local autonomy, a belief that the functions of the national
office were not extensive enough to warrant a professional staff,
and the simple lack of funds contributed to the unwillingness of
nev/ly created unions to provide for the financial needs of their
national executives. As a result, early labor leaders were
severely limited in advancing unionism. For example, Henry
Miller, who was eloctod the first Grand President of the National
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers in 1891, was not compensated
for his work. In attempting to extend the membership of the new
organization, he was obliged to seek temporary employment in
each oity he visited. Not surprisingly, the results were un-
128impressive. Likewise, both President White of the Bricklayers
and President Tom Phillips of the Boot and Shoe Workers were
among the many labor pioneers unable to fulfill their constitu-
tional responsibilities because their respective conventions
failed to provide funds, either in salaries or for traveling
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expenses.
Even those early labor leaders fortunate enough to receive
salaries often found them grossly inadequate. As head of the
National Labor Union, Eichard Trevellick was allotted 01,500 a
year; John Siney was to receive $1,200 as president of the Miners 1
National Association? and the salary of Iron Molders 1 President
William Sylvis was raised to $1,600 in 1867, "making him probably
the highest paid labor leader in the United States.
. . The
incomes stipulated in constitutional clauses or convention reso-
lutions, however, bordered on fantasy, for the actual compensa-
tion given these men was generally far less. Of the 81,500
promised Trevellick, he received only $700. Nor did Siney
get the proposed #1,200. The Miners 1 National Association owed
him a large sum in back pay when he left office in I876, and his
last official act v/as stoically to deny his secretary permission
132to raise the money. J The deflated incomes of these men were
used to run the national administrations as well a3 to provide
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for their personal and family needs. lacking an expense account,
John Siney was obliged to pay out of his own pocket the cost of
traveling and organizing. 135 Sylvis likewise was destined to
remain on the edge of poverty, for as his biographer points out,
"if something had to be done and there were no union funds with
which to do it, he paid expenses out of his own pocket. Ho paid
for the furniture in the International Union office; he paid
large amounts on •loans' to needy molders; he paid for his secret
service to spy on employers, and when the union demanded an
accounting, he chose rather to bear the expense personally than
to reveal activities that publicity would render useless."1-^
Despite the heavy burdens created by their meager incomes,
Sylvis, Siney, and Trevellick were nonetheless better able to
contribute to the development of trade unionism than most of
their fellow labor leaders. Working at trades during the day
and for the union at night taxed the energies of many potentially
valuablo men, and this situation combined with inadequate remuner-
ation led them to shun union office. In general, a correlation
existed between compensation and the willingness of an incumbent
to seek re-election. During the International Union of Station-
ary Engineers' first eight years, nine men held the sparingly
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paid, part-time post of general president. JJ Within the Iron
Molders' Union, founded in I859, the period of long presidential
incumbencies dates from I863, one year before tho office was
1^6
given a stipulated salary. J From 1886 to 1900 the unremunor-
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ative office of president of the Carpenters was occupied by eight
men, each serving one two-year term. Meanwhile, P.J. McGuire
retained the post of secretary-treasurer which carried with it a
salary amounting to S2,000 a year by the turn of the century.137
Likewise, from I892 to 1897, M.J. Counahan held the full-time,
SI, 200 a year position of secretary-treasurer of the Journeymen
Plumbers. During his tenure, five men held the unpaid office of
president and the eight non-salaried vice presidencies had all
changed hands.13
The initial drive to compensate national officers derived
from the gradual realization by the rank and file that unions
needed qualified men to handle their affairs. The fact that the
officer performing clerical duties was frequently the first, or
at least the highest paid functionary reflected this awareness.
The secretary-treasurer was the first full-time salaried post
among the Carpenters, Journeymen Plumbers, Hotel and Restaurant
Employees, Sons of Vulcan, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,
Steam Engineers, a3 well as the Knights of Labor. In other
organizations such as the Iron Molders, the V/orkingmen • s Benev-
olent Association, the National Labor Union, and the APL, the
president was the first paid officer, but he performed many
clerical tasks. There is some indication that centralized unions
were more willing to give their leaders salaries than decentral-
ized bodies which lacked the need for strong national officers,
I39
but the evidence, however, is by no means conclusivo.
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Once unions decided to retain full-time, paid leaders,
the issue of proper compensation emerged. Involved were not only
financial considerations, tut basic questions of union ideology.
Should all leaders be paid equally or according to the task; or
further, should their pay be commensurate with their skill and
ability? Should they be paid the going wage offered by the
capitalists to the working class or on the basis of what the
workers ought to receive? Or perhaps should they be given
salaries equal to their business counterparts? 1^0
These questions were posed in almost every union. "To
the present and future officers," argued a typographer, "we
should pay a salary more in keeping with the work that is to be
done, the reputation of our organization, and the quality of
brains that we require—and, last but not least, more nearly
approximating what we ask our employers to pay us. . .
An old miner suggested that the salaries of UM1.'/ officials be
based on a sliding scale adjusted to the prevailing price of
three tons of coal, an arrangement which "would stimulate them
to work for the advancement of the miners as it would also be an
advancement to themselves. ""^ The organ of the Window Glass
Blowers reminded its readers that "you are the employer in this
instance and should give your employees the same fair considera-
tion you expect for your services. . . , nl^ The Typographical
144
Journal agreed: "The Union should be a model employer."
"In order to get first-class leaders," the Pattern Makers '
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Journal raaintained, "the union must pay first-class salaries.
That is the only way the corporations can enlist capable men in
their service, and trade unions can accomplish the same results
only by doing likewise."145 Some unionists were skeptical of
business parallels. "Pair wages for all our members and good
salaries for our officers should be the slogan," insisted one
printer, "but we had better not follow the example of the cor-
porations too far along these lines." 146 One Wobbly took a more
adament stand. After pointing out the meager earnings of the
average working-stiff, he concluded: "I do not believe our
officers should be paid a bourgeois salary of $1,500 a year."147
Despite rigorous debates, the issues discussed generally
had little impact on the original salaries paid the officers.
The realities of the situation limited the sum to whatever the
union *s treasury could afford, one which was frequently bolow
the wages of the membership. Advances in salary came slowly at
first, and occasionally the leaders lost ground. The salary of
the secretary of the Bricklayers is a case in point:
The international union was formed in 1365; in 1067,
the secretary v/os voted a salary of § cjQO f which was
eliminated in I87I, restored to half its former amount
in I87I, reduced to SI50 in 1077, to 0100 the following
year, and eliminated in 1079 • In. 1082 it was decided,
That if it be found at the next Convention that more
than sufficient money is on hand to defray the expenses
of the Union for the past year, Brother Carpenter,
National Secretary, shall receive the surplusage, pro-
vided the same shall not exceed one hundred dollars.
*
Brother Carpenter received $100 for his labor. In I8O3
the salary was raised to $250j the following year to
$300 j and in 1836, it was doubled so that, for the first
time, it exceeded the level at which it stood in IO67.
Nor had the heady inflationary process spent itself: the
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sHoo^n 1889^ $8°° ^ 1887 9 81,000 in 1888 9 ^
Such experiences lend justification to the lamentations of the
^texnJSak^q^ Journal that "it has always been an unfortunate
characteristic of workingmen that, while they ask for higher
wages, they are unwilling to pay high wages to their own repre-
sentatives." ^
After the turn of the century, however, earnings of labor
leaders improved considerably. From 1900 to 1920 the salary of
the Typographical Union's president rose from SI, 475 "to $5,000j
that of the head of the Journeymen Plumbers from nothing to
$3,000. The president of the Operative Engineer's income went
from zero to £6,000$ the Grand Chief »s of the Locomotive Engineers
from $5,000 to S10,000j and Gompers ' remuneration as head of the
noAFL went from $2,100 to $10,000. J A debate may prevail among
economists on the ability of unions to improve drastically their
members 1 earnings, but the figures above leave little doubt of
the ability of unions to increase their leaders* incomes.
The rationale for wage increases after the turn of the
century was connected with the emerging imago of the union as a
business. After pointing out the contributions of Samuol Gompers
and Frank Morrison to "the splendid growth and high standing"
of the AFL, a resolution offered at the Federation's 1914 con-
vention continued: "The salaries paid these officials in com-
parison with salaries paid to officials occupying positions of
far less importance and responsibility in our industrial estab-
lishments is much too small.
.
.
..W A typographical worker,
impressed by the increased workload of the national officers,
pointed out that "when a business house or corporation increases
the work and responsibility of its officials, an increase in
salary usually goes with it, or follows shortly afterwards," and
called upon his fellow workers to pursue the same policy. 152
"Many will say that they /Tabor leaders/ are paid enough to meet
all the advances in living expenses, and still be able to save a
little by the practice of economy," wrote another printer, "If
we would, however, look at the corporations we might learn some-
thing from them. Although they are generally deemed soulless,
it is a fact that they recognize ability, and they have, and do
from time to time, advance the salaries of the men employed in
executive positions. I do not believe that there is a corpora-
tion in the United States doing one-third the business of the
International Typographical Union that does not pay larger
salaries to their executive officers than we do." 1-^
By and large, the leaders were pleased with salary in-
creases. To be sure, there were a few stoic figures like Andrew
Furuseth, head of the International Seamen's Union, who would
accept only such compensation as would cover his minimun neod3
(Furuseth fortunately being a bachelor). 1-^ But the protestations
against salary increases by most labor leaders were more self-
serving than sincere. In 1882 Powderly threatened to resign as
Grand Master Workman if the Knights increased his salary; probably
he feared the commensurate amount of work he would be called upon
to perform. ^ Three years later, however, after his work load
had increased anyway, he let it be known that he had been offered
a $1,500 a year position with the Provident Life and Trust Company
in order to pave the way for a salary raise. This tactic worked,
for the following year he was granted a yearly income of $5,000,
making him the highest paid labor leader of the Gilded Age. 156
Samuel Gompers also struck the posture of opposing large
salaries for labor leaders. "It is a mistake," he argued in
I894, "to pay a man so high a salary in the labor movement that
he shall be in his method of life so far removed from the wage-
workers as probably to ween them from their conditions and
interests and possibly from sympathy with his fellow-workers." 1-^
This statement, one suspects, was made partly for public relations
purposes, as it came after six years of subtle agitation by
Gompers for a wage increase during which time his salary rose
from SI, 000 in I887 to $1,800 by I892. 158 Nor did ho press his
case against large salaries hard enough to forestall further
advances: in I899 his salary was made $2,100; 1902, $3,000; 1907,
$5,000; 1914, $7,500; 1919, 310, 000. 159 Gompers mildly objected
to the last two raises, not because he did not think a labor
leader should receive such sums—by then he clearly thought they
should—but because of the false impression they gave the un-
organized. "7/hen I was in Europe as a fraternal delegate five
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years ago," he asserted in 1914, "one of the biggest things that
was hurled against our movement and against me in Paris was the
idea of a man in the labor movement getting 25,000 francs a year.
We have a great mass of men and women of labor who are yet un-
organised and while you who have worked with me so long would
understand, to them a salary of such character would be appal-
ling.
. .
."
16°
Several leaders in the labor movement were more open about
wanting higher salaries. While John Mitchell acted as though pay
raises were a secondary consideration for him and maintained that
he would not accept one if anyone opposed, his vice president,
Tom L. Lewis, was more candid. "I am one of the people who if
I think my services are worth a certain sum are going to ask for
it, and if I don't get it I am going on strike," he informed the
l6l1900 UMV/ convention. Daniel Tobin of the Teamsters took a
similar stand, and even Sidney Hillman of the newly formed
Amalgamated Clothing Workers revealed anxieties over his income
when ho complained that it could only be raised by a referendum
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vote. Perhaps the most revealing attitude on the subject i3
found in a private letter from Daniel Keefe of the Longshoremen
to John Mitchell dated 1901*
The Convention held at Toledo turned out just as I
wanted it. They gave mo an increase in salary of
$300.00 for the year, leave of absenso of two months
and allowed me some C>500«00 and some odd dollars which
I expended for the Organisation in one way and another
during the last year, so you can see that thijg| woro
handled in a uractical a.nd business like way.
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Initial pay increases were justified on the grounds of the
immense amount of work which lahor leaders performed as well as
to compensate for the past hardships of self-sacrificing men.
"In accepting the position of chief officer of the Knights of
Lahor at a salary of $1,500 a year," Powderly wrote to a carping
critic, "I did it knowing that the compensation was not in pro-
portion to the amount of work to bo done. I work from sixteen
to eighteen hours a day, I have not known a holiday for the last
seven years. You will see by that that my actual pay for labor
done is about 23 cents an hour. If I were actuated by a desire
to accumulate wealth I would not give my services for that
figure. To this argument, Gompers addeds "It is true that
I am receiving a salary to-day and have received a pitiable one
for a number of years, but these upstarts may not be aware that
hundreds of men have worked for years in the cause without any
recompense whatever. They do not know that from 1881 to 1886
there was not one solitary cent paid to any officer of the Feder-
ation, and but a very few dollars were expended except for print-
165ing, stationary, and postage."
One may believe, however, that increasingly after tho turn
of the century, salary advances were related in part to status
anxieties of both union members and leaders. Advocates of pay
raises constantly brought forth comparisons of the salaries given
to leaders of other unions. "What do the railway engineers and
firemen, who pay their executive officers $5,000 a year think of
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us? Or the mine workers, who pay their president S3, 000 and their
secretary $2,400, or the glass bottle blowers, who pay their
president 82,400, or the Carpenters who pay $2,000?" asked the
affigjga&hical Journal in 1907. 166 By 1920 many labor officials
were receiving incomes of S5,000 and above, and a leader's prom-
inence in the movement was roughly correlated to his salary.
As Victor Thompson writes in Modern Organization :
Above a certain level it would seem that salaries are to
some rather large extent a function of status—the higher
the status, the higher the salary. In fact, it would
seem that salaries operate chiefly as symbols of status
rank. That the perquisites and conveniences of the
work situation are distributed according to status
rather than organizational need is common knowledge,
and it has been argued that they are distributed in
inverse ration to need. These perquisites also act as
symbols, and along with other symbols
. . .
help to
main+gin the status system by increasing its visibil-
ity.
Creation of full-time, salaried executives had a tremendous
impact on the evolution of labor union leadership. Grants of
authority through constitutional provisions or convention resolu-
tions bore little relationship to a leader's actual power as long
as he was unable to fulfill his assigned duties for lack of finan-
cial backing. The I89.I constitution of the Electrical Workers,
for example, created a centralized organization with considerable
power granted to the national leader. Yet, prior to 1<?03, the
International officers went without regular salaries and wore
forced to work at their trade to earn a living. Unable to devote
sufficient time to the affairs of the union, they were incapable
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of making locals comply with constitutional provisions. As a
result, members frequently disregarded national obligations and
the more powerful locals came to regard themselves as virtually
autonomous. They plunged into illegal and poorly planned strikes,
while the International was too weak even to exercise its expul-
sion powers. Finally, at the 1903 convention the delegates
granted the Electrical Workers 1 president a sufficient salary
and instructed him henceforth to devote all his time to the
Brotherhood. "The adoption of this policy," commented Michael
Mulcaire, a student of the organisation's early development,
"was an important event in the history of the Union, because it
marked the transformation of the International from a decentral-
ised and discredited association to a centralized and respected
... .,168
organization.
"
Besides enabling leaders to control union affairs better,
the establishment of salaries made union posts more attractive
to qualified men. Within many unions, the earnings of the national
officers compared favorably with those of workers in the trade
as well as small businessmen. In 1910* for example, the salaries
of the president and secretary of the Journeymen Plumbers were
more than twice the estimated yearly income of an average plumber
169in Chicago, a high wage city. ' With fattening pay checks, a3
was noted earlier, leaders were more willing to remain in office
for several terms. And as a number of advocates of efficient
union administration maintained, longer tenures in office enabled
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men to develop expertise and also strengthened the organisation
"by promoting a continuity of policy. 170
Finally, salries paid to leading union officials by 1920
contributed to the widening gap in life style and outlook between
the leaders and the led. Literary Digest exaggerated when it
declared in 1920 that "Labor Pays its Leaders Capitalist Wages,"
yet their remuneration was impressive. As president of the AFL,
Gompers received $10,000 a year, the same sura given Warren Stone,
head of the Locomotive Engineers. Longshoremen president T.V,
O'Connor got S7,5°0> Marden Scott of the Typographical Union,
$5,000; and William Johnson of the Machinists, $4,200, raised to
$7,500 the following year. The basic compensation of other
national leaders in 1920 fell between 84,500 and $10, 000. 171 On
top of these figures, the leaders were reimbursed for money spent
on union work, a practice not enjoyed by earlier union pioneers.
In 1907, for example, James Lynch received a base salary of $2,000
as president of the ITU. Another $400 was added for being an
officer in the Union Printers' Home Corporation, and SI, 947. 19
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was paid as "expenses." In 19l8> Gompers 1 reimbursement for
expenses exceeded his salary for the year, $8,516.61 to
$7, 500. 00. 173
The reporting of such figures should in no way detract
from the sacrifice such men made for the labor movement. They
worked hard for their money, and many could, and several eventu-
ally did, earn more in private business. "I should say,
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considering the general ability and the powers for organization
which Samuel Gompers has," appraised George E. Holmes, general
manager of the Industrial Relations Service, "that he would be
worth $100,000 a year to large interests which could afford to
pay him all that he is worth."174 Yet their salaries were
clearly beyond the income of the average working man. As of
1917-1918, Scott Hearing wrote:
The American wage—the amount paid by American
industry to its workers- may be characterized briefly
in these terms. A comparatively small percentage
(from 5 to 10 in 100) of the persons gainfully employed
in modern industry are on a salary basis. The vast
majority of the employees (from 90 to 95 in 100) are
paid a wage or its equivalent. Among those who work
for wages, the great majority (about nine-tenths of the
adult males) receive wage rates of $1,000 per year or
les3. The wage-rates of two-thirds of the" males falls
below $750; a third below £500. These statements make
no allowance for unemployment, which is a constant,
irreducible factor. '-^
VII
The most important addition to the personnel of the nation-
al office was a corps of organizers. Although in some early
unions organizers were elected by the convention delegates or
chosen by the executive board, by the turn of the century they
generally were dependent upon the national officers who hired,
fired, and paid them and directed their activities. Union con-
stitutions usually provided little guidance a3 to the work of
organizers j they were to be utilized as the national executive
saw fit. In performing their assigned task3, they were of
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invaluable service to the labor movement—in spreading unionism
to unorganized territories, in conducting strikes and aiding in
collective bargaining, and in giving general guidance to locals.
They were the liaison men of unionism, coordinating the activities
of the subordinate bodies with the desires of the national office;
they were the eyes and ears of the national executives, increas-
ingly isolated from personal contact with the rank and file by
barriers of excessive duties and bureaucracy.
Yet organizers were also the ward heelers in a leader's
political machine. Whichever officer commanded the organizers
generally commanded the national staff. For this reason, power
struggles between the secretary-treasurers and presidents of the
Carpenters, Hotel and Restaurant Employees, and other unions and
federations frequently focused on control of organizers. The
positions were of considerable patronage value for the officer
who controlled them. The work was interesting, not excessively
demanding, and respectably compensated. Around 1902, agents for
the Carpenters were receiving a healthy four dollars a day, while
eight years later the salaries of organizers for the Journeymen
Plumbers were more than eighty per cent higher th.-ui the earnings
177
of workers in the craft. Those blessed with the posts carried
into the field all the powers of the executive, which they were
expected to wield in the officer's favor. In a 1912 roport,
President William Huber of the Carpenters expressed a familiar
hope among labor leaders "that every officer of the Brotherhood,
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as well as all of our organizers and business agents will
.
see to it that a favorable vote is rendered from their dis-
trict." 178
A humorous but revealing incident stemming from the use of
organizers for political purposos occurred in the United Mine
Workers in 1899. In John Mitchell's campaign for re-election as
union president, he faced a forceful challenge from Pat Dolan,
head of District 5 in western Pennsylvania. To undermine his
opponent's support in his home territory, Mitchell forged an
alliance with the district's secretary-treasurer, William Warner.
With this aid Mitchell v/on the coveted post, and a month later
received a request from Warner asking him to reciprocate, for
Dolan was after the secretary-treasurer's scalp. Against the
district president's protest, Mitchell sent tv/o of his most
faithful organizers to work for Warner's re-election and also
instructed his friend to pick one or two men from the Pittsburgh
area to campaign for him and to send the bill to the national
office.
Somehow Dolan got possession of the letters and showed
them around thereby creating strong anti-Mitchell sentiment. To
offset this turn of events, Mitchell sent the following to Warner:
I desire to ask you to come on to Indianapolis so that
v/e can fix up letters from you to me which will justify
answers such a3 I sent, so that I shall be in a position
to defend myself. If everyone knew Dolan as well as you
and I do there is no reasonable miner who could take
exception to those letters, but the fact that the mine
workers generally do not knov/ whether Dolan is a good or
a bad moji makos it necessary that I bo placed in a
position that will not compromise., mg in the eyes ofthe miners, or in our convention. ' y
Warner made the requested trip and the necessary falsifica-
tion occurred. He then took the "revised" correspondence hack
home where he arranged to have it published in the Lonaooning
Keyiew as a counterattack on Dolan. Ironically, the incompetent
Warner, who first blundered by letting Dolan get the original
letters, now gave the Review 's editor the doctored correspondence
plus Mitchell's letter cited above explaining that they were fake.
Warner caught the mistake before the printed copies were dis-
tributed and under orders from Mitchell had them all destroyed
at union expense. As an epilogue to the story it should be
noted that Warner lost his bid for re-election, but Mitchell
took care of him by appointing him, a national organizer.' 180
Mitchell's use of organizers, while ethically suspect,
was condoned by the informal canons of labor leadership. If the
tables had been reversed, Dolan undoubtedly would have done like-
wise. As Robert Christie pointed out for the Carpenters, the
men who attacked P.J. McGuire for running a leadership dominated,
undemocratic union, turned around after gaining power in 1902
and "filled the void with swarms of professional organizers and
181hence a political machine. ..." Jere L. Sullivan, Secretary-
Treasurer of the Hotel and Restaurant Employees, was able to make
and break presidents through his control of organizers. Desiring
Ed Flore to win the post in 1909, he appointed a number of the
candidate's friends as organizers and sent them to those parts
of the country where Flore needed support, When the incumbent
president complained, Secretary Sullivan simply hid behind
legalities:
You forget that International Organizers are myjurisdiction. Kovaleski is a competant organizer,
l/hat he does in his free time is his own business.
As soon as he falls down on the 30b, I'll take him
off the payroll and not before.
The backbone of the Gompers' machine in the AFL likewise
was a corps of organizers, Numbering about eight in 1883, the
ranks grew to seven hundred by the turn of the century, over two
thousand by 1919, about one hundred twenty-five of which were
receiving regular salaries. 183 "Their chief function was to
organize workers into unions," biographer Bernard Llandel points
out, "but they also served as Gompers' informants on local con-
ditions and as his agents in helping settle disputes, to advise
the local unions, and to carry out his policies. They v/ere
responsible to no one but Gompers, and their jobs depended on
their performing in a manner satisfactory to hira.""*-8^
VIII
Complementing the mechanisms of power within each organ-
ization, particularly after the turn of the century, were associ-
ations of unions designed to advance their common interests.
Dominated by the leadership of the member unions, associations in
the building trade, railroading, and other industries saw as one
of their functions the suppression of rebellion and secession
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movements, and thus by implication the perpetuation of the
existing power elites. Five printing trades which joined to-
gether in an alliance around I909 pledged:
that when any union or members or groups of members
subordinate to any one of the five International Unions
making up the International Allied Printing Trades
Association secede from the present organization, thefive International Unions will join in a general move-
ment against the seceders and to the end that the
supremacy and authority of bho International organ-
isations affected may be clearly and permanently
established, the five International Unions. pledge
their moral and financial support.
. .
,
->
The most powerful of such alliances in terras of total
membership was the American Federation of Labor. The ethos of
the Federation had changed markedly from its pioneer days in the
lSGO's. After the turn of the century, AFL President Samuel
Gompors functioned as the servant of business union bureeiucrats.
"And business unionism," Bernard Llandel points out, "had a dif-
ferent meaning in 1900 than it did in I875. Gompers had estab-
lished business unionism in the cigar industry primarily as a
means of bringing order and regularity into the union. It wa3
a means of strengthening the union in its battles with tho
employers; it was a disciplined solidarity. But in tho twentieth
century, his conception of business unionism was that of unions
run by their loaders—machine rule by the 'experienced officers'
—
engaged in the business of supplying labor to employers at
prices fixed by contractual arrangement . ""^^
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The Federation's later conventions reflected the domination
of the organization by national union leaders. At the 1919 con-
vention of the AFL, Margaret Bonfield, a visiting fraternal
delegate from the British Trade Union Congress, implied in a
speech that the gatherings of the BTU were far more democratic
than the present meeting since delegates to the Congress were
mostly rank and file while the convention of the AFL was composed
of labor leaders. Delegate John P. Prey—who was also vice
president of the Holders 1 Union, perennial secretary of the
Committee on Resolutions at the AFL conventions, a member of the
first and second labor missions sent to the Allied Countries by
the AFL during World War I, and soon to become president of the
Ohio State Federation of Labor—felt compelled to reply. With
such credentials it was obvious that in his rejoinder he had to
admit that the Federation was leadership dominated, so he
challenged Miss. Bonfield with the argument that the same situa-
tion existed in England.
In order to encourage national unions to join the Feder-
ation, the AFL established at its founding the principle of non-
interference in the internal affairs of affiliates. The organ-
isation violated this policy on several occasions, in one in-
stance by preventing W.C. Pomeroy of the Hotel and Restaurant
188
Employees from expelling his opposition from the union. Yet
the principle remained the official stand of the organisation
and increasingly was construed in a manner which perpetuated the
270
existing power structure within unions. Hidding behind the
Principle, the AFL's executive council allowed corrupt leaders
to retain their positions of power. In 1905, for example, the
council turned down an appeal from San Francisco Teamsters to
remove President Cornelius P. Shea, indicted for extortion in
relation to a strike at Montgomery Ward in Chicago. "He is a
disgrace to himself, a dishonor to the teamsters of the country
and a stain to the labor movement," the plaintiffs pleaded. Yet
the executive council, which had breached the principle in other
cases, did not feel that these grounds warranted a violation of
the union's autonomy. 1^
The policy of non-interference was more blatantly used to
perpetuate the existing leadership of a union at the AFL's 1914
convention. Earlier that year the United Garment Workers experi-
enced a major rank and file revolt spearheaded by Sidney Hillman
against the corrupt and tyranical administration of Thomas A.
Hickert. At the following AFL convention both factions sent
delegates and demanded representation. The Hillman UGv/ was never
allowed to testify before the gathering, and the Credentials
Committee, comprised of established labor leaders, recommended
the seating of the Rickert faction over the rebels on the grounds
that the former had been known to the AFL a3 the officers of the
Garment Workers and the latter were unknown. "If the labor
movement should follow this rule in all cases," the frustrated
rebels pointed out, "it would make it impossible for any union
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ever to change its officers, for the old officers are always
the ones that are 'known' and the new are always 'unknot'. Yet,
this strange rule, laid down by the Credential Committee, was
accepted as sufficient grounds for seating as tailor delegates
persons not representing tailors."190 Continuing with the
perverted policy of non-interference, President Gompers and
Secretary Morrison sent to the members of tho divided union a
circular under the APL letterhead declaring the Hickert faction
as the official United Garment Workers. 191 Turned away by the
convention, the rebels took the only honorable course left open
and formed the Amalgamated Clothing Workers. Now they confronted
the problem of being branded a dual union by the Federation.
The AFL's policy toward dual unions added to the importance
of the leaders 1 power to revoke charters of rebellious locals.
If the expelled local decided to go it alone as an independent
body, it found the whole of the American Federation of Labor
against it. According to the AFL f s constitution:
No Central Labor Union, or any other central body of
delegates, shall admit to or retain in their councils
delegates from any local organization that owes its
allegiance to any other body, or that has been sus-
pended or expelled by, or not connected with, a
National or International organization of their trade
hereinafter affiliated.
. •
Thus a local union which displeased the parent organization and
had its charter withdrawn was placed outside the pale of the labor
movement. Limited to its own reBourses, its contracts and strikes
were not recognized by the Federation and the jobs of its members
were open game for any interested union.
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Finally, the AFL served as a refuged for labor leaders
rejected by their following*, John A. Moffitt, president of the
United Hatters since I898, was finally removed from office by
reform forces in 1911. Samuel Compers quickly came to his aid
and made him an AFL legislative agent. 193 Likewise, after his
ouster from the presidency of the Machinists in 1912, James
O'Connell continued to serve as a vice president of the AFL and
was made president of the Metal Trades Department with Compers'
194
aid. Albert Berres of the Pattern Makers, John B. Lennon of
the Journeymen Tailors, and Hugh Frayne of the Sheet Metal
Workers were among the other union leaders who retained positions
in the AFL after they no longer held offices in their respective
195
unions. y
IX
By 1920 the general structure of union government tended
toward leadership domination. On the one hand, the institutions
designed to check and supervise the executives had proved inad-
equate for the task. Conventions met too infrequently, were too
large, and were too dependent upon the directions of the national
officers to serve as a meaningful control. Referenda failed to
provide a medium for rank and file sentiment, and led to confu-
sion and chaos detrimental to the efficient operations of the
union. Conflict and bickering between the early executive
boards and the national officers was also detrimental and
eventually resulted in the boards transformation from instruments
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to check the authority of the leaders to an agency to work
harmoniously with them. On the other hand, the executive's
position was directly strengthened through creation of an exten-
sive administrative bureaucracy. Staff positions were a source
of patronage "by which the officers could build their own political
machine. Through their chosen agents the leaders effectively
wielded their basic powers of the press, purse, and punishment.
Finally, in supporting their authority, the established executives
were aided by various craft associations as well as the American
Federation of Labor.
The dominance of the national leaders over their unions
enabled them to work effectively in labor's behalf. They could
make those quick decisions frequently needed to turn the tide
of events to the union's favor. Strategy could be developed and
negotiations pursued without the constant threat of an uninformed
rank and file taking blundering action. Yet domination could also
lead to abuse. When an irate rank and file rebelled against its
leaders, the national administration controlled the means of
suppression. As Sylvia Kopald points out repeatedly in her study
Rebellion in Labor Unions;
the officials 0021trolled the union treasury upon which
they could draw 'to save the union', while the funds of
the insurgents were of necessity uncertain and inadequate.
They could get out anti-insurgent propaganda through
official letters and. circulars and spread them ovor a
wide territory. They possessed full membership address
books and established publicity machinery. They had
the advantage of superior training in propaganda,
publicity and procedure. They could placo at strategic
points experienced •talkers' and organizers. Theycould Promise the full power of the central office toprotect the 'loyal men' and could distribute awardsand punishments. They could wield the last weaponby ejecting the too stubbornly rebellious from the
union. They made full use of all this machinery.1%
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CHAPTER VI
THE NEW MEN OF POWER
I
The preceding chapters have explored the forces underlying
the evolution of union leadership in the decades prior to 1920.
They have focused on the changing images of the union in terms
of its internal power structure? the impact of evolving union-
management relations on union officers j the role of the rank and
file in encouraging leadership domination; and the evolution of
the mechanisms of power toward creating strong national execu-
tives. Throughout, the men holding national office have been
treated as playing a subordinate role in the process. In a
sense, they were prisoners of historical forces, unknowingly
confined by the perimeters of their situation. Within these
limits, however, their activities added to the evolution of union
leadership.
The life of a national labor leader was not an easy one.
Union work probably taxed least the earliest officers v/hose
duties were limited in order to protect local autonomy. The
burden on the leaders correspondingly increased as the central
headquarters assumed greater responsibilities. An unending
torrent of mail to answer, records to keep, charters, receipts,
and funds to disperse bogged down the sparsely paid secretaries,
288
289
Amidst the frantic routine, they darted off articles for the
journal, sent the edition to press, and then addressed envelopes
hoping to have it in the mail only a week behind schedule. Mean-
while, presidents and vice presidents dashed across the country,
lecturing here, advising strikers there, organizing a local
elsewhere? all the while living in cheap hotels or accepting
makeshift accommodations from sympathizers they met along the
way. In 1869, President Richard Trevellick of the National Labor
Union spent one hundred sixty-nine days traveling and holding
meetings, a record to be surpassed by a number of later leaders,
among them John Mitchell who recorded on June 1, 1906 that he
had not seen his children since Christmas. 2 Weary from travel,
the early leaders* spirits were seldom bolstered by the reception
they received. The initial volumes of the United Mine Workers 1
Journal as well as other labor publications contained countless
stories of men journeying "from ten to fifteen miles at a time
over mountains and rivers and forging the same up to their knees
in water in the midst of rain and snow in order to keep their
promises and not disappoint their constituents. After surmount-
ing all these obstacles, both footsore and hungry and wet to the
skin, they were rewarded with the presence of 20 or 30 men when
there should be at least two hundred. Y/as this not discouraging
to men who suffered so much to give us an idea of what our duty
is to ourselves and our fellow men. . . .••
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Larger salaries, expense accounts, and an increased staff
reduced some of the basic discomforts for later labor leaders.
While on the road at night, they could go to sleep after a good
meal in a comfortable hotel or a rolling Pullman car, secure in
the knowledge that their families were adequately fed and clothed
and that some minor but annoying piece of union business was
being handled by a competent subordinate. Yet they needed that
good nights sleep, for their job was extremely taxing. Controlling
their own organizations and participating in union-management
affairs constituted heavy burdens in themselves. Moreover, the
increased influence of unions and the resulting prominence of
their officers put greater demands on the leaders 1 time. They
conferred far more frequently then their predecessors with
Presidents, governors, mayors, Congress, state legislatures, and
a host of investigatory commissions; and served as members on
numerous governmental committees as well as in private groups
from the National Civic Federation, to the Federal Council of
Churches, to the American Legion. Middle-class clubs and univer-
sities asked them to lecture, while popular magazines constantly
sought their views. And added to the expansion of their duties
was the increased pace of work. Improved transportation got
leaders more places, faster, and with less time for contemplation.
Better communication, likewise, enabled quicker decisions which
were often more advantageous to the movement but more tiring to
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their maker. No wonder when Grand Chief Warren Stone of the
Locomotive Engineers was asked in 1911 the secret of his success
he attributed it "largely to the fact that I have an iron eonsti-
tution and can work eighteen hours a day year in and year out;
success you know is only another name for hard work. 11 ^
Illustrative of the demands on union leaders and the pace
with which they moved, was Samuel Gompers' itinerary during one
month in 1902:
The Federation convention in New Orleans adjourned at
three in the morning on November 23, 1902. The same
day he held a conference with representatives of
various labor organisations and a meeting with the
Executive Council. Two days later he was in Birmingham
to address a mass meeting. He returned to Y/ashington
on the 28th, and four days later went to Hartford,
Connecticut, to attempt to adjust a dispute between
the Horse Nail Makers Union and the Capewell Horse
Nail Company. The following day he was in Boston,
where on successive evenings he lectured at Feneuil
Hall and debated with Louis D. Brandeis on the incor-
poration of unions. Stopping at New York to address
the National Civic Federation, he returned to the
capital to make appearances before a Senate committee
considering the eight-hour bill. He went back to Now
York the next day to lecture on strikes to the League
for Political Education, returned to Washington, and
stayed only a few hours, when he was called to Scranton
to testify before the Anthracite Coal Strike Commission.
He returned to his office on December 18. Daring that
month he sent out some 5,000 letters, of which he
probably dictated $00 personally*
Even when Gompers stayed at headquarters, his workday was exhaust-
ing. "More often then not," he recorded, "it was midnight before
I got home—there were meetings, speeches to make, conferences
to attend, for the cause of labor i3 no easy mistress to serve.
"
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Added to the strain of long hours and hard work, leaders
were under constant tension from fear of personal danger. Defend-
ers of the status quo in America have always been preoccupied
with the role of leadership in social movements. Like the mis-
guided terrorists of the left and right, they believed that by
separating the leaders from the led they could abate the challenge
to their authority. The actions of various anti-union employers,
their henchmen and sympathizers should have awed even the more
extreme advocates of "propoganda by deed." "Last Thursday
morning," reported the United Mine Workers 1 Journal in May, I894,
"President McBride received, through the mail, what, to all
appearances, was a diabolically constructed infernal machine,
composed of death-dealing constituents."^ The next month the
J
o
urnal disclosed that "a Dastardly attempt has been made to
kidnap Y/.B. Wilson, a member of the national executive board, in
the Prostburg, Md. district, by certain coal operators there.
'Billy' escaped the trap, but has evidence that a cowardly con-
spiracy and scheme existed to spirit him away for an indefinite
Q
period." On his way to Pueblo, Colorado in March, 1904, sixty-
three year old Chris Evans, a member of the Mine Workers' execu-
tive board and previously secretary of the APL, was brutally
assulted v/hile on a Chicago and Southern passenger train by
three masked men who used the butt end of their revolvers on his
Q
head and face, inflicting from fifteen to twenty deep gashes.
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In Clarksburg, West Virginia in 1910, ten thugs ganged up on
two more DM!? executive board members, leaving them both badly
10injured. And m Glassraere, Pennsylvania in October, 1916, gun-
men presumably hired by non-union coal companies made an attempt
on the life of UMW President John P. White. 11
Nor were the officers of the Mine Workers the only victims
of terrorism. While precise records are unavailable, the pioneers
of unionism no doubt lived in greater anxiety than their more
established, later-day counterparts. During a strike in Leadville,
Colorado in 1880-1881 and the Rio Grande Strike of I884-I885,
Joseph Buchanan of the Knights of Labor lived in fear of assas-
sination or lynching by a mob. In the second strike he went so
far as to hire a detective to investigate foreboding rumors, and
spent most of the conflict boxed up in his newspaper office under
the protective guard of a shooting olub composed of about forty
12
radical socialists. The audacity of the terrorists almost
equalled the hideousness of their acts. In Chicago on July 17,
1905, "Five men, flourishing bright blue magazine guns, broke in
the hall were the election of the Federation of labor was held,
and, after smashing the ballot boxes and tearing up the tickets,
attacked Michael Donnelly, international president of the butcher
workmen, who was left lying on the floor in a pool of blood, with
probably fatal injuries. The assailants, whom no one recognized,
escaped. " ^ Similar gang-land drama occurred on the night of
December 26, 1912 when President Charles Moyer of the Western
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Federation of Miners and organizer Charles Tanner were brutally
attacked in their room at the Scott Hotel in Hancock, Michigan
by a mob of Citizen Alliance members and imported gunmen. 14 Acts
of violence against leaders and members of the Industrial Workers
of the World have become enshrined as part of the unpleasant
folklore of the American labor movement along with many other
incidences, the details of which are enough to disturb even the
most hard-core cynic.
While terrorists aot3 might cause the victims to become
more cautious, their consequences did not always favor the insti-
gators. Rather than rendering workers docile, acts of violence
frequently led to greater militancy and allegiance to the leaders.
Disclosure of the incident by the press could inflame public
opinion against the employer and possibly result in government
investigation. Thus terrorism was both ineffective and at times
counter-productive, a fact v/hioh its perpetuators have recognized
belatedly. The more sophisticated iinti-unionists perceived a
more subtle and respectable means of doing away with unwanted
labor leaders—through legal prosecution, and, when possible,
imprisonment. With the aid of anti-union judges like John J.
Jackson—who in one decision labeled labor leaders "vampires"
v/ho "have nothing in common with the workingman"-—harassment of
15
union officers under the facade of justioe proceeded at pace.
Throughout the period from the Civil War to 1920, labor
leaders faced the constant threat cf legal action. Several of
295
the cases are classic examples of justice and misjustice in
America—the Clearfield Trial of John Siney and Xingo Parks in
1873; the Debs trial of 1894; the Haywood-Moyer-Pettibone Case of
1905-I906j the Buck's Stove and Range Case of 1907-1914; the pros-
ecution of the Wobblies during World War I. 16 Along with these
more spectacular episodes were hundreds of lesser known trials
of labor leaders for crimes ranging from murder to contempt of
court. For two years in the mid-1890 «s, William B. Wilson had
conspiracy charges hanging over his head before they were finally
17dropped. In I898, while vice president of the miners, John
Mitchell v/as indicted by a grand jury in Braidwood, Illinois for
intimidating other laborers during a strike. Along with Mitchell,
charges were brought against twenty-one state and local leaders.
January, 1900 saw John P. Heese of the UMW's executive board im-
prisioned for violating an injunction. 1^ The following month
another board member, George Purcell, appeared before tho bar in
London, Kentucky to answer to an indictment of having induced
miziers to strike when under contract, and then a few days later
was again arrested in another part of the state for violating the
20Kentucky "disturbance" statute. On January 14, 1918, UMW Pres-
ident Frank Hayes, Vice President John L. Lewis, Secretary-
Treasurer William Green, and seven other leaders were ordered
before the United States Supreme Court to show why they should not
be adjudged guilty of contempt for violating an injunction
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restraining them from organizing employees of the Hitchman Coal
and Coke Company. 21
While the minors v/ere having their troubles, James Hughes,
Master Workman of the clothing cutters' branch of the Knights of
Labor, was convicted of extortion in I89I when he attempted to
collect a fine from employers violating the contract. 22 That
same year Joseph Barondess of the garment workers was also con-
victed of extortion. Upon hearing the verdict, this immigrant
from the Pale quipped: "Russia has its Siberia and New York its
1 23Tombs." Twenty-four years later, Morris Sigman and six other
leaders of the ILGV/U were tried and acquitted of murder charges. 2 ^
The leaders of the Carpenters v/ere particular targets for lawyers.
"From 1910 to I913 injunction servers constantly harassed various
officials of the Brotherhood," recorded Robert Christie. "At one
time, twelve different suits were in progress in New York City
alone. In total, almost a hundred suits were entered in the
largest court assault directed against a trade union to that timo."2^
Statistics on the Brotherhood's expenditures for legal fees suggest
the increased use of the courts against union officers:
TABLE 3
CARPENTERS » LEGAL PEES: 1902-191426
1902-1904 3 .00
1904-1906 8,351.49
1906-1908 13,072.65
1908-1910 19,203,21
1910-1912 35,350.42
1912-1914 104,^78.03
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Attacks by anti-union employers—whether by terrorism,
legal prosecution, or other means—added to the strain on the
overburdened labor leaders. Yet these challenges they expected
and could take in stride. "We are in this business knowing full
well that it is no bed of roses for anyone," observed Thomas
Hughes of the Teamsters, "and must expect trouble and lots of
work if we will do anything for the movement."27 Par more un-
nerving were the attacks against them by their supposed friends
and comrades. The "Kickers and Knockers" continually challenged
their authority, while the sleeping mass of the rank and file,
potentially fickle and ungrateful, could turn against them at any
moment. "It is an awful life to live, this labor movement,"
bemoaned Teamster vice president George Golden, "and all we get is
28
abuse from our members." Gompers, whose strength of character
contributed so much to the labor movement, v/as constantly seeking
to reinvigorate the spirit of mission within his dejected cohorts.
"It is needless to say to you," he wrote to an organizer, "that
if one is to be deterred from active participation in the labor
movement because of adverse criticism by some of our well meaning
friends, we would have few or no active men. Persistency despite
criticism is as much a necessity in the labor movement as in
29
every other field of human existence."
In spite of such words of encouragement, many leaders did
bond under the strain of their jobs. Secretary-Treasurer Pat
McBryde of the miners and President Edward Plank of the printers
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both chose to resign rather than face the bickering of their
followers. 30 Numerous others sought posts in business and govern-
ment in hopes of leaving the long hours and insecurity of union
work behind. Some who stayed with the movement sought relief
from the strain through drink, a vice which got the best of P.J.
McGuire of tho carpenters and Frank Hayes of the miners, and which
also contributed to the serious illness which led Mitchell to
resign. 31 Even the stout Sara Gompers felt the only way he could
relax was to take a few drinks, and in his later years he occa-
sionally appeared intoxicated in public. 3 However, those who
could bear the strain for as long as Gompers did with only this
slight indiscretion were truly unusual men.
II
Union officers who withstood the hardships of their joh
to become prominent labor movement figures reveal in their char-
acter certain traits which help explain their success. To be sure,
not all labor leaders had the same personality orientation, yet
enough of them shared certain anxieties and drives in common to
warrant a discussion of these traits in a study on leadership
development.
Among these characteristics was a strong desire for sooial
esteem. Union journals devoted extensive space to general articles
on labor leadership, many written by the officers themsolvea.
Somo were positive in tone, stressing their strength of character
and dignity. "The ideal labor leader," tho teamsters' magazine
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declared, "is an ideal man in every particular, whose ready
brain quickly grasps each new situation as it presents itself
and whose cool, level head instantly directs the proper course
of action.
. .
,"
33 Par more were negatively oriented, lamenting
the hardships of leadership and the lack of respect union
officers received from their own following and the larger com-
munity. "It is safe to say," both the Mine Workers' Journal and
the American Federationist bemoaned, "that the average labor
official is the best abused man on earth."34 Innumerable essays
complained of "the cowardly attacks made upon labor leaders by
the hirelings of the daily press.
. .
."
35 Others explicitly
objected to the fact that "Labor loaders are barred from all high
social functions. They are excluded from all fashionable clubs.
Even in the average university settlement they receive the
curious attention that i3 given to tame bears.
"
3^ The labor
leader* s "name is not found in the society columns of the news-
paper, he is not invited to afternoon tea at the home of the
capitalist, and reception committees do not give him a seat on
the platform unless the function is a political one and votes
are needed. All this would be of small moment, however," ration-
alized the Garment V/ork6r , "were it not that it retarded the
progress of his workj but, this being the case, social recognition
and support become important factors in the labor movement and to
37
secure and hold them is the work next in line for the organizers."
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Individually, union officers were equally concerned with
their status and image, as several trivial incidents revealed.
"Why dont you have some style about you," lectured the aspiring
Powderly to the Knights of Labor's secretary, "What do you use
tea paper for when you write me? it looks as if we were going
into bankruptcy.'-3 Agnes Nestor of the Glove Workers plowed
through the reports of the 1916 Industrial Relations Commission
before which she had earlier appeared and was "elated" to learn
"that, next to John Fitzpatrick, I had the greatest number of
pages of testimony," a fact she felt compelled to record in her
39autobiography. Executive board member William C. Webb of the
miners complained that a politician was "more toothsome to the
owners of hotels, halls and churches in 'West Virginia than a mere
labor organizer." During his journeys in the state he felt
slighted because "political spouters are given all the comforts
and accommodations that the localities in which they are sojourning
can afford, while men who are engaged in spreading the gospel of
truth as applied to labor, must gather their little congregations
around them in open air under the most adverse conditions.
. .
,"^°
John P. Prey of the Molders constantly whined about his failure to
gain respect. In a letter to one friend he envisioned a conspir-
acy by his union's president to undermine his increasing social
prominence, and in another letter to Gomper3 he expressed the
belief that it was debasing for him to be expected to give free
lectures on the labor movement when men from other walks of life
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were compensated for their talks. 41 Many other labor leaders
used up reams of paper, filled hundreds of columns in the union
press, and consumed hours of convention time to defend their
names, reputations, and characters from a variety of insignif-
icant charges and insults. 42
In his biography of William L. Hutcheson, Maxwell Kaddock
utilizes David Pdesman's archetype of the "outer-directed man"
as a key to his subject's character. 43 Within limits the concept
is applicable to other labor leaders prominent after the turn of
the century. Their concern over status and respectability
suggests the radar reaction of the other-directed personality.
Extensive membership in social clubs and fraternal organizations
reveals a strong desire "to belong." As a young man Samuel
Gompers joined a variety of groups, including the Arion Base Ball
Club, the Ancient Order of Foresters, the Independent Order of the
Odd Fellows, the Society of Human Progress, and Felix Adler's
Ethical Culture Society. 44 Edward Flore, whose ambition led him
to join the Hotel a,nd Restuarant Employees as a base for a
potential career in politics, at one time belonged to thirteen
45
social organizations. Meraorabolia from the Masons and Shriners
comprises over half of the volume of the collection of Joseph
46Slight, Secretary-Treasurer of the National Window Glass Workers.
Yet, while sharing characteristics of "the other-directed
man," labor leaders were not willing to simply blend into "the
lonely crowd." They wanted to bo in the limelight, as central
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stars in the drama of life rather than be hurried in crowd scenes.
As youths, Samuel Gorapers, Agnes Nestor, James Maurer, John L.
Lewis, and other labor leaders were captivated with the theater
and had dreams of becoming thespians. 47 This need to capture an
audience, to dramatize the pathos and dignity of existence, and
to receive the applause after the performance was over stayed with
these individuals in their roles as labor leaders. Surely,
twentieth century America knows no greater Shakespearean figure
than John L. Lewis.
Desiring to be in the limelight of public affairs, the
more prominent labor leaders worked hard to achieve their goal.
"/Tom hj Lewis is a man of ambition," observed the United Mine
Workers' Journal in 1908 of the union's new president. "Ambition
it was that took the boy of seven out of the breakers and made
him a coal miner at eleven 5 that kept him in night school when
other boys were playing; that gave him the meager savings of
$105, seven months in the National University at Lebanon, 0.,
and that when through the nights of three years, while ho was •.
still working in the bowels of the earth during the day, kept
him reading." 4^ William L. Hutcheson's biographer describes
him as a youth "proud of his •superiority 1 ." "It inflamed his
desire to convince, to influence, perhaps to command. His
instinct for leadership was profound and irresistible. He
loved politics, though he never quite regarded his interest in
that field as an end in itself. Nothing could quite satisfy him
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entirely but the feeling that he was leading men by serving their
cause in a common objective. His natural traits forced him to
want to be a chief.
. .
."^
Wanting to lead was the first prerequisite of a successful
labor leader; the second was. to convert ambition to action. This
entailed not only developing wide-spread rank-and-file support,
but also a foothold in the union's power structure. There devel-
oped within the labor movement an informal protege system in
which young aspirants to power attached themselves to an estab-
lished union figure who helped advance their career. Uriah S.
Stephen's backing of Terence Powderly to assume his post of
Grand Master Workman in I879 was an early manifestation of the
process, as v/as the support Adolph Strasser offered to the
ambitious Samuel Gompers. The protege system did not fully
come into its own, however, until the mid-1890' s when unions
assumed more institutional forms. William D. Ryan, head of the
Illinois miners, played the role of Mark Hanna for John Mitcholl
and maneuvered him into the first vice presidency of the national
body. From this post, Mitchell became the protege of President
Michael Ratchford who kindly paved the way for the young man to
51become his successor. Mitchell in turn beoame the mentor of
William B. V/ilson, who in his earlier career had received the
support of John L. Sexton, publisher of the Advisor , and his son
52Sam Sexton, who became editor of the United Mine Workers' Journal .
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His chief opponent, Tom L. Lewis, marshalled his strong family
connections. His father, Thomas J. Lewis, had been active in
miners* unions sinoe the days of John Siney. His older brother,
William T. Lev/is, had been a leading spirit in the Knights of
Labor as Master Workman of the miners' District Assembly 135,
Labor Commissioner of Ohio during the governorship of William
McXinley, and then one of "the right-hand lieutenants" of Senator
Mark Hanna. Another brother, Stephen L. Lewis, was the vice
president of the iron and steel workers' national organization,
while a third, Isaac Lewis, was at age twenty-nine the mayor of
the mining community of Martin's Perry, Ohio. 52 John L. Lewis,
who had no kinship with the previous Lewis dynasty, was groomed
for power by both Samuel Gorapers and UMW President John P. White. 52
Outside the miners' union, the protege system also prevailed,
although probably not as extensively. In the Western Federation
of Miners, William D. Haywood received the backing of President
Edward Boyce; Jere L. Sullivan of the Hotel and Restuarant
Employees helped elevate Edward Flore to the union'3 presidency;
Milton Snelling rode to power in the Operating Engineers on the
coat tails of Arthur M. Huddell; and Max Zuckerman of the Cap
54Makers fostered the career of young Max Zaritsky. The protege
system was potentially rewarding to both parties involved. The
young understudy received the post to which he aspired, v/hile
the benefactor attained the ego satisfaction of making men loaders,
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and v/as able to wield behind the scene influence on union policy,
even after he broke his formal ties with the organization.
Even more revealing of the drive of many labor leaders was
the manner in which several attained top union posts without
running for election. The classic example of such manuevering
v/as the rise of John L. Lev/is to the presidency of the lUne
Workers, related below with personal details by fellow mine
leader John Brophy:
Lewis started in the mines of Iowa, then moved to
Illinois* His highest post in Illinois was membership
on the legislative committee of District 12. He was
an officer of a local union and a mine committeeman,
but never held any higher elective post. Then, as
some of the Illinois boys put it, he •decided there
were ways of getting ahead in the labor movement be-
sides elections, 1 and used his legislative work to
court John H. Walker, president of District 12. He
got Walker to recommend him for a job on Gompers'
staff. Gompers had several men who did odd jobs for
him. legislative work, visiting conventions, reporting
on strikes, etc. With the entry of the United States
into the war, Lewis specialized in liaison between
Gompers and the United Mine Workers. John P. White,
president of the UMW, v/as putting in almost full time
as labor representative with the Fuel Administration.
White was tired of his union job and wanted to become
a full-time consultant in the Fuel Administration
without losing contact with the union. He discussed
the problem with his new friend, Lewis, who had some
helpful ideas as to how he could move over and still
hold his influence in the union. Frank Hayes, the
vice-president, was one of the Illinois group, an
ineffectual person who had won his eminence by a gift
of florid oratory. After a few years in office, he
was iiotable principally for his efforts to keep up with
the boys in drinking. He had previously been very
abstemious, and did not have the head for heavy drinking,
but once started was apparently unable to quite.
The plan Lewis and White worked out was that Lev/is
was to be appointed statistician in the national office
of the United Mine Workers and business manager of the
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UMW Journal. Both jobs were sinecures, if the holder
chose to treat them that way. The staff could do the
work, and Lewis could give almost full time to building
himself up with the membership. In July of 1917,
Lewis received his appointment and White started*
negotiating for his government job.
White was appointed in October and resigned the
presidency of the union. Hayes moved up to president,
with the power, under the constitution/ to appoint a
new vice-president. In accordance v/ith the terms of the
understanding with White, Hayes appointed Lewis vice-
president. The only hurdle to be topped was getting
approval of the appointment by the executive board.
There was considerable resentment against the choice of
this unknown man. Walker and Farrington of Illinois,
who knew Lewis better than anybody else on the board,
were strongest of all against him. They may have had
ambitions of their own for the post; I don't know about
that. Whatever their reasons, they never forgave Lewis.
Illinois, under their leadership and after they v/ere
gone, remained solidly anti-Lewis for a generation.
Philip Murray, president of District 5 and a former
board member, made a special trip to Indianapolis on
the eve of the board meeting to win over a number of his
friends. Prom what he told me later, I gather that he
felt the union needed somebody with Lev/is' s vigor and
drive to make up for the weakness of White and Hayes.
Murray was not privy to the deal that had been worked
out by Lewis; I think he really thought this was a
good appointment. His work was successful J he won
over a majority, the opposition collapsed, and the stage
was set for the next move.
In the absence of Prank Hayes, who was reported to be
'ill, ' Lewis presided over the 1919 convention of the
United Mine Workers. Prom what I have heard, Hayes's
illness would nowadays bo called alcoholism, and it
was not necessary for Lewis to get him drunk, as some
have charged. If White had had any ideas of being tho
power behind the throne, he was soon disabused. Lewi3
ran his own show, as acting president and as president,
which he soon became. Hayes was out of circulation
from September, 1913, until he resigned his position,
in February, 1920. Lewis then succeeded to the presi-
dency and appointed Philip Murray vice-president. 5
While dramatic, John L. Lewis's manouverings wore not
unique. As related earlier, John Mitchell utilized a modified
56
version of this technique to win the UMW presidency in IO99.
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In the Hotel and Restaurant Employees, it was established custom
for departing executive board members to pick their successors.
Thus in 1904, resigning Fred Seames designated Ed Flore to take
his place as an International Vice President. 57 At the same
time that John L. Lewis was manipulating his way up the Mine
Workers' hierarchy, his later enemy William L. Hutcheson was
following a roughly parallel, although less scheming, path
within the Carpenters. In 1913 he won election as second vice
president of the union in a contest he later admitted was rigged.
When the first vice president resigned later that year, Hutcheson
moved into the vacant post and from there into the presidency
when its occupant, James Kirby, died of food poisioning in I915. 58
In the Operating Engineers, Milton Snelling was the last presi-
dent to be elected to his first terra by convention or membership
vote. Every president since 1916 has either died in office or
resigned between conventions, and his successor has been appointed
by the general executive board.^
The ambitious drive of labor leaders did not subside with
the attainment of union office. Some including Daniel Tobin and
George Leonard Berry went on to build up influence within polit-
60ical parties. Others like Warren Stone used their unions as
a base for financial empires.^ For many, the union became a
vehicle for social mobility into careers in business and
62politics. The correspondence of John Mitchell, for instance,
reveals a man with ambitions outside the labor movement. On the
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one hand, he entered into a variety of speculative business
ventures, always hoping to "clean up a handsome little stake each
year." On the other hand, he teamed up with Daniel Keefe of the
Longshoremen, and William B. Wilson and V/.D. Byan of his own
organization in search of government patronage positions for
themselves and their friends. At the local level they received
cooperation from minor politicians solicitious of the coal
miners' votes. 64 On the national level, Mitchell had the good
fortune of being friendly with Senator Mark Hanna, whom he
casually called the Captain. "While in Washington I called upon
the Captain," he wrote to Keefe, "—in fact he sent me an in-
vitation—and had a heart to heart talk with him concerning
some of the good things. He told me that he had the District
Superintendency of a free postal delivery in view for youj that
he had told the Postmaster General that you must have it." ^
On another occasion Mitchell wrote Keefe: "If we cannot land
the place we want, put in a bid for the Chief of the Bureau [of
Immigration/, at New York City, which pays almost as much, and
there is considerable patronage to be disposed of. One thing
sure, we must have a good berth." 66 "Of course," he cautioned,
"I think it good policy to preserve our dignity, and not appear
to be tumbling over ourselves in getting the good things." ^
Through this correspondence over patronage, it becomes strikingly
clear that the opposition of "business unionists" of the Mitchell-
Keefo stripe to Terence Powderly and other traditional labor
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leaders was based on something other than conflicting ideolog-
ical views. "I think, John," Keefe wrote to the miners' leader,
"that if you would write Ryan and have Ryan see some others and
write Senator Hanna opposing the re-appointment of Powderly /Ka
Commissioner-General of Immigration/ without mentioning my name,
that it would be a long step in the right direction 1'—Keefe »s
own appointment to the post. 68 "As a matter of fact, Billy,"
Mitchell explained to the future Secretary of Labor in 1903,
"both Powderly and ^Robert/ Watchorn are members of that faction
that has sought to keep our best friends out of /appointed
government/ office." 6^
Ill
By the end of World V/ar I, offices in established unions
were well worth striving for. Despite the troubles v/hich still
accompained the posts, the rewards of the job wore highly attrac-
tive to men of humble birth. In material terms, the labor
leaders lived in the style of the middle class. With incomes
considerably above the earnings of the average worker, they often
owned their own homos, sent their children to college, and
belonged to prominent social groups. Gone wore the shabby,
poorly fitting suits of men from the working class. Earlier
labor leaders like P.J. McGuire had been noted for their unkempt
looks, with long drooping mustaches and garments wrinkled by
night-long travel on bouncing freights. The men who replaced
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them, like Harry Lloyd of the Boston carpenters, "dressed well
in dark clothes, wore a heavy gold chain and charm and might
have been mistaken for a young lawyer."70 The rising prestige
of the AFL was reflected in Gompers 1 more natty wardrobe,
accented by a diamond pin in the cravat. 71 And radicals like
Henry D. Lloyd and Clarance Darrow delighted in dating John
Mitchell's "corruption" by men of business from the day in 1902,
v/hen on a trip to New York to attend the National Civic Federa-
tion he traded "the black soft felt hat by which he is univer-
sally known" for the silk derby of fashionable society. 72
The biographies and autobiographies of union pioneers
men like William Sylvis, John Siney, Samuel Gompors, Terence
Powderly, Joseph Buchanan, Abraham Bisno, and William B. Wilson-
relate the economic sacrifices these men made to become active
in the labor movement. After World War I, new recruits to the
labor movement were largely spared such suffering. David J.
McDonald, the future president of the United Steelworkers, was a
typist for the Wheeling Steel Company earning $80 a month when,
in 1923, he landed his first union job as personal secretary to
Philip Murray of the UMW. His starting salary was $200 a month,
which, he relates in his autobiography, "sounded to me about one
73
cut below what Andy Carnegie must be making." On hi3 first
three days on the job, he was whisked to Hew York City, during
which time he enjoyed such previously unknown comforts a3 hi3
own berth in a Pullman car, a room to himself in the Hotel
Pennsylvania, and his "first meal in a big city hotel dinning
room." More than the new comforts he enjoyed, young McDonald
was impressed by the expanded horizons opened to him—of meeting
men he never dreamed of meeting and touring places no common
laborer could hope to reach. The workers' "existence is all
routine and headaches, and it's apt to contribute very little to
personal growth," observed David Dubinsky several years later.
"In my job I meet all sorts of people—government officials,
labor leaders from every corner of the world, politicians,
business men, journalists. That is what opportunity is all
about-—being able to touch the world at many points.
To domestic radicals as well as many Europeans, the most
distinctive feature of American labor leaders after the turn of
the century was the extent to which they had adopted the life-
style of the bourgeoisie. In speech after speech, Socialist
Eugene Debs attacked established labor leaders for succumbing to
"the blandishment of the plutocrats," while Communist William Z.
Foster penned Misleaders of Labor to expose trade union officials
as "agents of the bourgeoisie in the ranks of the workers," and
"often petty capitalists themselves." In Robert Michel a*
s
classic study, Political Parties, written in 1915 > the radical
European sociologist's only extensive reference to the American
scene concerns the erabourgeoisiement of the labor leaders.
Since "the United States of America is the land of the almighty
dollar" in which "public life seems to be dominated ... by the
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thirst for gold," he writes: "We cannot wonder, then, that North
America should be preeminently the country in which the aristo-
cratic tendencies of the labor leader, fostered by an environment
often permeated ... by gross and unrefined materialism, should
have developed freely and upon a gigantic scale. The leaders of
the American proletariat have merely followed the lead of the
capitalism by which the life of their country is dominated.'"77
Michels' equation of embourgeoisiement with cultural
conditioning provides a far more sophisticated explanation than
the "cloroform-conspiracy" implications of Debs, Foster, and
other American radicals. Labor leaders strove for place and
power in order to fulfill the nebulous American Dream; to attain
success in a society dominated by middle-class values. Despite
the presence of various radical groups which hoped to fundamen-
tally alter the nature of our society, the dominant impulse of
the labor movement has been simply to gain for the workers a
larger piece of the American pie—Samuel Gompers* famous demand
for "more, more, more." Terence Powderly confronted time and
again the petty-bourgeois anxieties of his followers, who at
rallies and conventions were eager to proclaim that "Property i3
Pobbery," "and yet," ho observed, "they are all striving to
acquire property, how inconsistant , but I did not intend to
7ft
moralize." IWW organizers were likewise unable to transform
into a revolutionary force individuals from the gutters of
society, who "thought only of rising to the sidewalk, and once
there entering the house. "79
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Desirous of climbing the social ladder themselves, the
rank and file generally looked favorably upon the advancement of
their leaders to posts in government and industry from which they
could achieve "recognition, fame, and fortune." 80 The rise of the
labor leader out of the movement, explained one sympathetic
miner, "is to be expected; the natural dread of poverty and
deprivation is always, under present conditions, a factor to
wheedle away from their allegience men to whom that poverty is
magnified by the glare of prospective ease and comfort.
. .
James I<ynch, one printer commented in 1914, "used the prestige
gained as president of the International Typographical Union to
get a better job, and got one, which was all right. And he
resigned, to accept a more lucrative job, which was all right." 82
Such views differed greatly from the early years of unionism
when a rule had prevailed that "When the daily press and the
employing class begin to praise a labor 'leader 1
,
it is time for
worlcingmen to keep an eye upon him." * By the turn of the
century, the glare of suspicion was becoming a gaze of admira-
tion. In a 1905 article on Robert V/atchorn—one-time Secretary-
Treasurer of the UMW who left the union to become Chief Factory
Inspector of Pennsylvania, then worked his way up the hierarchy
of the Bureau of Immigration to the po3t of Commissioner for
the Port of New York, and later became a vice prosidont of the
Union Oil Company—the United Mine Workers' Journal jubilantly
declared:
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wm h v, J ? seneral °utlinG of a successful careerhic should be an object lesson to every man who readsit. It indicates that by honesty, devotion to his
ambition, hard work and determination what a man may
accomplish. Contrast the rise in station, earning
capacity and power from the little boy in the English,
coal mine to the present position that Mr. V/atchomholds. There are similar opportunities for every manin the union to advance himself, and Mr. V/atcho^n's
career will doubtless serve as the inspiration fos
many young men to try to equal his great success. 4
Only the radical minority sincerely questioned the propriety of
such mobility, although occasionally conservative union politicos
would treat such advancement by a member of the opposition as a
sign of their insincerity in order to undermine their prestige.
An astute young worker studying the careers of men like
Watchorn, soon came to recognize the valuable role union offices
played in the drive for upward mobility. "Great prestige," C.
Wright Mils observed, "increasingly follows the major institu-
tional units of the social structure."^ "To be celebrated, to
b8 wealthy, to have power, requires access to major institutions,
for the institutional positions men occupy determine in largo
O/-
part their chance to have and to hold these valued experiences."
By the second decade of the twentieth century, the APL and
several of its affiliates had become recognized by the power
elite as established forces in American society. Office-holding
in the Federation, Mine Workers, Carpenters, Teamsters, Typo-
graphical Union, or the various railroad brotherhoods brought
with it social prominence whero earlior occupants had been
lambasted as scalawags, demagogues, blatherskites, and loafers.
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In the 1880
-s lahor leaders of the stature of Powderly and John
Jarrett of the Amalgamated Iron and Steel Workers lobbied hard
to win for themselves the post of chief of the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, only to lose out to a Massachusetts gentleman,
Carroll D, Wright. 8? Yet by 1904, the post was deemed unworthy
of John Mitchell. "You are better off, more important and in-
fluential," James Duncan wrote, "as President of the United Mine
Workers than you would be as successor to CD. Wright j the Vice
OO
Presidency is another proposition/' 00 And Mitchell concurred:
"I recognize the fact that as President of the United Mine
Workers I have more prominence, influence and prestige than I
could have by holding any position with the Government unless it
were one in the Cabinet or the Vice-Presidency."^ Apparently
William B. Wilson held a similar estimate of the miners' top
post, for having already won a seat in Congress he chose to run
for the union's presidency upon the retirement of Mitchell in
1908. Albert E. Hav/ley gave up a job as inspector for the
Interstate Commerce Commission in 1909 to become Secretary-
Treasurer of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemon;
Emanuel G. Hall relinquished hi3 post as Assistant Commissioner
of Labor for Minnesota to become head of the state's Federation
of Labor in 1911 J and in 1924 James Lynch returned to the presi-
dency of the Typographical Union after holding several important
91posts in government and business.
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Changing attitudes by the nation's keepers of culture
reflected the increasing prominence of labor and its leaders.
In the 1890 «s both John R. Commons and Richard Ely faced hostil-
ity from university circles for their championship of the workers'
cause.
2
As late as 1915 the University of Pennsylvania forbad
Samuel Gompers from speaking on campus. Disgruntled by the
decision, more than a thousand undergraduates defied the univer-
sity authorities and passed a resolution of censure directed at
the institution's high-handed methods.93 Yet signs of change
appeared after the turn of the century as a number of schools,
most notably the University of Wisconsin, established programs
in labor studies. By 1919 the University of Cincinnati went so
far as to attempt to hire a real labor leader, John Prey, for a
chair in the department of industrial relations.94
The religious establishment also demonstrated a more
favorable attitude toward unions. Beginning with James Cardinal
Gibbons' support of the Knights of Labor, the Catholic Church
strove to influence the conservative labor movement, an effort
which resulted in the founding in 1910 of the Militia of Christ
under the direction of Pather Peter Deitz. The accommodation
of the protestant churches with organised labor was less exten-
sive, yet through the efforts of the Social Gospelers and men like
Charles Stelzle, a rapport was established: by 1910 practically
every denomination designated one service a year as Labor Sunday;
labor leaders served on the governing board of the Federal
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Council of Churches j and various faiths sent fraternal delegates
to labor union conventions. 96 For their part, the business
unionists were generally delighted at their increased respect-
ability within the churches, and participated more extensively
in church activities than their earlier counterparts. 97 In the
America of 1920, to become a respectable leader of society, it
was helpful to be a pillar of the church.
Nothing else quite symbolized the growing status of con-
servative unions and their leaders as the dedication of the new
APL Building in Washington, D.C. on July 4, 1916. Like many of
the labor leaders in attendance, Sara A. Conboy, Secretary-
Treasurer of the Textile Workers, was overwhelmed with the respect
paid to labor by dignitaries of government. "As I looked over
the number of people on the reviewing stand," she gloated, "and
saw the President of this United States and Mrs. Wilson, Secretary
Lansing and Mrs. Lansing, Vice President Marshall with Mrs.
Marshall, Secretary Wilson and so many other notables, I could
scarcely help exclaiming that Labor has indeed come into its
own."
98
IV
By 1920 the nature of modern labor union leadership was
clearly discernable. A number of the Leaders whom C. Wright
Mills would label "The New Men of Power" had already gained
office and were behaving in the manner which Mills v/ould
belatedly describe. Within the more established unions, the
national executives were the focal point of power, giving the
labor movement its oligarchical character which has been both a
source of strength and a cause of injustice. In the larger
society, the conservative labor leaders had attained a place on
the fringe of the power elite to which they have largely been
confined. During World War I they served on a variety of com-
missions to direct the war effort, aided the government in under-
mining anti-war sentiment through the Alliance for labor and
Democracy, and, as historian Ronald Radosh has shown, began their
activities as instruments of American foreign policy.^ In the
election of 1924, both parties considered choosing labor leaders
for their vice presidential candidates. John L. Lewis was pushed
for the Republican nomination by the Harriraan interests, while
George L. Berry of the Pressmen lost the Democratic nomination
by only three votes. 100 The fact that they lost symbolizes the
less than total acceptance they enjoyed.
The consequences for the labor movement of the rise of
strong, national executives were both favorable and detrimental.
The emergence of professional leadership was a major step in
transforming unions into stable, permanent forces in the economy.
From their secure base in their own organizations, men like John
L. Lev/is, Sidney Hillman, and David Dubinsky were able to
weather the "Loan Years" of labor and launch their spectacular
drive to organize the unorganized in tho 1930 f s. Yet the sarao
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base which allowed boldness on the part of the CIO founders,
encouraged conservatism and lethargy on the part of many of their
fellow officers. Whatever visionary plans they had when entering
the labor movement dissipated under the immediate pressures of
the job. The unions which were originally to serve as vehicles
to a better world, became for these men an end in themselves,
to be guarded from adversity regardless of cost. Maintaining
that "In the American labor movement order is the first and
greatest of laws," they discouraged rank-and-file spontaneity
v/hich led to a number of undemocratic practices and the emergence
of the increasingly familiar unionist alienated from his organ-
ization. 101 The cautiousness of the labor leaders in the polit-
ical and economic fields led to their qualified acceptance by
respectable society. And with the embourgeoisieraent of its
leaders, whatever radical potential had existed in the labor
movement was defused.
In a broader sense, the emergence of the modern labor
leader contributed to the bureaucratization of American life and
the resulting empire-like nature of contemporary society. "The
United States of the mid-twentieth century," radical historian
Christopher Lasch concludes:
might better be described as an empire than a community.
The state deals with domestic minorities through their
official representatives, in much the same way that it
deals with client 3tates abroad. These native chieftains,
enjoy various pleasures and privileges j they themselves,
as a result, are sufficiently integrated into the imperial
order to perceive their function to bo not so much to
present the view of their constituents as to mediatebetween them and the state-by no means the same thing.Their interests lie in resolving and preventing con-ilicts rather than in carrying them to a successful
conclusion. Their constituents, in turn, sustain theseleaders m office not because their leadership isparticularly effective in satisfying the material needs
ot the people they are supposed to represent (althoughin some cases undeniable improvements have taken place)but because identification with these spokesmen, whohave risen from the ranks of a minority to prominence
and prestige, provides vicarious and symbolic satis-
factions; and because, in any case, the hierarchical
and undemocratic structure of the organizations in
question effectively prevent changes in leadership. 102
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I say in correction of your sketch, that instead of being of
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APPENDIX
I. ETHINC BACKGROUND OP IABOR L&YDERS
Ethnic Back/y_ound
Native American
Irish Catholic
English
Scotch
Scotch-Irish
Canadian
German
Welsh
French
East European Jew
Hungarian
Scandinavian
Italian.
Dutch
African
Unknown
TOTAL
Traditional
Labor Loader Buginegg Unionist
8 4
19 33
15 19
9 10
6 5
6 6
5 7
5 5
3 0
1 17
1 0
0 6
0 5
0 1
0 2
72 80
150 200
II. ORIGINS OP LIBOR LEADERS
Origin
Traditional
Labor Loader Business Unionist
American Born-
Foreign Born
Unknown.
TOTAL
55
52
43
150
98
72
30
200
330
331
III. NATIVE BORN LABOR LEADERS:
PLACE OF BIRTH
Traditional
Region Labor Leader Business Unionist
New England
Middle Atlantic
East-North-Central
West-North-Central
South Atlantic
East-South-Central
West-South-Central
Mountain
Pacific
IV. NATIVE BORN LIBOR LEADERS i POPULATION
OP PLACE OP BIRTH
Population
Traditional
Labor Leader Eusiness Unionist
Under 2,500
Over 2,500
Over 10,000
Over 100,000
Over 1,000,000
21$
79$
35$
23$
0
33$
66$
41$
22$
7$
V. PLACE OP RESIDENCE OP LABOR LEADERS
Traditional
Region
_
Labor Leader Business Unionist
New England 11$ 1°$
Middle Atlantic 41$ 30$
East-North-Central 30$ 32$
West-North-Central 8$ l°Sj
South Atlantic 4$ 5$
East-South-Central 2$ 2$
West-South-Central 1$ 2$
Mountain 1$ 2$
Pacific 2$ 4$
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VI. POPULATION OP PLACE OP RESIDENCE
Population
Under 2,500
Over 2,500
Over 10,000
Over 100,000
Over 1,000,000
Traditional
Labor Leader
9%
91%
84/0
54/o
Business Unionist
6%
Q6%
60%
31%
VII. RELIGION OP LABOR LEADERS
Chuch
Catholic
Protestant
Jewish
Atheist
Unknown
TOTAL
Traditional
Labor Leader
24
22
2
1
101
150
Business Unionist
59
23
18
0
100
200
VIII. FATHERS' OCCUPATION
Occupation
Traditional
Labor Leader Business Unionist
Professional
Owned Business
Parmer
Y/age Earner
9%
9%
21%
b*>%
2Qf%
64$
IX. EDUCATION OP LABOR LEADERS
Level
Traditional
Labor Leader Business Unionist
Beyond Six Years
Some College
Other (Correspondence,
Business College, etc,)
20%
4%
2%
2%
6%
y%
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X. LABOR LEADERS AND POLITICS
Democrats
Republicans
Third Party Supporters
Activists
Appointees
Traditional
Labor Leader
12$
_Business Unionist
46>£
35*
Estimate
#Prior to World
IVar I
XI. MEDIAN AGS AND UNION OFFICE
Traditional
Office Labor Leader Business Unionist
First National Office Age 35 Age 33
Highest National Office Age 36 Age 37
XII. TENURE IN UNION OFFICE
Traditional
Q__^£g Labor Leader Business Unionist
Highest National Office 1.5 Years 12 Years
Total Tenure 2 Years 15 Years
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